
Class <£ ¥7?* 

Book <-> 






OF 



General Fitz John Porter. 



MR. CHOATE'S 




i 



West Point, 



iSlwl 




Major Gen'l Winfield S, Hancock. 



1 



CLOSING ARGUMENT FOR THE PETITIONER, 
Fitz John Porter, 

BY 

Joseph H. C ho ate, of Counsel, 

before the 

Advisory Board of Officers at West Point, 

January ntk, 1879. 



Argument of Mr. Choate, Counsel for the 
Petitioner. 

Mr, Choate said : If the Board please I will, as 
briefly as I can, conclude the argument on the part 
of the petitioner, and reply, so far as it may seem 
necessary, to what has been presented on the part 
of the Government. I say as briefly as I may, for 
I have been reminded of the advice that was given 
by Doctor Breckenridge to a class to whom he was 
lecturing, on the subject of the efficacy of prayer, 
as compared with its length , when he said : " Young 
gentlemen, I beg you to remember that the Lord 
knows something." 

I am going to argue this case upon the assump- 
tion that this Board knows something of the evi- 
dence which has been taken, and which they have 
been engaged in receiving and examining for a peri- 
od of six months, and especially something of the 
laws of war and of the rules of military conduct. 
We, who represent General Porter, pretend to know 
very little of the latter subject, and confide entirely 



2 

in the ample knowledge of the whole subject which 
this Board possesses. 

At the outset, I wish to express our obligations 
to the learned Recorder, for the ingenious and in- 
structive argument which, for the last two days, 
he has been laying before the Board. It is exactly 
that which we could have wished should be done, 
namely : that the strongest argument that could 
possibly be made upon all the facts should be pre- 
sented to the Board on behalf of the Government, 
before you proceed to decide upon the evidence. 
In my judgment, the best argument which could 
be made on behalf of the Government, from the 
facts presented, has now been made. 

More than that, we owe a considerable obligation 
to the Recorder for the diligence which he has 
manifested in searching for and procuring evidence 
supposed to be adverse to the cause of General 
Porter. A large part of it consists, in my view, of 
matter very strongly favorable to the cause of the 
petitioner, and matter which we never could have 
found by any search or power on our part. He has 
gone further than the mere gathering of facts. 
Every rumor, every suspicion, yes, I may say, 
every piece of scandal detrimental to the interest 
or conduct of General Porter, in relation to the 
events of the 27th and 29th of August, 1862, has 
now been presented before you. And if, as I hope, 
notwithstanding all this, your judgment shall ar- 
rive at a conclusion favorable to his cause, it must 
always be said that the search has been fully 
exhausted, and that everything that could possi- 
bly be brought into the balance against him has 
been thrown in. 

As it seems to me, much of the closing argument 
of the Recorder has relieved us of a great deal of 
responsibility and anxiety and labor, because, 
upon the main question of this case, as I have al- 
ways regarded it, namely : the conduct of General 



Porter on the afternoon of the 29th of August, 
he has now seen lit to present, for the first 
time, an entirely new view, something" alto- 
gether different from all that has heretofore 
been claimed, and not only different, but abso- 
lutely antagonistic to it. If we may accept 
him as the authorized mouth-piece of the Govern- 
ment, or of the prosecution, or of the adverse side 
which we are to resist or that is to resist us, so that 
we may take the propositions that he now presents, 
as final against us, we may dismiss from our minds 
all the claims that have heretofore been made in 
relation to the decisive events of that important 
day. For when we come to discuss that part of the 
case, I think we shall be able to demonstrate to the 
Board, that the claim of fault on the part of Gener- 
al Porter as now presented, is not what General 
McDowell claimed, either on the former trial or 
upon this examination. It is not what General 
Pope claimed, either then or in any of the numer- 
ous and varied presentations of the case, that he 
has since made. It not only is not the same, but is 
absol utely hostile and repugnant to all those. And, 
if what he now insists uppn does not bear the test 
of examination, that branch of the case will be en- 
tirely ended. 

We are entirely satisfied with the view that the 
Recorder has presented ; but in what light it places 
those two great generals, who have, up to this time, 
stood in the attitude of accuser and of champion of 
the accuser, it is not for me to say. It does seem 
to me, however, that it has been a little ungrateful 
on the part of the learned Recorder, for he had a 
full view of the results of what he was presenting and 
of its necessary effects ; ungrateful, for instance, to 
Gen' I McDowell, who, according to his statements 
made upon oath in this investigation, has aided 
the Recorder in this case, and composed for his con- 
sideration and use in the preparation of it, some- 



where from nx -en and printed pa- 

The General intimated z' - .-'and 

that he thought he was on triaL I did not then 
understand the true purport of the remark. But 
now it appears that he was on trial in the mind of 
the representative of the government, and th: 

- —.-..- 11 - 1 •■■-.- -._ 71- 

:"_: i --ii- --: ill ii :i> -- -ii : ii- 1 .in 
out of Court with the utmost ignominy, as I think 
.^U demonstrate to you. And leral 

- osed that the* represen- 
tative of the government, now presenting i ~i > 
for final consideration, would hare found in some 
of the many, the almost countless publican-: - 
General Pope on this subject, hostile to General 
Porter, an inkling of the claim that he has now 
made. But he. too. is treated with contempt and 
scorn by this prosecution, as I shall show 
i: — ii -i-7 iirx:-::-i I177 — ii:i 1 ?iii ~ -:- 
form with alacrity, to defend these generals : and 
I shall be glad that while defending General 1 

. - - 
— : -- - -'„- ; -""-11 " '" ii--' — "iir - 

tion. which is made against him by the learned Re- 
. en Wherever grievan sea ay have against 

that gentleman, however much we may have reason 
: ; * 1. : lis .11 . 1- 11 -"..- : :- 1 . - >■ _-- 

of this case. I do not think anyone on our part 
has ever dared to suggest, or would be willing 
to intimate that he was guilty of the stupidiry and 
ignorance which, is inevitably fixed upon him. if 
:•'.--. _--.--- - 1 - 

l-i.i-l?.- :i -: ' . - — :i - 1 1 - 17 ~: - - - - 
day for the first time in the whole history of this 

: .. - : 1 - > i- :- Is ." : 

ascertain the truth ! Does he believe now. as his 
.-.-..---« 7 1 '--- 11 : . 11 ".-- . - --- 

. - -- -: :- 

the court-martial, and upon which General Porter 

:.-! 1 " . .. Tl-r^r =-rrl:~s :1_ . . _-- : =.::■ 



teen years ago were invalid % Does he desire to bring 
General McDowell into disrepute \ Does lie wish 
to convert this controversy into a third Ball Run 
for that distinguished general, as if two would not 
suffice ? I shall, in its proper place, ask the careful 
attention of this Board to the view which he has set 
forth, because, as it impresses my mind, it stamps 
this whole prosecution with contempt, and de- 
mands for it the scorn of every intelligent and 
honest man. 

Again, the learned Recorder said — an unneces- 
sary straw thrown into the scale against General 
Porter — that he had personally changed his mind 
as to the petitioner's guilt or innocence ; that, having 
come to this investigation with views favorable to 
General Porter, he, upon an examination of the 
case, had been compelled to change his mind. 
Well, we shall have to bear that. 1 do not think 
that it was necessary, in his official capacity, that he 
should seek to put that additional burden upon Gen- 
eral Porter's back. Nor did it seem to me that the 
reasons that he gave for the change of his views 
were reasonable, or worthy of any consideration. 
You will recollect that he enumerated the causes 
for his change of mind. But as he has done this, it 
may not be improper for me to acknowledge also, 
a change of mind in regard to the case. For I 
must confess, almost with shame, that for more 
than fifteen years I was one of those heedless and 
unthinking millions who took it for granted that 
General Porter was guilty. Not guilty, if you 
please, of the atrocious crimes of which he was 
convicted, because I never knew the exact nature 
of these charges : but guilty of something heinous 
and derogatory to his character as a soldier. I had 
taken it for granted, as I believe the millions of the 
inhabitants of this country had, that a court-mar- 
tial consisting of nine eminent generals sitting in 
judgment upon their peer, could not have found 



6 

him guilty and put upon him the brand of infamy, 
which is conveyed by their sentence, unless he had 
really committed some fearful crime. When he 
came to ask me to act for him in a professional ca- 
pacity, I was obliged to tell him so ; and he said, 
with a manliness, which I shall never forget, that 
he would not ask me to act for him unless upon an 
examination of the record, and upon the facts that 
he had to present, I was satisfied of his innocence, 
and further even than that, for he added, that if 
after taking his case, I should find, as it proceeded, 
and was developed, any reason to believe him 
guilty, I should be at liberty to abandon it. Well, 
I examined the record. I found that the case had not 
been half tried; that the trial had taken place in the 
midst of the frightful excitement of war, when party 
and sectional passions were at their utmost height, 
when the disasters in which the war had involved 
the country had saturated the minds of the people 
— and of almost all the soldiers of the country with 
alarm and indignation. I found that there were 
circumstances most unfavorable to justice in the 
surroundings and in the composition of the Court 
which tried him. I found that one half of the 
main witnesses cognizant of the facts, had not been 
accessible to him or to the Court at the time of the 
trial. I found that the most able and learned 
jurists of the country, in examining the case, had 
pronounced that even upon the record as it stood, 
there was no evidence fairly, upon the acknowledg- 
ed principles of justice, to sustain the conviction. A 
personal study of the record satisfied me of his 
innocence, and when I came to examine his new 
evidence, not only did it demonstrate that lie was 
not guilty, but that for the very acts and omissions 
to act with which he was charged, he was entitled 
to the very highest merit and commendation. So, 
it seemed to me, to be not only a high profes- 
sional service, but an urgent public duty to enter 
into his defence, and to stand by him as long as he 



needed support. I say a public duty, as well as a 
professional service, because, in my view, this is 
not General Porter's case alone; it is the case of 
the whole army ; it is the case of every honest 
soldier who marches under our flag ! Yes, it is 
the case of all the people of this country, for 
blighting as was the stigma which was placed upon 
him, it rests upon the army and the country, too. I 
think I shall show you that there never has been 
a soldier exposed to such shame and humilia- 
tion, and there never has been an army suffering 
from such a brand as this ; and if it is undeserved 
by him and by the army, why, as the President 
has said, it is time that it was reviewed and re- 
moved. 

The learned Eecorder has further said that he 
did not regard the fact that General Porter had 
been for sixteen years besieging the Executive De- 
partment at Washington for relief as a circumstance 
entitled to any consideration. But I do. I think 
that is the first, great, convincing argument of in- 
nocence which presents itself upon the threshold 
of this case before you look into the evidence. 
Why, what could have borne him up during all 
these sixteen years? Could guilt have done it? 
Suppose him to have been guilty of the crimes with 
which he was charged, should we ever have heard 
of the case any more, should we ever have heard 
of General Porter any more, except as bearing his 
shame to his grave, as best he might 'i No ; a 
guilty man would never ask for a re-examination 
of the charges, knowing only too well, that if one 
half of the proof demonstrated his guilt, all the 
knowledge that could be brought from all the 
world to bear upon the subject would only prove it 
blacker and deeper. Yet, I suppose, that General 
Porter from the 21st of January, 1863, until this 
moment, has never had a single waking hour 
that has not been inspired with the prayer that he 



8 

might not die until he should be able to demon- 
strate to his countrymen his innocence — should 
be able to clear his name from this infamous 
brand that has been put upon it, and hand it 
down to his children, as pure and bright as he 
received it from ancestors of honor and renown. 
This conscience which has been implanted with- 
in us is a great and powerful engine for sup- 
port or for destruction. It may make — Shakes- 
peare says it does make — "cowards of us all." 
It may make the great and gallant general who has 
sought and found a bubble reputation at the can- 
non's mouth, quail at the idea of coming before 
three of his brother soldiers simply to tell the 
truth. But when it takes the shape of what Virgil 
calls the " mens sibi conscia recti ," the heart con- 
scious of its own innocence, it can carry a man, as it 
has carried General Porter, through perils such as 
have never yet been found upon the battle-field, and 
through, years of suffering and humiliation, to 
which death itself, at any time, would have been a 
merciful release. So, I submit to you that the fact 
that General Porter has been asserting his inno- 
cence, in the face of all the world, from the moment 
of his conviction until now, is, at least, entitled to 
be taken into consideration, in passing upon the 
question of the guilty or innocent intent within 
the breast of the man. which, after all, constitutes 
the very gist of this inquiry. 

Well, he has maintained this contest, and upon 
what ground has he asserted it? 

The learned Recorder is pleased to say, upon the 
ground of newly discovered evidence. 

Why, not so entirely, if the Board please. It is 
on the ground that he was always innocent, that 
upon no facts that could ever be truly stated, 
ought he to have been convicted. And then, up- 
on the further fact, that what he asserted upon his 
original trial, and what the Court refused to be- 
lieve, he could now demonstrate so clearly that 



9 

any man who runs might read and understand, and 
must believe it. 

Well, the learned Recorder says, why didn' t he 
ask President Lincoln to open his case, if he had 
such confidence in it himself? and several ques- 
tions of that sort have been asked by the learned 
Recorder, which imply a forgetfulness of facts, facts 
proved in the case on his own part. There has not 
been a President at the White House from the day 
of his sentence, to this before whom he has not 
laid his case ; and as to President Lincoln, we ex- 
pressly proved an application on the part of Gov- 
ernor Newell, representing the petitioner ; and we 
have always believed that if President Lincoln had 
not been taken away by the bullet of the assassin, 
we should have had justice at his hands. But — 
and I beg the attention of the Court to this fact — 
urgently as he has presented his appeal, just as 
urgently has it been resisted from other quarters. 
It is not for us to inquire or to know who has had 
an interest to prevent the question of General Por- 
ter's guilt or innocence being inquired into, but 
somebody has done it. And I rather think that 
the opposition has come from more sources than 
one. One of them is apparent upon this record : 
General Pope, his original accuser, has always, ex- 
cept upon one occasion, the sincerity of which I do 
most truly doubt, been resisting the effort and in- 
quiry, and has, down to this moment, been stand- 
ing in the way of justice. I conceive that nothing 
but a consciousness of absolute innocence could 
have carried General Porter through to his present 
position in this case against such obstacles. 



Powers and Duties of the Board. 

Now, we have the first result of all these strenuous 
efforts upon his part, the order for the constitution 



10 

of this Board. The learned Recorder, from motives 
that I cannot understand, and from a view of the 
case which he has not disclosed, has studio u sly- 
undertaken to belittle the functions of this Board. 
Ah, he says, it is to be regretted that this Board 
has no judicial functions. Judicial functions ! A 
dignified Board of eminent soldiers, ordered by the 
President of the United States, and commanded to 
ascertain the truth of this controversy — for it is a 
controversy with sides, as it appears— and he, a 
member of the Board, what object could tempt him 
to impute to it insignificance and a lack of judicial 
functions % I had always thought that the highest 
function of judicial bodies, the highest and the 
grandest, was the ascertainment of truth; and when 
it takes the shape of the ascertainment of the truth 
of a point of history, which involves the good name, 
not only of a gallant soldier, but of a great army, 
and a great nation, human justice can attain to 
nothing higher. And so it did seem to me that 
this reflection upon the Board of which he is a con- 
stituent member, was wholly uncalled for. 

Again he regrets that this Board has no 
power to summon witnesses, or, as he terms it, 
compel the attendance of witnesses. Well, who 
has been hurt by that % Who has not come that 
was wanted by us or by the Board \ One man and 
one only. There is one big fish who has escaped 
from the meshes of this judicial net, the great gen- 
eral who stands behind this prosecution, holding 
up its arms. But is it for the learned Recorder, es- 
pecially in view of the tender and confidential rela- 
tions which seem to have existed between himself 
and General Pope, to regret that this Board has not 
had the power to drag him across the Continent, 
and to place him a reluctant witness upon the 
stand, and have the truth drawn out of him, as by 
the forceps of the dentist % Yet these are his re- 
flections ; these are his regrets, and I have no doubt 



11 

that, as I think I shall show you, it is General 
Pope's regret, which the Recorder has uttered, that 
the suggestion originated from him, that this Board 
has not the power to compel the attendance of wit- 
nesses. And considering the defiant attitude in 
which that gentleman stands to this case, and to 
this Board, I think that the suggestion is cool, 
even for West Point, in the month of January. 

I submit that this Board has the most am- 
ple powers for the discharge of the duty imposed 
upon it. For the one thing that we have missed, 
the personal presence of General Pope, I do think 
we shall be able to get along without. I do think 
we shall be able first to ascertain what General 
Pope's views are, and second, to put them to a 
competent analysis by comparison with the facts 
as they have been proved here, just as well with- 
out his presence as with it. 



Authority for the Board. 

Now, if the Board please, I wish to read the ap- 
plication of General Porter, and the order organ- 
izing this Board to show what its functions are. 

"To his Excellency, Rutherford B. Hates, 

"President of the United States : 

" Sir : I most respectively, but most urgent- 
"ly, renew my oft repeated appeal to have you 
" review my case. I ask it as a matter of long- 
" delayed justice to myself. I renew it upon 
"the ground heretofore stated, that public 
"justice cannot be satisfied so long as my ap- 
" peal remains unheard. My sentence is acon- 
"tinuing sentence, and made to follow my 
" daily life. For this reason, if for no other, 
"my case is ever within the reach of execu- 
tive as well as legislative interference. 



12 

"I beg to 1 present copies of papers here- 
" tofore presented bearing upon my case, and 
" trust that you will deem it a proper one for 
"your prompt and favorable consideration. 
" If I do not make it plain that I have been 
"wronged, I alone am the sufferer. If I do 
"make it plain that great injustice has been 
"done me, then I am sure that you, and all 
"others who love truth and justice, will be 
"glad that the opportunity for my vindica- 
" tion has not been denied. 

"Very respectfully, yours, 

"FITZ-JOHN PORTER.' 

Then follows the order of the President organiz- 
ing the Board. 

"In order that the President may be fully 
"informed of the facts of the case of Fitz- 
" John Porter, late Major- General of volunteers, 
"and be enabled to act advisedly upon his 
" application for relief in said case, a Board 
"is hereby convened by order of the Presi- 
dent." 

This is what it is to do. 

" To examine in connection with the record 
" of the trial by court-martial of Major-General 
" Porter, such new evidence relating to the 
"merits of said case, as is now on iile in the 
"War Department, together with such other 
" evidence as may be presented to said Board, 
"and to report, with the reasons for their con- 
" elusion, what action, if any, in their opinion, 
"justice requires should be taken on said ap- 
" plication by the President." 

One would think that there was an order from 
an unquestionable source of authority, which 
did constitute a judicial tribunal for one of the 
highest judicial jmrposes ever known to history. 



13 

Well, then, at the outset, questions arose how 
you were to proceed, and I have noticed a disposi- 
tion on the part of the learned Recorder to hamper 
you by technical rules and restrictions ; but we do 
not understand that there is any reason for putting 
fetters upon the action or power of this Board. 
What is it that you have to do— what is the object ? 
Truth, is it not ? Truth, and the whole truth is the 
only object ; and justice — pure justice, is the simple 
end of it. 

The record of the court-martial is submitted to 
you first, but in connection with everything else in 
the nature of evidence which may be brought be- 
fore you. " You are to fully inform the President 
"of the facts of the case," so as'to enable him to act 
advisedly on the application for relief, and to re- 
port your conclusion with your reasons. I think 
my learned friend, the Recorder, might have cud- 
geled his brains for a good many years before he 
could have framed an order, the scope of which 
would be more full and large, to enable the Board 
to attain the only object which this petitioner, in 
asking, and as I believe the President in organiz- 
ing the Board, has ever had, namely, complete and 
final justice. 

Now, the nature of General Porter's claim, I 
wish it to be understood, is not for pardon but 
for justice only. He does not ask for pardon, as a 
condemned and guilty defendant, but he asserts 
now, as he has always asserted his entire innocence 
of all guilt and asks that that may be declared. 
Complete innocence, perfect, unconditional loyalty 
is what he asserts for himself, and what we, upon 
the record now before you, assert for him. 



The President's Power. 

And that raises a question I suppose, of the 
power of the President in this matter of the con- 



14 

stitution of this Board. In respect to that, I have 

a suggestion to make. At one time, when General 

Porter was making one of these renewed appeals 

for executive interference in this case, influences 

which I suppose were the same as have so long 

thwarted his application for justice, prevailed in 

procuring an Act of Congress, which I will now 

read to you. It is to be found in the 15th Statutes, 

page 125, and is known as " An act declaratory of 

" the law in regard to officers cashiered or dis- 

" missed from the army by sentence of a gen- 

" eral court-martial. 

' ' Be it enacted by the Senate and House of 
u Representatives of the United States of Amer- 
' • tea in Congress assembled : 

" That no officer of the army of the United 
"States who has been or shall hereafter be 
" cashiered or dismissed from the service by the 
"sentence of a General Court Martial, formally 
" approved by the proper reviewing authority, 
" shall ever be restored to the military service, 
" except by a re-appointment, confirmed by 
" the Senate of the United States." 
A law which appears to me to be altogether just 
and wise, and as you see, it bears directly on the 
question, if ever -there was a question, of the 
ability of the President in such a case, to restore 
General Porter, or any other officer in a like situa- 
tion, however innocent, to the military service, un- 
less the re-appointment shall be confirmed by the 
Senate of the United States. Well, now, under 
that branch of this order, which requires you to 
form an opinion and to report what the cause of 
justice requires of the President, there may be oc- 
casion for your action, there will be, as it seems to 
me, in any event. If, as the result of all our 
labors, you find the court-martial correct on all the 
facts now known ; if you find on all the evidence 
that has been brought before you, that General 



15 

Porter was guilty of the charges, you will so re- 
port, and that justice requires no action of the 
President. I think that more than that would 
come within your province and your duty ; if you 
find that after all his lamentations he was guilty of 
all these infamous charges, you should not only 
report your conclusion, but that the punishment 
that was inflicted on him was altogether inadequate 
to the crime that he had committed. It would be 
only a just rebuke to the petitioner for vexing the 
ears of the country, and of the President, and of 
this Board, and of the students of history with his 
unfounded appeals. I say grossly inadequate to 
the crime committed, because, as it does seem to 
me, there never was so foul a crime imputed to a 
soldier in historical times as has been by this rec- 
ord, placed upon the petitioner. I desire to 
call the attention of the Board to this : it is not a 
mere case of disobedience of orders ; there have 
been ample cases of disobedience of orders before ; 
it is not a case of treason for which you can invent 
a motive, a provocation, or an apology ; not at all. 
There have been other traitors. The place where 
we now sit was a witness to a conspicuous one, but 
Arnold 1 s treason was merely an intent to hand over 
one of the military posts of the country to its ene- 
mies. The case of General Charles Lee has been 
cited by the Recorder, occurring at Monmouth, in 
the Revolutionary War, but that was of trifling 
malignity as compared with this, which was im- 
puted to General Porter. Let me read one of these 
charges of which he was found guilty ; the third 
specification of the second charge. 

" In that the said Fitz John Porter, being 
"with his army corps near the field of battle of 
"Manassas, on the 29th August, 1862, while a 
' 'severe action was being fought by the troops 
"of Major-General Pope's command, and being 
"in the belief that the troops of the said General 
"Pope were sustaining defeat and retiring from 



16 

"the field, did shamefully fail to go to the aid 
"of the said troops and General, and did shame - 
"fully retreat away and fall back with his army 
"to the Manassas junction, and leave to the dis- 
asters of a presumed defeat the said army; and 
"did fail, by any attempt to attack the enemy, 
"to aid in averting the misfortunes of a disaster 
' 'that would have endangered the safety of the 
"capital of the country." 

Now, I challenge the Recorder, or anybody else, 
to find in all history a crime like that. I do not 
believe it is possible for any such crime to be found 
related. The annals of history may be searched in 
vain for the counterpart of this. That he wilfully, 
consciously, and merely to spite his commander — 
for that is the view in which it was presented by 
the learned Judge Advocate, and by the Recorder 
here— merely to spite his commander, did hold 
aloof, with his brave army corps, from the battle 
in which the rest of the army were engaged, with 
intent to sacrifice the rest of the army and bring 
shame upon its commander and ruin upon the 
country, and perhaps to hand over its capital and 
its very existence to its rebel adversaries. There is 
an instance, not in history, but in the legendary 
days of Rome — and in those legends we have ideal 
history embodied — which shows the judgment, I 
think, of mankind as to the proper punishment to 
be inflicted for such a crime. It is related that in 
the days of Tullus Hostilius a conquered king 
of the Albans, Mettius Fufetins by name, whom 
he had placed as corps commander in charge 
of one of the armies of Rome, went out with him 
to the contest with the Veientians, and the legend 
states that he stood aloof while the armies were en- 
gaged, in order that the army of Rome might be 
vanquished. Now you have observed that that 
had not the elements of crime here imputed ; it was 
not the case of a man who had been a loyal sub- 



17 

ject and a General of his own army, but it was that 
of a conquered king who had been trusted with a 
command. What did T nil us do with him ? "So 
" when the Romans had won the battle, Tullus 
" called the Albans together as if he were going to 
44 make a speech to them, and they came to hear 
" him, as was the custom, without their arms ; and 
1 ' the Roman soldiers gathered around them, and 
" they could neither fight nor escape. Then Tullus 
" took Mettius and bound him between twc char- 
iots, and drove the chariots different ways and 
" tore him asunder." And in my judgment no less 
than that would have been an adequate punishment 
of such atrocious crimes as were imputed to Gen. 
Porter. 



Disparity Between Offence and Punishment. 

Now, we call the observation of the Board to the 
startling difference between the guilt that was im- 
puted and the punishment that was imposed in this 
case. As one of the secrets of history it will prob- 
ably never be explained how it could be that the 
court martial regarded him as guilty of such a 
crime and yet merely dismissed him from service, 
and declared him to be forever disqualified from 
holding any office of honor or profit under the 
United States. The sentence itself confesses the 
injustice of the conviction. If it was for the pun- 
ishment of the offender, it was wholly, as every- 
body sees, inadequate, but if there was an indirect 
purpose in that prosecution, if he was a sacrifice to 
the discipline of other men, of other Generals and 
other soldiers, that might explain a thing which 
otherwise is so mysterious. And perhaps the 
learned Recorder will not quarrel with the authority 
which I now cite on that subject, which is the reply 
of Judge Advocate General Holt to the answer 
of Mr. Reverdy Johnson, from which he has cited 
and to which he has so strongly objected : 



IS 



k4 The wonder of military men, who under- 
" stand the atrocity of Porter's offence in all its 
"bearings is, not that he was condemned, but 
" that his life was spared. The court-martial 
" might well have sentenced him to death, and 
"they forebore to do so, in all probability, 
"only because they felt that, as a walking, 
"blasted monument of treachery to his coun- 
" try's flag, he would be a warning to others 
"far more effective than any voice which 
"could issue from the depths of his dishonored 
" but perhaps forgotten grave." 

Does not the Judge Advocate General here reveal 
the true inwardness of the action of the court mar- 
tial? 

If Porter was tried and sentenced and punished 
for the supposed crimes or apprehended crimes of 
other men, we can understand it. If he was sacri- 
ficed to the discipline of the army of which he had 
formed a glorious part, even that, like death and 
wounds, is something which a patriot soldier can 
bear. It may be that we shall have occasion to 
examine that very question a little further, because 
as it does seem to us, that must be the explanation 
of the otherwise extraordinary judgment of the 
court-martial. This case has often called up to 
public recollection and comment the case of Ad- 
miral Byng, who, in the middle of the last century, 
was court-martialed for a supposed failure on his 
part to do his utmost when proceeding with a Brit- 
ish fleet for the relief of the Island of Minorca 
that was beseiged by the French. He was not 
guilty. He, too, was a brave and gallant soldier, 
faithful to his country's flag, but he wa*s charge- 
able with an error of judgment in not pressing the 
French fleet with all his power, as his brother sol- 
diers assembled in court-martial, felt that he might 
and should have done. There is, however, this re- 
markable difference between Byng's case and Por- 



19 

ter's case — the Court that declared the former inno- 
cent condemned him to be shot, and he was shot — 
shot, in obedience to a supposed governmental ne- 
cessity, to appease the howlings of the British mob, 
for the Court expressly declared he had been guil- 
ty of no cowardice, of no treachery, of no evil intent. 
Yet, being instructed that the imperative nature of 
the article of war bearing upon the subject, if they 
found that he did not do his utmost, permitted no 
sentence short of 'death, they sentenced him; and, 
the king and the ministry not being brave enough to 
stand up against the brutal demands of the British 
public, he was led out and shot like a traitor. The 
Government, in spite of the eloquent appeals of 
William Pitt, deliberately sacrificed him to the 
mob who had burned his effigy in every town in 
England, and had placarded all the streets of Lon- 
don with the startling threat, "Hang Byng, or look 
out for your king !" Well, as it seems to me, to a 
brave soldier, Byng's fate was a light punishment 
compared to these sixteen years of imputed infamy 
and shameful humiliation which Porter has borne, 
and so Byng thought, for when he heard of the judg- 
ment of the Court, he said, "What! have they 
put a slur upon me ?" apprehending that they had 
pronounced him a coward. But when told that it 
was not so, that they had acquitted him of coward- 
ice, a smile wreathed his features, and he marched 
to his fate as bravely as he had ever trodden upon 
the deck of his frigate. But this court which tried 
General Porter found him guilty of all these dam- 
nable attrocities to which I have called your atten- 
tion, and yet failed to impose any punishment at 
all in proportion to the magnitude of the offense. 

And now, suppose, on the other hand, after giving 
all weight to the judgment of the court-martial and 
its proceedings, you find General Porter innocent. 
You must proceed further under the instructions 
of the order organizing the Board and requiring it to 
report; and as a necessary part of your investigation, 



20 

and especially as bearing upon the question of the 
weight which you are to give to the proceedings of 
the court-martial, the important question must be 
answered, how, being innocent, so far as the record 
discloses, he came to be convicted. Justice to Por- 
ter, justice to the country, justice to the action of 
the Court will require at least a recognition of that 
question. If there were circumstances surrounding 
the Court, or in its composition, or in the necessary 
haste imposed on its action by the exigencies of the 
service, or in the imperfect facts before them, or in 
the rules of evidence applied by them, unfavorable 
to justice, it is important to know it — for you, for 
the President, for the country to know it — for the 
purpose of determining how much you ought to 
regard yourselves as constrained, as guided by 
their conclusions. And so, as to the action of Pres- 
dent Lincoln, entitled in the eye of every Ameri- 
can, in the judgment of History, to the very first 
merit as an authority. 



Circumstances under which Porter was tried 
before. 

I ask you, first, to consider briefly the circum- 
stances under which the court-martial convened, 
with a view to the question whether they were 
favorable to a just trial of the cause. If they were, 
it lends a support to the judgment of that tribunal 
which it will require all the more complete demon- 
stration of truth on the part of General Porter now 
to overcome. Well, we knew that it did not need 
any evidence to bring before you the circumstances 
under which that Court assembled ; and I submit 
to you that they were most unfavorable to the con- 
sideration of such a case or to the administration 
of justice upon the particular questions raised. 
This brings into view the whole previous history of 
the war in Virginia, but which need not occupy the 



21 

attention of this board for more than a few min- 
utes. 

The breaking out of the war of the rebellion, as 
everybody knows, found this government and coun- 
try in a state of absolute destitution as to prepara- 
tion for war. The first efforts and struggles on the 
part of the government to sustain itself were of the 
most painful character ; and particularly is this 
true of the history of the war in Virginia, where 
these transactions occurred on the 29th of August, 
1862. This has a bearing upon the circumstances 
that surrounded this court martial. Who has for- 
gotten the mortification and humiliation in which 
the first campaign in Virginia resulted ? The 
whole campaign, if it may be called a campaign, in 
1861, exposed the Goverment and the country to 
chagrin, remorse, and mortification. While the press 
and the people were howling " On to Richmond" 
with ten million voices, our arms in Virginia 
seemed almost paralyzed. The story of the first Bull 
Run and of the Federal army waiting before the 
quaker guns of Manassas, is a type and a picture 
of the whole history of that year. Then the govern- 
ment, and its gallant generals who had rallied to its 
support devoted themselves to the great work of 
preparation ; the Army of the Potomac was organ- 
ized, and the campaign of that army for 1862, for 
the next year, was set on foot. It was supposed 
to be the best organized and the greatest army that 
ever, on this continent, sallied forth, and all 
the hopes and all the boastful promises and 
expectations of the government and of the people, 
were staked upon it. But it is not too much to 
say that its career was another history of disap- 
pointment and mortification. Who can ever for- 
get the doleful stories that came from the swamps 
of the Chickahominy, and the palsy that seemed 
to rest upon the country when the final step of a 
retreat to the James River was taken? There were 
redeeming features in the view of the government 



22 

of the distressing history of that period. There 
were two bright days : there was the day at Gaines' 
Mill, and that other day at Malvern Hill, when it is 
not too*much to say that the services of the petit- 
ioner were the most brilliant of all the great and 
brave achievements of its record. 

But that army got back to James River, and in 
the judgment of the go verment and of the country, 
nothing useful had yet been accomplished. 

Well, our hopes never failed us, at any rate, and 
our courage never failed us, and a new plan was 
resolved upon. 

An Army of Virginia was organized ; General 
Halleck was called from the West and placed in 
command as General-in-Chief, and General Pope, 
for whom the best wishes and best promises were 
held forth, was called to organize and command 
this Army of Virginia ; and as the next step, the 
Army of the Potomac was recalled to unite with 
the Army of Virgini i in the protection of Wash- 
ington, and in new projects for the conquest of 
the rebel confederacy. I need not repeat to you the 
history of the sixty days existence of the Army of 
Virginia. It was another story of disappointment 
and chagrin ; more mortifying, more depressing 
than all that had gone before ; there was fighting 
enough, there was slaughter enough, but in the 
public judgment, there was no result. And now 
we come, as I suppose, to the most distressing per- 
iod in the whole history of our contest with the 
confederacy. Gold went up and the hearts of men 
went down, and shame and anger possessed the 
hearts alike of the people and the government. 
Always, in times of great distress, and disaster, 
I think there is no exception in history, it is the nat- 
ural impulse of the great masses of a nation, the 
irresistible impulse of the popular heart, to look 
out for somebody to blame ; to put it upon the 
shoulders of somebody, for somebody must be to 



23 

blame. Well, what was the key-note of tins last 
imputed failure ? I pass no judgment. I can 
form none in such a matter, but I am looking at 
the public judgment that surrounded that Court. 

What was the key-note of the failure ? Why, it 
was that General Jackson and his famous rebel 
army, after its capture had been heralded as an ab- 
solute certainty, was allowed to escape. That was 
what happened, that was the crisis, that was the 
culminating point of national distress and mortifi- 
cation, and everybody enquired who was to blame. 

Do you not know, does not everybody 
know that there are times, and that such are the 
times when accusation and conviction are equiva- 
lent and interchangeable terms? Well, there was 
another wheel within the wheel of the national dis- 
tress ; there were suspicions, there were charges 
that hung on every lip, that were believed by every 
other man you met in those days, that were evidently 
believed by the government, that there was treach- 
ery, that there was disloyalty in the Army of the 
Potomac, and among the generals of the Army of 
the Potomac, and that some proceedings were nec- 
essary. Some example was necessary that should 
enforce discipline and cut out the roots of any such 
supposed disloyalty or treachery. For myself, I 
believe that the whole charge was without founda- 
tion ; for myself, I believe that they were all loyal, 
and that under any commander, as their achieve- 
ments before and afterwards demonstrated, they 
were ever willing to fight their best. But, never- 
theless, this charge was made, was taken up and 
became a public outcry, and the necessity for 
something to be done that should stop or should 
punish the supposed offence, was in every newspaper, 
and on every tongue. The thirst of a great nation 
for vengeance, for a victim, will always be sa- 
tiated. Just then, General Porter was accused, the 
government believed him guilty ; General Pope, 
the commanding general of the army, asserted his 



24 

guilt, and General McDowell, who was next in 
command, supported the charge. And who, in 
such times, could resist such a charge? 

Who docs not know that in times like those, the 
meie accusation was, from the inherent infirmities 
of human nature itself, almost the same tiling 
:is ;i conviction < The Recorder says that we 
bring charges against the court-martial. I dis- 
avow it. I unite with him in all his encomiums 
upon the distinguished gentlemen who composed 
thai Court. I question not their conscientious per- 
formance of duty in that critical time. But, they 
were only men, and human judgment is finite. 
The learned Recorder puts it most admirably, and 
if I had a copy of his opening address, I should be 
under obligations to him for expressing the very 
idea which 1 wish to present in regard to that 
Court. 

It is too true that human judgment is but finite, 
a inl that there are many times and occasions when 
an innocent man is necessarily convicted. His- 
tory is full of instances which demonstrate exactly 
what 1 mean. I mean the impossibility of preserv- 
ing an unbiased judicial mind in the face of an 
overwhelming pressure of popular impulse, or pop- 
ular opinion. The greatest judges that ever 
Bat upon the bench, the wisest and most trained 
minds who had made law and the investigation of 
disputed cases their sole province and study through 
a score or more of years, have been exposed to the 
same subtle, insidious, irresistible influence of pub- 
lic feeling upon them; and it is not in the least 
derogatory to their character as judges, 
but merely imputes to them that they are men. 
Take, for instance, Queen Caroline's case, a case 
which enlisted the public feeling of every man and 
every woman in England upon one side or the 
other. It is a regretted, but a recognized fact, 
th;it, upon the questions of law raised by the 



25 

facts in that case, and presented to the Law Lords, 
embracing the greatest and wisest of the judicial 
minds of England, they always voted upon them, 
not according to the law and the facts as afterwards 
considered, when reviewed by judicial minds, but 
invariably according to the dictates of that party 
division of the people of England with which, by 
tradition and by the experience of their lives, they 
happened to sympathize. Nobody has ever ques- 
tioned the integrity of Lord Eldon or Lord Erskine. 
So it was in O'Connell's case, when England was agi- 
tated throughout every hamlet and household. 
There are times when the administration of justice in 
the face of this subtle, far-reaching, irresistible pop- 
ular power becomes wholly impossible. And so, I 
say, that this court-martial sat in times and under cir- 
cumstances which were not favorable to the admin- 
istration of justice ; and if any unfavorable reflec- 
tions have ever been cast upon those judges or 
their action, I, for one, on the part of the peti- 
tioner and of my associates, disavow them all. We 
impute to them nothing but honest performance 
of duty. 



The Composition of the Court-Martial. 

In the next place, was there anything in the com- 
position of the court-martial that was not favorable 
to justice % In that respect, my learned friend, the 
Recorder, has seen fit to comment upon the manner 
in which the court-martial was organized. I think, 
myself, that there was an error committed, but one 
with which you have not to deal, and one for 
which the Court was not at all to blame. Let 
me read to you the law to which I refer, the Act 
of Congress of May 29th, 1830, which was supple- 
mentary to an Act for the establishment of rules and 
regulations for the government of the armies of the 
United States, passed April 19th, 1806. 



26 



It enacted that : " whenever a general officer com- 
" manding an army shall be accuser or prosecutor 
"of any officer in the army of the United States, 
" under liis command, the general court-martial for 
"the trial of such officer shall be appointed by the 
" President of the United States." 

In our present view of the evidence, as it stands 
recorded before this Board, General Porter was 
brought to trial by reason of the accusation and 
prosecution presented against him by the General 
commanding the army of which he was a part. If 
tlic facts had been presented to the President or to 
the court-martial at the outset of its sessions, as 
they have been presented to you, that Court, at 
any rate, would never have proceeded with the 
trial. But, General Pope saw fit to go before that 
Board, and say that he was not the author of the 
charges, that he had nothing to do with them, and 
so to leave the Court under the impression that the 
real accuser and prosecutor was General Roberts, 
his Inspector General, in whose name they were 
presented. 

Now, as to the object of this law, we differ from 
the learned Recorder in his construction of it. We 
suppose that when an Act says, that when a Gen- 
eral is to be tried upon charges presented by his 
superior General, commanding the army of which 
he is a part, that the court-martial shall be consti- 
t in I'd by the President, and not by the commanding 
General — General llalleck in this case, we sup- 
pose it is so enacted out of consideration for 
the dignity of the offence and of the offender, — 
that if a general officer is to be brought to trial 
upon charges involving his fame and his life emana- 
ting from such a source, no less dignified a person 
than the President shall appoint the Court ; no less 
Impartial a tribunal than one created by him — 
raised as far as human foresight can raise it — above 
army quarrels and army rivalries, shall be the 
judges who are to try him. Now, if that is the 



27 

proper view of the law, suppose that General Pope 
had gone before the Board, and instead of swearing 
as he then did, that he had nothing to do with the 
charges, had sworn, as he afterwards stated, in his 
report to the committee on the conduct of the war, 
in 1865, which I have in my hand, for, there he not 
only boasted of having been the accuser, but con- 
fessed that he had demanded his reward for carry- 
ing the prosecution successfully through. 

He said : 

" I considered it a ditty I owed to the country 
" to bring Fitz John Porter to justice, lest at an- 
" other time, and with greater opportunities he 
"might do that which would be still more disast- 
"rous. With his conviction and punishment en- 
" ded all official connection I have since had with 
" any thing that related to the operations I con- 
" ducted in Virginia.' 1 '' — (Supplement to Report of 
Committee on the conduct of the war, part 2, p. 190). 

Now, let me read you a previous sentence from 
the same report, to show his boast : 

"In the last days of January, 1863, when the 
" trial of Fitz John Porter had closed, and when 
" Ms guilt had been established, I intimated to the 
"President that it seemed a proper time then for 
"some public acknowledgment of my service in 
"Virginia from him.'" — {Ibid, p. 190). 

Suppose, now, that the President of the United 
States, or General Halleck, or the court-martial had 
known those facts as there stated by General Pope, 
can anything be more certain than that a court-mar- 
tial, at any rate selected not by the President, but 
by General Halleck, would never have proceeded to 
the trial of the cause. 

The next circumstance in regard to the composi- 
tion of the Court that I have to snggest, without 
imputing the least reflection or suggesting anything 
in the least derogatory to the members of that Court, 



except that fchey are but men, is this— and is in the 
direct line of the last objection that I have made— 
b.M-a use I do not believe that the President of the 
United States would ever have committed that mis- 
take What was it '. What was the cardinal thing 
that General Porter was accused of? What was 
it. that the rage of the country was to be appeased 
about \ Why, it was letting Jackson escape, was 
it not '. Jackson with his army, after the "bagging 
"of tin* whole crowd," had been most felicitously 
and publicy proclaimed. Now, from the facts that 
have been spread and confessed before this Board — 
we knew that Jackson's escape was accomplished 
the <lay before that upon which General Porter is 
charged with dereliction. It was not on the 29th of 
Angust that General Jackson effected his escape. 
It was on the 28th, because then, as was suppos- 
ed, they had him in a trap from which he could 
not escape, and General Ricketts, who constituted 
one division of General McDowell's corps, was sta- 
tioned at Thoroughfare Gap, between Jackson and 
L<mnstreet, and General King was marching down 
the turn-pike to Centreville, behind Jackson, so 
that if they had remained there, as they were order- 
ed at all hazards to do, there could have been no 
possible help or relief for Jackson. But they left 
those positions, where it is due to General Pope to 
say, especially as to General King, that he was or- 
dered at all hazards to remain, and, as was stated 
by General McDowell, and as everybody knows, 
and as the Recorder will not question, the door of 
the trap that held Jackson was thereby left open, 
and nobody remained to guard it. Not a regiment, 
not a soldier of our forces intervened any longer be- 
tween Longstreet and Jackson. Well, one would 
have supposed, who knows anything of what are 
the necessary attributes of a judicial mind, that the 
vei \ last thing which it would occur to the power 
constituting the court-martial to do, would have 
been to place General Ricketts and General King 



29 

upon the Court to try the offender — absolutely up- 
right men, perfect men, as I suppose, but how could 
they sit as judges ? How could they bring to bear 
the judicial element and the unbiased mind ? They 
might themselves be tried for letting Jackson es- 
cape, and they to sit in judgment upon another 
man to be tried for that offence ! What we say is 
this : That judicial impartiality under those cir- 
cumstances cannot be asked of men. This law that 
I read was a wise one. I do not believe that the 
President of the United States, if he had had the 
organization of the Court, would have organized it 
in the manner in which it was constituted. I do 
not believe that General Halleck, who did organize 
the court-martial, knew the fact at all. What a 
position in which to place those generals ! I have 
spoken of the historical and traditional liability of 
the great and trained judges of Courts of Law to 
bias, to the difficulty of sustaining a judicial mind, 
in times of popular rage or excitement ; but how 
much greater is the exposure of Generals summon- 
ed hastily from the field for the discharge, perhaps 
for the only time in their lives, of the great func- 
tions of judges 1 Well, why was this done ? The 
order constituting the court-martial explains it, and 
it is certainly a source of the utmost regret that the 
exigencies of the public service did require any 
such selection, for the order organizing the court- 
martial says positively, thaUt was necessary, and 
that there was nobody who could possibly be spared 
to sit upon that Court, except those nine generals 
who did compose the Court. I want to read the 
exact words of the order : 

"No other officers than those named can be 

"assembled, without manifest injury to the 

"public service." 
Was not that a lamentable thing, that two of the 
judges were thus related to the subjects that were to 
be tried 1 I doubt not that they did their best ; I 



30 

doubt not that they tried to be judges, but how could 
they be? Human nature will not stand everything, 
and however great they may have been as generals, 
or wise as men, 1 do not believe they could stand 
that. Nay, more, General King, to whose with- 
drawal from the rear of Jackson on the 28th, con- 
nary to orders, is now imputed by everybody the 
.-cape of Jackson, not only sat as a judge, but 
had to be a witness. The exigencies of the public 
service not only compelled him to sit in the impos- 
sible attitude of a judge, but compelled him to 
take the stand and establish the truth as a wit- 
ness adverse to one of the principal aides and wit- 
nesses on the part of General Porter. Is it not 
asking a little too much of our poor human nature, 
to put a man in that position? Who knows but 
that it was the votes of Generals King and Ricketts — 
who knows but that it was General King's vote 
alone that turned the scales of Justice against Gen- 
eral Porter ? Nobody will ever know, except the 
members of that Court. But why do I cite all 
this? Because the Recorder said, that the judg- 
ment of that court-martial was right, and must be 
accepted by you. Independent of its being right, 
I think we see now that it was impossible for those 
nine men, all of them, to act as judges. That 
could not be. They might sit there and record 
their votes, but it was impossible for them all — it 
was impossible for two out of the nine — in the 
nature of things, according to the laws of the hu- 
man mind, to be judges. 

Another thing, among the many circumstances 
unfavorable to the administration of justice by 
that court-martial; was there any unnecessary 
hast.- i The Recorder says, that the record shows, 
that it took a great many days to get in the evi- 
<h lire. But was there any unnecessary haste in 
their judicial proceedings, which were required to be 
deliberate and slow — considering all things — look- 
ing before and after i I will read to you the order 



31 

that was served upon the court, upon the moraine 
of January 6th, 1863, five clays before the sentence 
was pronounced. Before I do that, let me say that 
even now, after we have had the benefit of a second 
trial, it would be regarded as rather summary, if 
you should receive orders from the War Depart- 
ment to hurry back to your respective commands 
as quickly as possible, and to close this case with- 
out regard to hours, because the public service re- 
quired it, and that you should instantly, upon the 
closing of the argument, take a vote. It might be 
necessary, owing to the exigencies of the public 
service, but it would not be judicial. Now, I read 
this order from Secretary Stanton to this court- 
martial. 

"War Department, 
Washington City, D. C, 

January 5th, 1863. 

"General — The state of the service impera- 
tively demands that the proceedings in the 
"court over which you are now presiding, hav- 
ing been pending more than four weeks, 
"should be brought to a close without any un- 
"necessary delay. You are therefore directed 
"to sit, without regard to hours, and close your 
"proceedings as speedily as may be consistent 
"with justice to the public service." 
" Yours truly, 

"Edwin M. Stanton, 

' ' Secretary of War. 
" Major General Hunter, 

" President, &c, &c" 

It was not, you will observe, justice to the ac- 
cused, but justice to the public service, that the 
Secretary appealed to, as the final motive for a 
hasty decision of the case. 

That was served upon the court-martial on the 
6th of January. Then the prosecution brought up 



32 

their rear guard of witnesses, and the case was al- 
most instantly closed that day. There were given 
to the petitioner three days to prepare his defence, 
and then what happened '( Why, these Generals, 
although they were Judges, were Generals first, 
last, and always. How could they shut their eyes 
to such an imperative order as that, from the great 
War Secretary, who was in that day the master of 
the fortunes of the whole army % The country was 
in danger, its capital was at stake ; it was more 
important to the public service that they should get 
back to their commands, than that they should stop 
to deliberate upon the evidence upon which they 
had to pass. Now what took place ? You can form 
some notion of how this imperative letter operated, 
judging by your own proceedings here. The Board 
met at half-past ten, the morning of the 10th of 
January. There was an argument presented on 
the part of General Porter, called the defence of 
the accused, which, read with even the speed of 
the rapid tongue of our learned Recorder, could not 
have been finished much before the shades of after- 
noon were falling, for it occupies forty closely 
printed pages of this record. I do not state it as a 
fact, because it is not in the record, but I have 
been informed, that it did actually occupy four 
hours and a half, or until half-past two in 
the afternoon. At six o'clock that court- 
martial had adjourned, and General Porter 
was already condemned and sentenced, because 
the exigencies of the public service demanded 
it , that each one of these Generals should 
go post haste to his command. Was that a condi- 
tion of things favorable to the administration of 
justice? I should think that even you, after you 
know, as you now must know all about the case, 
would deem it necessary to deliberate after the 
arguments were concluded, and to compare the 
evidence with the arguments to see whether on 



33 

either side they were specious and fallacious, or 

sound and based upon the truth. You would not say 

" Why, I must be off to St. Paul by the morn- 

"ing train," and "I must be off to Fortress 

"Monroe to night," and " I must return to 

fc ' my neglected cadets." 

But you would say, let us look into this thing. 
There is a man' s life at stake. The fame of an officer 
of the army is involved. You would require to de- 
liberate ; and if you did receive such an order, which 
would be impossible in times of peace, you would 
remonstrate — you would refuse to decide the case 
without a chance for deliberation. 

So it does seem to me tiiat there are circum- 
stances surrounding the history of that court- 
martial which make it only fair for us to say — and 
even the learned Recorder will not term it libellous, 
that it was asking more than human judgment, 
and more than human nature was master of, for 
them to pass judicially upon the case. 

Next, as to the state of facts before them. Do 
3^ou believe that the court-martial knew anything 
to speak of about the real facts of the case ? What 
does a soldier when he is looking for the move- 
ments of troops, first ask for? Is it not for a map 
of the country % Did they have a map % Yes, 
they had a map, and only one map. Well, was 
it a map? For there are maps, and maps as the 
Recorder knows. It was in the form of a map, 
but it was all wrong. You could not tell any- 
thing about the country from it. I do not think 
that General Pope and General McDowell and the 
other generals are so much to be blamed, as they 
sometimes have been, for the movements of that 
campaign ; because this map, the same which was 
produced before the court-martial, was the only one 
they had to study, and they did not know any- 
thing about the country independent of the map. 
Now, what is the fact about this map ? General 



34 

Reynolds has said that it was all wrong. General 
\\';ii Ten, who lias made a special study of the sub- 
ject, because lie has been sent down by the War 
Department, detailed for the special purpose of 
preparing it, has given a correct map of the same 
region to this Board. I read from General Warren's 
evidence, at page 26 of the new record. 

"That map is so erroneous that a proper 
"answer cannot be given to the question. 
" I cannot recognize these roads or places or 
"any of the streams, as corresponding to 
" the places as they are on the map I have 
" made, now before us." 

So I think that their pole star was wrong ; 
it was several degrees out of the way ; 
and many a mariner might easily make 
shipwreck if the north star were to get dislocated 
and removed many degrees, or even a few degrees 
from its place in the heavens. Well, did they 
know the great main facts of the case ? Did they 
know that Longstreet's army had arrived on the 
scene of action, not whether they were in front or 
behind the Gibbon's woods — but did the court-mar- 
tial know that they were anywhere there? Not at 
all. It a\;is told them, but obviously they did not 
believe it, You have heard from Mr. Bullitt a, 
discussion of the Judge Advocate's reasons, which 
are to be taken as the reasons of the Court and the 
President, and it is perfectly obvious that they 
utterly disbelieved and ignored the great and the 
leading fact in the case as it is now known. Again, 
did they know the real location of General Porter, 
with respect to Jackson's right wing, when he was 
expected to fall upon and consume it I Not at all. 
They had not the least conception of the relative 
positions. 

Now, maps are to form an important part of my 
argument. I want to call the attention of the 
Board at this moment to one or two. There is a 



35 

map which has been produced here as indicative of 
what was understood by the court-martial, because 
it was so understood by the principal witnesses who 
testified against General Porter as to the position 
from which he was supposed to have fallen back 
at the close of the action of August 29th, 1862. 
It is one of those maps prepared by Lieut. -Colonel 
Smith, and is a very important item in this case, 
because, when I come to ask you to look at the 
map which was before the court-martial, you will 
observe that the same error of fact was before that 
Court as there is in this map in regard to the posi- 
tion of General Porter's force. Here it is described 
as the position from which Fitz-John Porter had 
fallen back. (See Map No. 5, from General Pope's 
Report to the Committee on the Conduct of the 
War. Map A iisr Appendix.) 

Now, I ask the Board to look, in the same con- 
nection, at the army map, which has been every 
day, until now, before the Board, and which I 
present as part of my argument, and shall ask to 
have it incorporated, — to look at the errors of posi- 
tion committed before the court-martial, and which 
the court-martial itself has committed in respect to 
the location of the troops — I mean, of Porter's force 
and of the respective forces of Jackson and of Pope 
on the 29th. For that purpose I have here taken 
one of General Warren's maps, (map No. 3) the topo- 
graphy of which, and the locations of the roads and 
streams, upon which are all correct, and have ap- 
plied upon it, according to the evidence, and 
according to the original record the location of 
the troops, as they were believed, upon the court- 
martial, to be. I think it will be found, not with- 
out instruction, even to the Board. Here is the 
junction of the Manassas and Sudley road at which 
General Porter is placed. Here [M 3] is where Mor- 



36 

ell placed himself, and Porter's corps deployed for 
a forward movement. There [M 3 or S] is where 
the witnesses for the Government (so-called), Pope 
and McDowell, and Roberts, and Smith, place 
General Porter. Here are the positions in which, 
upon the evidence before that Court, the rebel 
army, extending to the Centreville pike, until the 
latter part of the day, and then supposed to extend 
down here [M 2], across the pike, were placed. 
Now, as General Reynolds says, it was only 
two miles, in a direct line, from this position 
of Porter's here [M 3] over to his own posi- 
tion. [These two maps, viz., the Army Map and 
Warren's Map, with the same positions projected, 
will be found in Appendix, maps B and C] 
As the Court will observe, there was nothing 
to prevent, in that view, as there presented on the 
map before the court-martial, a flank and rear 
attack by Porter upon the unsuspecting right 
wing of the rebel army, and that was the supposition 
of facts npon which he was tried and convicted. 
Falsely placed immediately upon the right wing, 
and a little in the rear of the right wing of Jack- 
son's army, with no rebel force between, and nothing 
in the ground between to prevent him, he was found 
guilty of lying idle on his arms all day, and keep- 
ing out of the light, in which, upon that showing, 
he might have borne an effective part. All that, 
on this trial, has been taken back. On this trial, 
the witness, Smith, who placed him there by a 
spy-glass ; and the witness, McDowell, who placed 
him there by mistake, both admit that they had put 
him, at least, a mile in advance of where he actually 
was. It has been demonstrated, as I suppose, that 
the right wing of Jackson's army, which he was ex- 
pected to attack, was here at the Warrenton turn- 
pike, and that the Confederate forces, under Long- 
street (26,000 strong), whose presence was proved 



37 

beyond dispute, but ignored by the court-martial, 
extended down even beyond the railroad, and the 
Manassas and Gainesville road, far in front of 
Porter — I mean, over on the other side of Dawkin' s 
branch — and occupying an impregnable position be- 
tween his little band and the right wing of Jackson, 
which he was expected to attack. Now, I desire that 
this other map (No. 4) of the true position, at noon 
of the 29th, as now proved, may be recorded as a 
part of my argument. I do not, of course, present 
it as evidence, but as argument. I believe the pro- 
jection of the positions upon this map have all been 
honestly, conscientiously, and faithfully made ; and 
I shall be glad if the Recorder has any objection or 
criticism to make that he maybe permitted to make 
it. We do not, in this investigation, desire in the 
least to mislead the Board, or to vary from the 
record of the trial, and I earnestly hope that if the 
Recorder, upon that map, or upon any of the other 
maps that I present, as a part of my argument, can 
find any fault, whether it is founded on fact or not, 
that he be permitted to find it. For, if these maps 
do not lie, they demonstrate that while Porter was 
convicted by the court-martial of not attacking the 
right wing of Jackson's army while that army was 
contending at equal odds with Pope, he was really 
punished for not throwing his army corps of ten 
thousand men in a hopeless assault upon Long- 
street's twenty-five thousand, whose presence, 
known to him, was unsuspected by General Pope 
and the court-martial, and which put him as far 
out of the reach of Jackson's right wing as if an 
ocean had rolled between them. (The map last re- 
ferred to showing the positions as claimed by the 
petitioner, will be found in Appendix as map D.) 

Well, what else was there about that Court? 
Why, one half of the witnesses could not be had. 
Some few witnesses from — shall I be permitted to 
call it the "Federal" Army, in spite of the Re- 
corder's protest against that word ? — were there ; but 



38 

all the Confederate soldiers and generals, and other 
officers, were, from the "exigencies of the pub- 
lic service," compelled to be absent, and the Court 
was compelled to get along without them. It does not 
give a very impressive weight to the judgment of a 
Court, that the door,s of the Court were locked, so 
that one-half of the witnesses could not get in. 
That would not pass muster, even in a case of 
4i petty larceny," to the like of which the Recorder 
i^ sometimes disposed to degrade this examination. 
I think that any poor wretch who had been con- 
victed and sent to the county jail for thirty days, 
for thieving, would be entitled to a new trial at 
once, if it turned out that one-half his witnesses 
could not get in, because the doors of the Court 
room were barred against popular entrance. That 
is a very important matter, indeed, in considering 
the weight to be given to the action of the Court. 
I observe that my learned friend, the R ecorder, 
has been inclined to draw a line between rebel wit- 
nesses and Union witnesses, to the disadvantage of 
the former. But he cannot raise any such issue 
with us, nor as I believe with this Board. I know 
nothing in regard to the gentlemen who have been 
called on our part from the confederate army, 
Generals Longstreet, Wilcox, Early, and Robert- 
son, Colonel Marshall, and many others, except 
what is known by everybody as historical about 
them ; they were mostly soldiers educated at this 
institution ; and with rare exceptions, I believe 
the graduates of West Point are taught, and 
do learn, so thoroughly that they carry it with 
thrill through all their lives, to speak the truth — 
whatever else they learn or fail to learn, they do 
Learn that. It is a pretty good certificate from this 
institution, that anybody who does not tell the 
tin ih is very apt to slip out by the back door of the 
Military Academy before the day of graduation 
comes around. Well, I believe they were gentle- 
men ; I believe that they were possessed of just as 



* 39 

perfect personal integrity as tliongh they had not 
been rebels. 

They were just as good witnesses as the federal 
witnesses and no better, entitled to equal credit, 
and to be measured by the same standard. Their 
evidence all round is to be weighed in the balance, 
and all the witnesses alike are not to be counted, 
but weighed. If they were to be counted we should 
have got out of Court a good while ago ; for after 
we had closed our case with the examination of 
forty or fifty witnesses, the recorder summoned in 
a hundred. So, pray, don't count the witnesses, 
but weigh them. 

Again, the court-martial was led to believe, and 
it disposed of the case upon the theory, that there 
was a retreat by General Porter. On this vital 
point it has now been demonstrated, to the satisfac- 
tion of the most skeptical, as already shown to you 
by the arguments of my associates, that the whole 
pretence of any retreat at all was without the least 
foundation in fact. But once more, to dwell a little 
longer on the errors of the court-martial, and that 
on a part of the case which was most essential, 
namely, the alleged disobedience of the 4:30 p. m. 
order of August 29th, the whole truth was not be- 
fore them, and there was what has now been shown 
to have been the most palpable falsehood before 
them instead of the truth. I suppose that if there 
is one fact that now stands clear beyond— I will 
not say contradiction, because the Recorder can 
contradict anything— but beyond reasonable con- 
tradiction, it is, that that order never reached the 
hands of General Porter until the sun was setting at 
about half -past six ; yet the case was passed upon by 
the court-martial upon the evidence before them, 
in the belief that it was received by him at five 
o'clock or half-past five. Now, everything is per- 
verted by false evidence. No Court can stand up 
against perjury— no Court can stand up against 



40 

mistake, or against any manner of false evi- 
dence, and if yon find that they were mis- 
ed by false evidence, whether intentionally 
false or not is wholly immaterial, it lessens 
the weight to be given to the judgment of 
the court-martial. This is also, I think, fairly to bo 
said upon the record of the court-martial : that 
whatever weight was given to facts, the facts were 
outweighed by the opinions of witnesses — the opin- 
ions, I mean, of General Pope, General McDowell, 
General Roberts and Colonel Smith. If I under- 
take anything in this argument, it will be to de- 
monstrate to the satisfaction of this Court, and of 
every thinking mind that looks into the case, that 
the opinions of these witnesses cannot be treated as 
fair or impartial opinions ; that, whether from bias 
or from mistake and ignorance of fact, it was 
utterly impossible for them to express a fair 
and impartial opinion. But that their opinions 
did carry that court-martial, there is and can 
be no doubt. As to both General McDowell and 
General Pope, with the utmost disposition to do 
honor to the established authorities, it is our duty 
in this case to demonstrate to you that if they had 
stated to the court martial what they have stated 
since, and what one of them has stated upon oath 
before you, General Porter's conviction could not 
possibly have taken place, and he would have been 
discharged by that court, not with condemnation, 
not with rebuke, but with honor. 

Now, as to the rules of evidence applied by the 
court martial, I think that, if they were overborne 
1>\ popi ilar impulse, if they were men and not gods, 
if their minds were biased by causes which they 
could not help or. prevent, perhaps you would find 
some signs of it in their proceedings. And so, and 
only for that purpose, 1 ask you to look into the 
record Tor the purpose of seeing how they treated 
certain questions of evidence which are subject to 
well-established rules. And first, when General Pope 



41 

was on the stand, at page 20 of the court-martial rec 
ord, a question was put to him which was certainly- 
very material — in a case tried upon opinions, to the 
last degree was it material. 

" Q. If, as you have stated, you were of the 
opinion that the army under your command 
had been defeated, and in danger of still greater 
defeat, and the capital of the country in danger 
of capture by the enemy, and you thought that 
these calamities could have been obviated if 
General Porter had obeyed your orders, why 
was it that you doubted, on the 2d of Septem- 
ber, whether you would or would not take any 
action against him \ " 

The witness declined to answer the question, as 
not being relevant to the investigation. The room 
was cleared for deliberation ; and although they 
allowed the question to be filed, they did not al- 
low it to be answered until the following took 
place. 

" The Judge Advocate said : The witness re- 
quests the permission of the court to answer 
the question referred to in the protest just 
read. The accused made no objection. The 
room was thereupon cleared, and the Court 
proceeded to deliberate with closed doors. 
Sometime after, the doors were re-opened and 
the Judge Advocate announced the decision of 
the Court to be that the witness have permis- 
sion to answer the question referred to." 

Now, is not that a novel method of judicial pro 
cedure — to make the admission of a question of 
evidence depend upon the wish of the witness and 
not upon the rights of the accused % First, to ex- 
clude the evidence as irrelevant, because the wit- 
ness refused to answer it, and then to admit it as 
bearing against the defendant, when the witness 
requested permission to answer it. A whole day 
for deliberation intervened. It was not admitted 



42 

the second day because of any mistake in the judg- 
ment of the Court on the first day, or of any change 
of opinion as to its relevancy, but because the wit- 
ness changed his mind and his wish. Well, you 
cannot sit in review upon that ; but, does it or not 
tend to confirm the suggestion that we make on the 
part of General Porter, that that Court, from the 
necessities of the situation, could not be judges ? I 
will not state all the numerous instances of this 
kind, but I will call attention to three or four more. 
The same witness, General Pope, was still being 
examined by the accused. He had given an opinion 
against General Porter, whose counsel wanted to 
test that opinion. 

' ' Q. Bearing in mind the terms and tenor of 
the order of 4-30 p, m. of the 29th of August, 
and its direction to the accused to attack the 
enemy's flank, and, if possible, his rear, and 
at the same time to keep up communication 
with General Reynolds, on the right of the 
accused, please to inform the Court whether, 
if it could have been foreseen at 4.30 p. m. that 
at the time when the accused should receive that 
order he would find himself in front of the 
enemy in large force, in such a position that he 
could not outflank the enemy without severing 
his connection with General Reynolds, on his 
right, would you, if that state of facts had 
been foreseen at the date of the reception of the 
order, have expected or anticipated obedience 
from the accused to the order, according to its 
terms?" 

Be had already testified against the accused that 
he would expect obedience to the order as the 
question had been put. Here was a question put 
t<> hini on cross-examination for the purpose 
of testing the weight of his opinion in every as- 
pecl of the facts of the case; it was the clear 
right of the accused to put the question. The 



43 

question was objected to, and after a good deal of 
discussion, and after the clearing of the Court and 
its deliberation — 

"After sometime the Court was re-opened, 
whereupon — 

"The Judge Advocate announced the de- 
cision of the Court to be that the witness shall 
not answer the question propounded by the 
accused." 
Then, when the court-martial had General Rob- 
erts, at page 49 of the record, under examination, 
the same sort of a question, as it appears to me, 
was decided in a different way. He was now being 
examined by the Judge Advocate. 

" Q. In view of what the army had accom- 
plished during the battle of the day in the 
absence of General Porter's command, what do 
you suppose would have been the result upon 
the fortunes of the battle if General Porter 
had attacked, as ordered by the order of 4.30 
P. M., either on the right flank or the rear of 
the enemy X The accused objected to the ques- 
tion. 

The court was thereupon cleared. 
Some time after the Court was reopened, and 
the Judge Advocate announced that the Court 
determined that the question shall be an- 
swered." 
What I have to say is, that undue weight was 
given to the opinions of the generals who testified 
adversely, and that they were not freely permitted 
to testify upon one side as upon the other. For, 
further, it appears that on the cross-examination the 
accused was not allowed to test his opinion which 
had been introduced on the direct. On page 51 of 
the court martial record, when the same witness 
was under examination by the counsel for the ac- 
cused, this occurred, 



44 

"Q. Did not the joint order specially ex 
elude from the discretion of Generals Porter 
and McDowell the necessity of their remaining 
in such position as to enable them to fall back 
behind Bull Run? 

" The question was objected to by a member 
of the Court. The Court was thereupon cleared. 
After some time the Court was re-opened, and 
the Judge Advocate announced that the Court 
determined that the question shall not be 
answered." 

Now, whether these and other similar rulings 
could have been reviewed or not in a court of law 
is not the question. There are many more of the 
same sort. They have been carefully digested in a 
previous paper which will be placed before this 
Board.* I only call the attention of the Board to 
them for the purpose of demonstrating, as it seems 
to me, they demonstrate themselves, that the times 
were not favorable to the administration of justice 
by that Board upon the case and the questions that 
were before them ; so I will not trouble the Court 
\*irh any more reference to what may be called in- 
ternal evidence from the record. I only claim from 
all these circumstances that I have now brought to 
the attention of the Board, that there is good ground 
for saying that the judgment of that court-martial, 
as a judgment, ought not to stand in the way of jus- 
tice now on any of the questions involved in the 
record ; that it does appear that they were not 
placed in a position that rendered it likely, or, as 
we think possible, for them to bring to bear a clear, 
undisturbed, unbiased, judicial mind upon the 
questions ltefore them. 

So. too, in regard to the opinion of President 
Lincoln. There is no man in history for whose 
opinion on a ease like this, if he understood it, if 



■ The Appendix to reply of Hon. Reverdy Johnson to Judge 
Advocate Bolt. 



45 

the facts were before liim, I would claim greater 
weight than for that of President Lincoln, and I 
believe that will be the judgment of the country. 
You will observe, in the first place, that these errors 
which were committed by the Court, were all invol- 
ved in the record upon which it was his constitu- 
tional province to pass ; and if he had examined 
that record and then approved the sentence, 
they would have been committed by him also. 
But we have made it clear that President 
Lincoln did not examine the record, that he could 
not have examined the record, and that he made 
his decision not upon the evidence, not npon any 
opinion of his on the evidence and the facts in the 
case, but upon the paper that was of a nature 
to mislead him, prepared by the Judge Advocate 
General under the order requiring a fair and 
judicial revision to be made of the whole evidence, 
but which unfortunately sets forth, only parts 
of the evidence, as it appears to us, in a 
cruel and vindictive spirit, and in a way 
calculated only to prejudice and poison the mind 
of the reader against General Porter, and against 
the truth. The great pressure of his overwhelming 
official duties, in that crisis of our country's 
fate, left the President no time to examine the record, 
and compelled him to rely, as he had a right to rely, 
upon what he believed to be a fair, judicial review 
of the evidence, but which was in fact the one-sided 
and embittered statement of an advocate determin- 
ed upon the ruin of the accused. We proved that 
by Governor Newell, because President Lincoln 
told him so. When application was being made to 
President Lincoln for relief on the part of General 
Porter, he said to the governor, in substance, that 
he had not been able to read the record. Do not the 
dates demonstrate, with equal clearness, that he 
had not, and could not have done so % The judg- 
ment and sentence were pronounced on Saturday 
night, the 10th of January. On Monday morning 



46 

the order was made by the President — this order 
requiring the revision for the advice and determin- 
ation of the mind of the President, to be made by 
Judge Advocate General Holt. Yes, on the 12th, 
one day prior to the proceedings having been forwar- 
ded to the Secretary of War for transmission, under 
the law, to the president. So that the proceedings 
were not in the President's hands before ihey went 
to Judge Advocate Holt, or before the 19th, when 
his pretended review bears date. For, on the 19th, 
comes that extraordinary paper, which has been 
sufficiently reviewed and exposed by Mr. Bullitt, a 
paper calculated, not to lead the President to the 
knowledge of the facts, but to lead him away from 
the knowledge of the real facts ; and on that he 
based his judgment approving the action of the 
court-martial. I have said before, that we were 
much obliged to the recorder for calling many a 
witness that we did not know of, and could not 
have obtained. He calls a son of President Lincoln ; 
and if there was any doubt before about how much 
and what sort of weight ought to be given to the opin- 
ion of the President, it is terminated by his evidence, 
is it not I What does he say % He was then a young 
man of 19 or 20, and his father was in the habit of 
talking with him confidentially. One day he found 
his father leading or meditating on the Porter case ; 
and the President produced to him, what I Why, 
that despatch. of General Porter to Generals King 
and McDowell in the latter part of the 29th of August, 
indicating an intention to withdrawto Manassas, in 
accordance with the injunctions contained in the joint 
order of G eneral Pope. Wheredid he find that? Why, 
it was set forth in full in the opinion, in the paper, 
prepared by Judge Advocate General Holt. The 
whole fact of the retreat was there ; and that was 
all the retreat there was; and we shall find that, 
instead of being a censurable purpose, it was alto- 
gether praiseworthy under the circumstances as now 
known, and the facts out of which it arose. But 



47 

the President was led to believe, because it is so 
stated in that paper of Judge Advocate General 
Holt that there was no doubt that General Porter 
carried out, and acted upon the intention declared 
in that letter, and did retreat, believing that the 
rest of the army was standing its ground against 
destructive odds. It was in this false belief- that 
the President evidently spoke. Now, we know, 
if we know anything, that the despatch to 
Generals McDowell and King, meant nothing of 
the sort, and that there was no retreat. Then 
what did President Lincoln say ? And this 
shows exactly what I have said before, as to 
the discrepancy between the guilt imputed, 
and the punishment awarded. Why, President 
Lincoln said that if that was true, — if all those 
malignant statements and those perversions of 
testimony so insidiously set forth, in the paper of 
Judge Holt were true, — that it would not have been 
too much or too severe a sentence if General Porter 
had been condemned to be shot. So, when you ex- 
amine that opinion and find the basis of it, you will 
see, that as applied to the facts and circumstances 
now before the Court, it is no more pertinent than 
if it were in reference to the case of some other offi- 
cer in some other war. But the striking point in 
Robert Lincoln's testimony as compared with Gov- 
ernor Newell' s, is this. The two together show how 
completely the mind of the President in regard to 
the case had been changed before his death, and 
how from being satisfied, and more than satisfied, 
with the condemnation of Porter, he had come by 
a knowledge of the actual facts, to the conviction 
that in justice he was entitled to a new trial. 



The Charges Against General Porter. 

Let me now take up, very briefly, these several 
charges. I propose to consider them in their 
order, because there is some confusion likely 



48 

to creep into the case, if they are consider- 
ed otherwise, as the learned Recorder has 
seen fit to treat them. In respect to the trans- 
actions of the 29th, li«' jumbled up the considera- 
tion of all the charges, irrespective of the article of 
war, under which they are drawn. It may be that an 
officer is guilty of disobedience; and yet is ndt guilty 
of the heinous crime of misbehavior in the face of the 
enemy; running away for the purpose of abandoning 
the capital of his country to a rebel host, and on 
the other hand the accused party might be not 
guilty of disobedience, and yet guilty of misbe- 
haviour before the enemy. So it seems to me that 
accuracy of judgment can only be preserved by 
treating of the distinct charges in the order in 
which they are arranged. 

In respect to the iirst charge, the alleged disobe- 
dience by General Porter, of the order of the 27th. 
I will first read the charge, and then offer a very 
few observations about it. 



Charge 1st, Specification" 1st, Disobedience of 
6:30 p. m. Order. 

" Charge 1st. — Violation of the 9th Article of 
11 War. 

" Specification 1st. — In this, that the said 
" Major-General Fitz John Porter, of the volun- 
" teers of the United States, having received a 
" lawful order, on or about the 27th August, 
" 1862, while at or near Warrenton Junction, in 
" Virginia, from Major-General John Pope, his 
" superior and commanding officer, in the fol- 
11 lowing figures and letters, to wit : 

" Headquarters Army of Virginia, 

11 Bristoio Station, August 27, 1862, 6.30 £>. m. 

"General. — The Major-General commanding 
11 directs that you start at one o'clock to-night, 



49 

and come forward with your whole corps, or 
such part of it as is with you, so as to be here 
by daylight to-morrow morning. Hooker has 
had a very severe action with the enemy, with 
a loss of about three hundred killed and wound- 
ed. The enemy has been driven back, but is 
retiring along the railroad. We must drive him 
from Manassas and clear the country between 
that place and Gainesville, where McDowell is. 
If Morell has not joined you, send word to 
him to push forward immediately, also send 
word to Banks to hurry forward with all 
speed to take your place at Warrenton 
Junction. It is necessary, on all ac- 
counts that you should be here by daylight. 
" I send an officer with this despatch, who will 
conduct you to this place. Be sure to send 
word to Banks, who is on the road from Fay- 
etteville, probably in the direction of Bealton. 
Say to Banks also, that he had best run back 
the railroad trains to this side of Cedar Run. 
If he is not with you, write him to that effect. 

' ' By command of Major-General Pope. 

" GEORGE D. RUGGLES, 

" Colonel and Chief of Staff . 

u Major-General F. J. Porter, 

" Warrenton Junction : 

" P. S. — If Banks is not at Warrenton Junc- 
" tion, leave a regiment of infantry and two pieces 
" of artillery, as a guard, till he comes up, with 
" instructions to follow you immediately. If 
" Banks is not at the Junction, instruct Colonel 
•' Cleary to run the trains back to this side of 
" Cedar Run, and post a regiment and section of 
" artillery with it. 

" By command of Major- General Pope. 
" GEORGE D. RUGGLES, 

" Colonel and Chief of Staff. 



50 

« did then and there disobey the said 

" order, being at the time in the face of the 
" enemy. This, at or near Warrenton, in the 
11 State of Virginia, on or about the 28th of 
" Angnst, 1862." 

The ground has been very fully gone over on 
our side, and it would be only imposing upon 
the good nature of the Board, if I should de- 
tain it very long. In the first place your at- 
tention has been called to the comparatively 
trifling nature of the charge — I mean as compared 
with the gross magnitude of those in respect to the 
29th. It all depends upon what we believe to be 
an immaterial variance, utterly immaterial, of two 
hours in the time of starting on the march on the 
night of the 27th. Without any regard to discre- 
tion, to judgment, to reasons that existed to the 
contrary, without any regard to the circumstances 
of the case, the learned Recorder asks in the most 
defiant manner, "Was he not ordered to march at 
one o'clock I He was. Did he march until three? 
He did not. Is he guilty? Guilty/ 1 Well, if 
thai is tin 1 way to dispose of the charge there is no 
ns.' of examining it. There is no use of a trial. 
He was ordered to start at one, he did not start 
until three. And the Board will observe that the 
same case might be made, if instead of being two 
hours it was one hour,or half an hour,or quarter of 
an hour. If a court martial can convict an officer 
and dismiss him from the service for a variation of 
two hours from the time at which he was ordered 
to march without the least regard to the circum- 
stances they can just as well do so, by the same 
summary method, for a delay of fifteen minutes. 

The learned Recorder made one suggestion in 
this connection that rather galled me. Even on the 
courl martial there was a decent regard paid to the 
feelings of the accused. The forms of courtesy at 
Leasl were adhered to. But the learned Recorder in 



51 

his opening argument has suggested that this 
change of two hours on the night of the 27th was 
made by General Porter, in the hope that those two 
hours would bring a change of commanders, from 
Pope to McClellan. I do not think such a sugges- 
tion as that is worthy of this Board, or of a com- 
ponent member of it. Now, that I am upon that 
subject, let me say also this ; that the observations 
that he made this morning, imputing a lack of per- 
sonal integrity to Gfeneral Porter are as gratuitous 
as they are offensive. I do not think he would 
have made that after deliberation ; nobody ever 
made any such suggestion before, as that General 
Porter wilfully stated falsehoods in his despatches, 
a charge distinctly made by the Recorder this 
morning. That was not the charge on which he 
was being tried by the court-martial or re-tried 
here. I shall not make any more observations 
about these insinuations in the further progress of 
the discussion, except to repeat once for all that they 
were very uncalled for and very painful to the feel- 
ings of the petitioner and his counsel. 

As to this order of the 27th. I say, although 
the complaint was a trivial one, although nothing 
came of it, and there was no delay resulting, 
although, as I suppose, it was merely thrown in as 
a make-weight on the subsequent and greater 
charges, still General Porter is bound to explain it 
and justify it. We ask nothing that shall loosen 
the bands of discipline or impair the cardinal rules 
of the military service as to implicit obedience to 
orders. We claim implicit obedience, and we claim 
intelligent obedience ; we claim actual and not 
fictitious and pretended obedience' ; we claim that 
a corps commander should act, and that General 
Porter did act, not like a machine set in motion by 
an order which he was not to read or interpret, but 
that he was an intelligent instrument of the dignity 
of a corps commander, invested with the functions 
which the military law imputes to that high grade 



52 

of service. Now, what is the nature of the ques- 
tion \ It is not, as it seems to me, whether he was 
ordered to start at one and did not start until 
three. I cannot think that that is the question. 
If it is, all the labor, talk, and study that has been 
devoted to it has been thrown away. 

The question, it seems to me, is one of intent. 
Was his failure to march until three, an act of in- 
tended disobedience and disregard of the order, or 
was it a decision justifiably arrived at by him in 
good faith, in the exercise of his duties and his re- 
sponsibilities as a corps commander, ten miles from 
his el lief who gave it, and receiving it under cir- 
cumstances which could not be known to General 
Pope, who gave it ? If you establish the affirmative 
of the latter question, we claim that General Porter 
is completely exonerated from this charge. The 
Recorder has said that General Porter has no right 
to set up his will against that of the commanding 
general. Well, so we say : We say he did not 
set up his will, that he did not assume or pretend 
to set up his will. His will, his impulse, was to 
obey the order strictly and to the minute ; but his 
judgment, which he was at liberty to exercise, 
which he was bound to exercise, required him not 
to move until the near approach of day. In the 
first place, in regard to this order, I make one ob- 
servation, and that is, that whatever may be the 
duties of corps commanders in the interpretation 
and execution of orders, they have a right to ex- 
pect that all orders that are sent to them by their 
chiefs at a distance, shall be both intelligible 
and possible of execution — I mean possible within 
the view of the sender. Now, was this such an 
order? Although the Board are perfectly familiar 
with the order and the objects expressed upon its 
face, I will read it once more. 

1 want to ask whether you think that General 
Pope thought it was possible of exact execution 
when he gave the order. Because, if he did not, 



53 

the rule of discretion conceded by the Judge Ad- 
vocate and conceded by the learned Recorder comes 
in. Applying the test of the Napoleonic rule in 
respect to obedience and discretion, as to orders 
given by a commander at a distance, it is con- 
tended by both of those learned legal authorities 
that there is no discretion as to the end, although 
there may be a discretion as to the means. The 
rule is as follows : 

" A military order exacts passive obedience 
" only when it is given by a superior who is 
1 ' present on the spot, at the moment when he gives 
" it. Having then knowledge of the state of 
" things, he can listen to the objections and give 
" the necessary explanations to him who should 
" execute the order." 

The prosecution in that view, says that this order 
was to get to Bristoe by daylight, and if he could get 
to Bristoe by daylight by starting at some other 
hour than one o'clock, all right, no offence given 
or taken in changing the hour of starting ; but there 
is no discretion as to the end. Well, suppose you 
have a written order of which the sender does not 
believe the end was possible ; suppose General Pope 
orders General Porter to march from Warrenton 
Junction at one o'clock, so as to get there at day- 
light, when he knows it is not possible for him to 
get there at daylight, or when he has fair reason to 
believe that it is not possible for him to get there at 
daylight, and that General Porter on receiving it 
knows that, how does that affect the application of 
the rule as to discretion, if there is such a rule % It 
removes the end altogether, does it not? If the 
commanding general orders a corps commander to 
march at one to reach a certain place by daylight, 
knowing that he cannot do it, even by starting at 
one, what is the next conclusion % How is it to be 
construed % Why, it is to get there with all prac- 



54 

ticable speed, is it not? Now, I want to ask the 
Board whether they believe that General Pope, when 
he said start at one a. m., and get to Bristoe at 
daylight, thought Porter could do so. That is an 
important question. If General Pope had honored 
us with his presence, we could have found out from 
the best authority. But when he stood at his post 
in Kansas, and said he would not come upon a re- 
quest, but would come upon a subpoena, and then 
when he was subpoenaed said he would not come 
at all, and defied the summons of this Board, we 
have a right still to explore the case for his motives 
and his knowledge. And, fortunately, we are not 
without the means of ascertaining them. It so 
happens, that General Pope had gone over this 
very road from Warrenton Junction to Bristoe that 
afternoon, starting in the latter part of the after- 
noon and getting there early in the evening, and he 
knew something about the condition of the road. 
He did not know how it was after the wagon trains 
had closed up behind him, but he knew something 
al >< mi t the distance and the condition of the road, 
as it was when he went over it. He was accompa- 
nied by two very intelligent and distinguished 
officers. He went alone with those few personal 
attendants, on horseback, and it took him a good 
while to go ; I do not know how long, but more hours 
than lie allowed to this army corps to go in the 
middle of the darkest night and get there at day- 
light. Having got there, he sends an order for 
this army corps to start at one, saying that it was 
necessary for them to be there at daylight. Now. 
what 1 say is, in the voluntary absence of Gen' 1 
Pope, if you have the judgment of two equally 
competent persons, who were with him when this 
order was issued, and who accompanied him on that 
journey, you have, I think, a pretty fair means of 
testing whether Gen'l Pope thought it was a prac- 
ticable or possible order. I refer- to the evidence of 
Gen'l Ruggles and Gen'l McKeever, to both of 



55 

which I shall ask permission to call the attention 
of the Court. 

I will read McKeever's testimony first, at page 
147. 

" Question. I will ask you whether, in your judg- 
ment and experience, a military commander, who 
had himself accompanied an army corps over that 
road in daylight that day from Warrenton Junction 
to Bristoe, would have deemed it advisable for 
another army corps of 9,000 men, with artillery, to 
leave Warrenton Junction at one o'clock in the 
morning to reach Bristoe Station by daylight or 
near that hour?" 

From the answer it is evident that the word "ad- 
visable " is a misprint for " practicable/' 

Daylight, I believe for the purpose of this dis- 
cussion is generally admitted on all sides as about 
four o'clock. 

" Answer. That is a difficult question to answer. 
It did not seem to me at the time to be practi- 
cable. 

There is a clear and emphatic opinion by one 
officer entitled to great weight, as it seems to me. 

On page 279 Gen'l Ruggles, G-en'l Pope's chief 
of staff says : 

" Question. Have you heard the proof here, 
" or do you know what has been proved of the 
" obstruction of that road by 2,000 or 3,000 
" army wagons % 

" Answer. I knew there were a large num- 
" ber of wagons and that the road was blocked ; 
" I heard that after General Porter had come 
"up. I knew that the road was reported to 
" have been heavily blocked with wagons. 

" Question. Do you know anything of the 
" darkness of that night % 

" Answer. I know it was very dark, so dark 
" that I lost my way going a few hundred feet 
" from the bivouac. 



56 

" Question. How 9.o you recollect that? 

" Answer. I recollect that from the reason 
" that I had nothing to eat since morning. Our 
" mess-wagon came up ; our cook had been 
" captured, and we could not find any servants, 
" and I had to stumble round in the dark my- 
" self. I think we shouted and hallooed to 
' ' people, and finally we got to the wagon ; 
•• then I got in and looked around, but could 
" find nothing more than a ham bone, the same 
" as Colonel Johnson ; the ham bone had been 
" pretty well picked. 

" Question. Does your experience enable you 
" to form a judgment as to the practicability of 
" an army corps on such a night, with a road 
" obstructed as you understand this to have 
"been, starting from Warren ton Junction at 
" 1 o'clock a. m. to reach Bristoe Station by 
" daylight? 

"Answer. 1 don't think it could have been 
" done. I recollect that road as I came 
" through." 

And he came through side by side with 
Gen'l Pope. 

" It ran part of the way through groves or 
" woods ; and I recollect that there were 
" stumps of trees and of saplings in the road ; 
" that the road was filled with these little 
" stumps ; that the road itself was tortuous. 
" I think the men would have been impeded 
' ' in the road by the trains, by these stumps, 
" and by the crookedness of the road. Accord- 
" ing to my recollection, there were several runs 
" that crossed the railway between those two 
" points, and over these runs were open bridges. 
" I think the men could not have marched upon 
" the railway, because in the darkness they 
" would have fallen through these open 
" bridges. " 



57 

Now, does not that satisfactorily establish that 
General Pope, when he gave that order, could not 
himself have deemed that it was practicable to obey 
it 1 If so, what becomes of this rule, urged by the 
Judge Advocate and by the Recorder, that the. 
corps commander, in such a case, has no discretion 
as to the end. There is no end if the end is impos- 
sible, except the end indicated by the order as the 
object of calling the army corps over the road. As 
it has been pressed against General Porter, we have 
considered whether it was possible. But, further, 
was it quite fair and honest % It was pressed upon 
the attention of the President, you will recollect ; — 
and the Court seems to have been imposed upon, 
to believe — that the immediate occasion of giving 
this order, was, because after the fight with Ewell in 
the afternoon, it was found that Hooker had got 
out of ammunition ; and Porter having ammuni- 
tion, that was the reason for sending for his 
corps to come up ; and also, because of an an- 
ticipated attack in the morning by the return- 
ing enemy. Both those considerations were urged 
upon the President, in the review by the Judge 
Advocate, and he was led to believe, as I un- 
derstand, that that being the purpose for which 
the order was sent, was the reason for its 
urgency, as made known to the court-martial. 
Well, now, if those were the purposes, would not 
it have been fair to put them in the order? If Gen- 
eral Porter was afterwards to be tried and convicted 
for not obeying an order, the urgency of which was 
that they were out of ammunition and expected an 
immediate attack, would it not have been fair to 
put one or both of those reasons in the order? 



Pretended Reasons foe the Order. 

Let us see now how this matter about the ammu- 
nition ^and the anticipated attack stands. General 



58 

Pope made a report of September 3d, which has 
beeB put in evidence, but not yet called to the at- 
tention of the Court, and it is to be found in this 
Board record, on page 1115. In that was the first 
suggestion that this order was sent on one of those 
accounts. There it is stated in this way, on page 
1116. 

"The unfortunate oversight of not bringing 
" more than forty rounds of ammunition, be- 
" came at once alarming. At night-fall, Hooker 
" had but about five rounds to the man left. As 
" soon as I learned this I sent back orders to 
" Fitz John Porter to march with his corps at 
" one o'clock that night, so as to be with Hooker 
' k at day-light in the morning." 
He does not say anything about any anticipated 
attack in the morning. But, he afterwards, Janu- 
ary 27th, '63, made what is called his official re- 
port ; and there both these circumstances for the 
first time appear. There, at page 18, he puts it in 
this way : 

" Thinking it altogether likely that Jackson 
" would mass his whole force and attempt to 
kt turn our right at Bristoe Station, and knowing 
" that Hooker, for want of ammunition, was in 
" little condition to make long resistance, I sent 
" back orders to General Porter, about dark of 
kk the 27th, to move forward at one o'clock in the 
" night, and report to me at Bristoe, by day- 
" light, in the morning." 

You will observe that the order says nothing 
about either of these matters. The order describes 
a very different state of things, and of purposes. 
After giving directions to come, and referring to 
the light that Hooker has had, the order says : 

" The enemy has been driven back, and is 
retiring along the railroad; we must drive 



59 

him from Manassas and clear the country 
between that place and Gainesville, where Mc- 
Dowell is." 

And these are the only purposes expressed in the 
order ; nothing about ammunition, nothing about an 
anticipated attack — and for two reasons — first, he 
did not know when he sent the order that they were 
out of ammunition ; and second, he had no reason 
for anticipating an attack, because he thought the 
rebels were retreating, and wanted Porter there to 
pursue them. Now, the Recorder says, that 
General Pope and General Heintzleman, and all the 
witnesses prove, that Pope knew, when he gave the 
order, that Hooker was short of ammunition. I 
take direct issue with that statement, and say that 
they do not ; that they prove just the contrary ; 
that they prove that General Pope did not know of 
the ammunition being short, and did not know of 
the anticipated attack when he wrote this order. 
The order is dated 6:30 p. m., which is sunset ; an 
hour after that it is dark. General Ruggles, in his 
testimony before this Board, says, he wrote the 
order and dispatched it before reaching Bristoe, 
where Pope arrived at dark, and then, and not till 
then, could he have received any report of lack of 
ammunition on the part of Hooker. General Pope, 
on page 12 of the court-martial record, says : 

u Just at dark." 

Very precise ; this is his sworn statement : 

" Just at dark Hooker sent me word, and 
"General Heintzleman alsorex>ortedto me, that 
"he, Hooker, was almost entirely out of ammu- 
"nition, having but live rounds to a man left." 

General Heintzleman, at page 80 of the same rec- 
ord, says this : 



60 

" Q. What information hare you, in regard 
"to the condition of General Hooker s supply 
"of ammunition, after the battle of Kettle 
"Run, on the 27th of August J 

"A. A portion of his division was'neaily out 
"of ammunition. 

" Q. Was, or was not, that fact made known 
"to Major-General Pope, in the afternoon of 
"the 27th of August ? 

"A. Late in the afternoon, it was." 

Well, this says late in the afternoon. But that 
precise point of time is lixed by General Pope, for 
he says it came to him just at dark ; and he ought 
to know. Then the witness Dwight does not help 
the Recorder at all on that matter. His evidence 
appears at pages 722 and 724, of the Board record. 
He says, after the fight : 

" We were short of ammunition. I was sent 
by Colonel Taylor to General Hooker to ascer- 
tain what we should do in case we were at- 
tacked during the night, as there seemed to be 
some doubt as to whether it was a rear guard 
or whether there would be an attack made. 
General Hooker replied to me, nearly as I can 
recollect, ' Tell Colonel Taylor that we have no 
ammunition, but that there has been communi- 
cation had with General Pope, and General 
Pope has communicated to General Porter, and 
General Porter should be here now ; he will be 
here in the morning certainly.' " 

And on page 724 : 

" Q. What time did you go into camp ? 

"A. Some time in the afternoon; when we 
"communicated with General Hooker it was 
" towards dark, if I recollect. 

'• Q. How near dark ? 

'A. It was dusk : I could not say the hour ; 
"late in the afternoon. 



" Q. May it not have been before dark ? 
"A. No, sir; it was quite dark." 

At 6:05 a. m. 28th, General Pope sent Porter a 
note stating that Hooker was out of ammunition, 
and he desired Porter to hasten forward. This 
note appears for the first time before this Board at 
Governor's Island, and is brought forward by Gen- 
eral Porter to prove that General Pope had pre- 
viously sent no such notice of lack of ammunition 
to Porter. This note was never received by Porter. 
It was published and found for the first time in a 
pamphlet published by General Roberts, in 1862. It 
is now found in General Pope's despatch book 
here before you, and dragged out by us. Now, is 
it fair for the Recorder to assert that Pope knew at 
6:30 p. m. 27th, that Hooker was out of ammuni- 
tion, and the sending that order to Porter was 
prompted in part by that knowledge % 

Thus, you have all the facts and circumstances ; 
and you have the time when Hooker communicated 
to Pope, and it was just at dark. There is not a 
particle of evidence in the case varying it from that. 
Writing his order to General Porter at 6:30 he does 
not say a word about ammunition because he knew 
nothing about it ; and yet, in his report and on the 
trial, and before the President, it was imputed to 
General Porter that this order was based upon the 
urgency of a want of ammunition known to Gen- 
eral Pope at the time he sent it. 



Porter's Interpretation of the Order and 
Action under it. 

The first thing in considering the action of Gen- 
eral Porter under this order, as it seems to me, is 
to inquire how it must have been considered by him 
when he received it. It was brought by Captain 
Drake DeKay, whose evidence was taken on the 
court-martial. Now, what is the fact about Drake 



62 

DeKay's arrival with the order, and how did he 
come ? He came alone ; he came on horseback with 
this order, which is regarded all around as one of 
great urgency, and he came as fast as he could, did 
he not? I suppose so. He claims so. Now, what 
time did he get there? The learned Recorder 
thinks he got there about 9 o'clock. But General 
Pope, in his report of the 3d of September, states 
the exact hour. He says : 

"The distance was only nine miles, and he 
(Porter) received the dispatch at 9:50 o'clock." 

It is said that General Porter did not know very 
much about the road. Didn't he? He knew that 
there was an aide bound to make all possible speed, 
coming alone on horseback over the road, starting 
at 6:30, that is with the advantage of the last hour 
of daylight, and it took him three hours and twenty 
minutes, which was twenty minutes more than 
General Pope proposed by the order to allow an 
army corps to go the same distance over the same 
road, in the darkness of midnight, afoot. Did not 
General Porter know anything about the condition 
of the road '. Was not the first thing, that neces- 
sarily came to his mind, the impracticability of 
exactly executing the order \ It seems to me that 
is beyond all question. What else came with it I 
Why, DeKay complained that the road was ob- 
structed, and of the great difficulty he had had in 
getting through. Now, if he had had great diffi- 
culty in getting through alone on horseback, be- 
en use of the obstructions of the road, General 
Porter at once saw that to an army corps going 
without any light whatever on foot, and with their 
artillery as the}- were required, it was an impossi- 
ble order. What was his first impulse? There is 
a greal deal of talk about animus in this case. The 
first words that an officer utters when he receives 
an order have a very strong bearing upon the ques- 
tion of animus. He says, this order must be 



63 

obeyed ; General Pope who gives it knows what he 
wants. Let ns start at once ! To whom does he say 
that? To his division commanders; all men of 
character and unquestioned loyalty and integrity, 
Morell, Butterfield and Sykes. Some criticism is 
made as to the manner of the petitioner, whether 
he read the order aloud, or whether he handed it to 
each one of them, or whether they knew its entire 
contents. But General Butterfield says he handed 
it to Sykes or Morell ; and I think General Warren 
says the same thing. And Mr. DeKay says, that 
they discussed the subject matter ; he told them 
what had happened, and that he was sent to guide 
them bacl^ 

Now comes the question of discretion. These di 
vision commanders, all three of them instantly 
united in a common protest against starting at one 
o'clock. And on what ground ? Because of the 
jaded condition of their troops, taken in connection 
with the impenetrable darkness of the night, for it 
was impenetrable at that time, and the blocked 
condition of the road, it being absolutely blocked 
up with wagons. Wagons had been rolling through 
there all day on the retreat to Alexandria, as speci- 
fied in the orders of General Pope, which I will 
presently read to you. Now, it seems to me that 
the question which is presented in a military sense 
(and on that I speak with infinite distrust), is this : 
When the division commanders who are charged 
with the responsibility for the welfare and condi- 
tion of the troops and the perfoimance of a march, 
unite in such a protest on such ground, ought their 
protest to be taken into consideration 1 There is 
the test of the guilt or innocence — of the alleged dis- 
obedience. Ought such a protest to be taken into 
consideration ? Well, General Porter thought it 
ought. And if it ought, who is to consider it % 
Who is to say, whether in view of the jaded condi- 
tion of the troops, or some of them, and of the infinite 
darkness of the night, and of the absolute blockade of 



64 

the load, who is to pass upon that question, or is 
it not to be passed upon at all '. Is it to be consid- 
ered, and if it is to be considered, who is toconsider 
it ? General Pope, who gave the order, cannot con- 
sider it ; he is ten miles away, and does not know 
these circumstances. If you answer the question, 
yes, that it is to be considered, the whole question 
of disobedience passes away, for General Porter 
is the only man left to consider it ; the rules of war 
place him there as the substitute of General Pope. 
That is the way it appears to me. You will observe 
that while it is an absolute and peremptory order, 
if you please, to start at one and get there by day- 
light, yet it gave the reasons why his presence with 
his corps was wanted. On this question of whether 
he ought to consider the protest of his division 
commanders in view of the terms of the order, 
what the older says as to what he was wanted for, 
as it seems to me, comes in : 

"The enemy has been driven back ; but is 
retiring along the railroad. We must drive 
him from Manassas, and clear the country be- 
tween that place and Gainesville, where Mc- 
Dowell is." 

He was| wanted, then, to be there, not at daylight— 
not at all ; General Pope, as we have seen, never 
could have'suspected it possible for him to be there 
at daylight ; he was wanted as early as he could 
get there in the morning to pursue the retreating 
rebels, and sweep the country between Manassas 
and Gainesville. 

Now, was it the thing, in a military point of view, 
for a corps commander so situated, receiving such 
a protest on such a ground from his division com- 
manders—was it right for him to take the protest 
and the circumstances into consideration, in view 
of what he was wanted at Bristoe for % Well, 
we submit that it was. We submit that just that 



Q5 

protest, on just those grounds, raised the ques- 
tion, whether he could be there so as to fulfill 
the purposes for which the order said he was 
wanted — not his own ideas, not his own pur- 
poses, but General Pope's statement of what he 
was wanted for. If you find first, that it was 
right for him to exercise that judgment ; sec- 
ond that he exercised it in good faith ; and third, 
that he exercised it on fair and reasonable grounds 
and knowledge, he must stand acquitted. It does 
not seem to me that there can be the least doubt, 
regarding it as a question of law or military sci- 
ence, or common sense. 1 suppose that in your 
profession, as in ours, great questions of law, and 
great questions of military duty, alike depend 
upon the dictates of common sense, and are gov- 
erned by them. 

Now look at the ground of protest as bearing 
upon the objects of the order, as stated in the 
order. What kind of obedience did it call for ? 
Did it call for General Porter to plunge his corps 
into the absolute darkness of midnight, at one 
o'clock, and throw them into inextricable confu- 
sion, and set them floundering about in camp, or 
at the first run, so that they could not be extricated 
until after daylight, and so that they could not 
start on the road until long after they had broken 
camp. I suppose that it called for an effectual, 
serviceable obedience. That is what common sense 
dictates. That is what we suppose military laws 
and regulations require. General Porter heard 
the protest. What did he know that General Pope 
did not know? Well, he knew the condition of 
the road as Drake DeKay, the messenger, found it. 
He knew the condition of the road, as his officers 
knew it ; as his aides-de-camp, Captains Monteith 
and McQuade, who had been sent out for the pur- 
pose, had reported to him. And then, as to the 
condition of the troops. General Pope had not 



66 

made any inquiries about that ; there is not the 
least scintilla of evidence in the case, that he had 
any knowledge whatever about it. Well, these 
troops that had been making day and night 
marches all the way from Aequia creek — their con- 
dition is not to be tested by a question of how 
many hours and minutes they had been in camp 
that day, or that night, but upon the knowledge 
and honest judgment of their direct and immedi- 
ate commanders, exercised in good faith, as to their 
condition. The Recorder says, that the direction 
of the order was, that Sykes should come alone. 
That was not so. Sykes was not to come alone. 
Nobody was to come alone ; if Morell was not 
there, Sykes was to come alone ; but if Morell and 
Sykes were together there, as the proofs show that 
they were, then the order is imperative — "The 
Ma jor-General commanding directs that you start 
at one o'clock to-night, and come forward with 
your w hole corps." 



TlIK CONDITION OF THE ROAD. 

Briefly, as to the condition of the road. The 
evidence on this subject is very full. So fully 
has it been developed that I will not refer to 
it. 1 understand the substance of the evi- 
dence to be, that there were between 2,000 
and 3,000 army wagons upon the ten miles of 
road. In one respect it will be seen that this 
case differs from its attitude before the former 
court upon this question ; theGovernment hasaban- 
doned the pretence, that he could have gone along 
tlif railroad, because, 1 suppose under the evidence 
of McKeever and Ruggles, the Recorder thought 
it was idle to make any such claim as was claimed 
before. Well, then, it was a common dirt road, 
and not a turn-pike ; running partly through the 



67 

woods, and blocked up with 2,000 or 3,000 army 
wagons, which, if stretched out one by one, would 
occupy 24 miles in length ; and if they were 
doubled up it is very difficult to say how even a 
horseman could get through without the greatest 
difficulty, as Drake De Kay found when he under- 
took to come alone. 



Darkness of the Night. 

The character of the night also has been 
pretty amply developed. If ever there was a 
dark night, it appears to me, from the evi- 
dence, that this of the 27th of August, 1862, was 
it. They say that there were other marches that 
night. Yes ; there were. There was the march of 
King's division. I should think a dozen privates 
had been brought here from Gibbon's brigade, 
King's division, to say how they marched that 
night. Do you recollect the evidence of General 
Patrick and General Gibbon about it ? They were 
terminating a march that night, floundering and 
straggling along, going into bivouac at 10 or 11 
o'clock. The evidence of General Patrick, is that 
he had to stretch a line of men across the road, in 
order that the troops might be stopped as they 
came along and turned aside, for it was not possi- 
ble for them otherwise, to see that those in advance 
had stopped. Then it is said that Lieutenant 
Brooke made a ride from Pope's head-quarters to 
Greenwich, with a troop of sixteen men, to carry 
an order to General Kearney and another to Reno. 
Yes ; he did. How did he do it % Riding on an 
unobstructed road it took him three hours and ten 
minutes to go four and a half miles. There is also 
another very significant piece of evidence in the 
case, because it is the testimony of one of the main 
witnesses for the government ; Lieutenant-Colonel 
T. C. H. Smith went out on a scout, as he calls it, 



68 

and he made five miles between one o'clock and 
six o'clock. lie says he was scouting for rebels, 
but I don't think lie was. I think he was scouting 
for General Porter ; for he says that he came 
around soon after day-ligbt or about six o'clock, 
at a distance of two or three miles from Bristoe, 
whence he had started ; and then and there saw 
the head of the column come up, with General 
Porter at the head. Colonel Smith was, as you 
know, one of the most malignant of witnesses 
against General Porter. But he confessed that 
there was that night, beginning at 9 o'clock or 
thereabouts, and extending until 11 or 12 o'clock, 
a storm of darkness that exceeded anything he 
had ever witnessed ; the darkness was absolute ; 
he could not see his hands before his eyes ; what 
eyes he has the Board know ; because it was those 
marvellous optics that saw treason lurking in the 
eye of General Porter, on the next day, the 28th of 
August. The darkness, according to him, was 
total. He says it is true, that at one o'clock, when 
he started out, it was not so dark; that he could 
see the forms of the houses and fences 
in Bristoe ; but he forgot to add what we 
called out from him on further examina- 
tion, that the light of the fire at Manasses 
that was made by Jackson burning our ham and 
bacon and Hour in such immense quantities was 
still perceptible, but even that light was extin- 
guished by the Cimmerian darkness of the storm 
between nine and twelve o'clock. Now, there is 
something singular about this. When General 
Porter was called upon to act upon this order, it 
was right in the middle of the Egyptian darkness 
of that night, as depicted by Lieutenant-Colonel T. 
C. H. Smith. I do not think the Recorder had ever 
considered that when he pretended there was not 
any new evidence in rhe case on the subject of the 
darkness of the night. 



69 

Another suggestion was made by the learned 
Recorder. I must admit that it would be unfair to 
ask any lawyer or military man to charge his mind 
with all the proof in this case. It is not possible. 
No man's skull is large enough to carry it all, and, 
therefore, I do not blame the Recorder for forget- 
ting it. But he would not have asked the question 
that he did ask if he had remembered the evidence. 
He asks, why did not General Porter send back 
word to General Pope that he was not going to 
start until daylight, and his reasons for not start- 
ing? Well, the answer is, he did. After a lapse of 
sixteen years, when we have such an infinite variety 
of facts brought out with such perfect clearness, it 
is one of our grievances, that we still lack four 
things, four links in the perfect chain of proof, I 
refer to the failure of General Pope to produce the 
three despatches which he received on the 29th 
from General Porter, and the despatch that he re- 
ceived on this night of the 27th, when General 
Porter, at the close of the deliberations of his 
council of war sent a written message by special 
messenger to General Pope, declaring that he could 
not start, and why he could not start, at one o'clock, 
the hour mentioned in the order, and when he was 
going to start. That is so important that I want to 
call the attention of the Board to the evidence on 
the subject. General Pope, at page 13 of the court- 
martial record, testified as follows : 

"Q. Did he at that time, or at any time 
before his arrival, explain to you the reason 
why he did not obey the order % 

" A. He wrote me a note, which I received, I 
think, in the morning of the 28th, very early in 
the morning, perhaps a little before daylight. 
I am not quite sure about the time. The note 
I have mislaid. I can give the substance of it. 
I remember the reasons given by General 



70 

Porter. If it is necessary to state them I can 
do so." 

And on page 27 : 

"On the contrary, from a note that I had re- 
ceived from him, I did not understand, that he 
toot/ Id march until daylight in the morning. 

"Q. Have you, sir, in your possession, or 
can you readily find in this city that note? 

" A. I cannot, as 1 stated in my evidence 
yesterday. As the same statements contained 
in the note were made to my aide-de-camp, if 
other testimony on the subject is necessary it 
can be got from him. 

"Q. When you received the note which, 
according to your recollection, stated that he 
would be unable to march, or would not march, 
until daylight, will you state at what hour you 
received it ? 

"A. I think that, in my testimony, I stated 
that it was quite late in the night. I do not 
remember exactly the hour ; I think towards 
morning — towards daylight ; perhaps a little 
before that. 

" Q. Did you take any steps, by message, or 
order, in another form, to the accused to expe- 
dite his march ? 

" A. I sent back several officers to try and 
see General Porter and request him to hurry 
up." 

Now, he sent back several officers, because of the 
answer he received from General Porter. lie also 
says tlmt this note expressed the reasons of the 
change in the execution of the order. We do not 
accept General Pope's statement that he mislaid 
this older. He had no right to mislay it. If he 
mislaid it he should have found it. It is not for 
the general commanding an army to come into 
Courl and say that he has mislaid or destroyed his 



71 

despatches when he is seeking the condemnation of 
an officer in respect to matters which would be ex- 
plained if those despatches were produced. General 
Ruggles has testified that when he ceased to be 
chief of staff of General Pope, on leaving Wash- 
ington at the end of that campaign, General Pope 
equired him to hand over all his despatches, 
which he did ; and he says all were preserved. 
General Smith, who was aide-decamp to General 
Po]je, in the same capacity, testified as positively 
that he handed over to General Pope all the des- 
patches that he had had. The learned Recorder has 
quoted a good deal of Latin. I will give him a sen- 
tence : " Omnia presumuntur contra spoliator em." 
a favorite maxim of law, that all things are to be 
presumed against the destroyer of evidence. There 
never was a more outrageous pretence or claim 
made than this, to condemn General Porter for 
disobedience to an order, and for not explaining 
the nature of his reasons for that disobedience 
when the commander Jras destroyed or mislaid the 
note which he received, stating why the order could 
not be obeyed. 

I say there was no delay, no time lost. But sup- 
pose that instead of this intelligent obedience and 
this rational exercise of the functions of a corps com- 
mander, having in view the carrying out the ex- 
pressed purposes of the order in the best way in 
which they could be accomplished, he had flound- 
ered out at one o'clock as the order required, 
knowing that he could not, by so doing, get there 
at daylight in this darkness, as described by 
Colonel Smith, that they had been involved in the 
inextricable confusion incident to such starting, 
and instead of getting to Broad Run, with the head 
of the column, at eight o'clock, as did happen, the 
corps had been delayed so that the head of the 
column did not get there until ten or eleven o'clock ; 
he would have appeared to obey the order and he 
would not have obeyed it. Would not he have 



72 

been culpable ? I am not competent to answer the 
question. I put it to you as military men ; would 
not he be blamable for making a pretended obedi- 
ence to the order, and not a real and intelligent 
obedience, if it had resulted in a delay that had 
tli w;u led the objects of the order as indicated on 
its face. 

The Recorder has referred to certain worthless 
evidence on this subject, of one Buchanan. Bu- 
chanan says, that he was in front of Porter's head- 
quarters at 3 o'clock and there were no signs of 
life, till after break of day, and that he waited 
there and saw nothing of Porter till after sun- 
rise ; but it turns out from the evidence of 
Locke and Monteith, who were in personal contact 
with Porter, that General Porter was already out 
upon the road endeavoring to clear it to expedite 
that march in the dark. Then Solomon Thomas, 
corporal Thomas, who is always brought in when 
the Recorder don' t know whom else to appeal to — 
he is brought in to say that they did not start as 
soon as they should ; but it turns out on his cross- 
examination that he says they did start at one 
o'clock a. m., and did not get to Bristoe until two 
o'clock the next afternoon. 

I call the attention of the Board to another 
matter, which seems to me to be worthy of con- 
sideration. 

Several very eminent legal gentlemen have ex- 
pressed to General Porter their views upon this 
case ; and if the Board will permit me, I would 
like to read a short extract from the opinion of 
Charles O' Conor, which seemed to me exceeding- 
ly sensible and entitled to the greatest considera- 
tion, and we will treat it as an offset to the opinion 
of the Recorder. 

14 After making all proper inquiries and con- 
sulting with his chief subordinates, the ac- 
"cused, in conformity with their judgment, de- 



73 



"ferred the time of starting on the directed 
" march for two hours. This was regarded by 
" the Court Martial as an unauthorized devia- 
" tion from the Chiefs instructions. For the 
" defence it was asserted that, owing to the 
" darkness of the night, the condition of the 
" road and the obstructions upon it, nothing 
" could have been lost by the change, either in 
* ' celerity of movement or in the time of arrival, 
" and that the exhaustion of Gen'l Porter's 
" troops from their previous service was such, 
" that their arrival at day-break, if practicable 
*' by means of a start at the hour indicated, 
" would have been unavailing for the purpose 
' ' in view. On some of these points the evidence 
" was slightly conflicting ; but that in theafnr- 
" mative preponderated. In my judgment no 
" examination of it was or is necessary. The 
" finding manifestly went upon the ground that 
" in respect to the hour of starting the order 
" was positive in its terms and that implicit 
" obedience, it' physically possible, was there- 
" fore an imperative duty. I think this view 
" was not sustained by the law or the fact. 
" A careful inspection of the Order, should 
" convince any one that the writer did not in- 
"tend to fix positively the time of starting or 
" that of completing the march ; taking its 
" whole contents into view it imported nothing 
" of the kind. The prosecutor was conscious 
" of this, for, upon the trial, he sought by 
" means of the oral extrinsic evidence hereafter 
" stated, to import into the document a mean- 
" ing quite contrary to its purpose and to any- 
" thing which Gen'l Pope intended to convey, 
" or which Gen'l Porter could have supposed 
" or even imagined at the time he received it. 
" It advised him ( § 2, ) that-a severe action had 
" taken place (at Bristoe,)in which the enemy 
" had been effectually and decisively defeated 



74 

■' and driven back so that he was retreating. 
" It also stated distinctly ( § 3, ) that the step 
" then in view and determined upon was, " to 
" drive him from Manassas and clear the coun- 
" try between that place and Gainesville. " 
" This cannot be regarded as idle gossip ; the 
"facts must have been communicated with a 
4 ' purpose,and that purpose could not have been 
" anything else than to give the subordinate full 
"knowledge of the object and intent of the 
" directed march. The words of the direction 
" itself (§ 1,) were indeed peremptory ; but this 
"was merely the writer's fashion of speaking. 
" If they were intended to exact the same blind 
"obedience that, standing alone, they might 
" seem to enjoin, adding a statement of the 
" cause or motive was superfluous. Nay more, 
" it was extremely objectionable; for it imp- 
" lied that the subordinate was not expected 
u to act blindly, but to exercise his judgment. 
" Looking to this announcement, ( §§ 2 & 3, ) 
" we perceive that it conveyed to Gen'l Porter 
"in the plainest and most intelligible form, 
" information that his troops were not needed 
"either to make an assault at day break or to 
"aid in repelling one that was apprehended 
4 'at that time. And on the contrary, it show- 
" ed explicitly that they were to be employed 
"in a service essentially different. Their pres- 
ence was sought as auxiliaries in the pursuit 
" of a defeated and retiring enemy. 

" On behalf of the prosecution it was testifi- 
li ed at the trial, that Gen. Pope's reason for 
" directing this night march was an apprehen- 
" sion that the enemy, though defeated and 
11 driven back, might learn that his victorious 
"opponent, Gen. Hooker, was short of am- 
" munition and, inasmuch as he had not been 
"actually routed, he might, by that intelli- 
" gence, have been encouraged to contemplate 



75 



"an attack on Hooker in the morning. The 
" date and tenor of the order, in connection 
" with this very testimony ( Rec. p. 12 ), show 
" that the latter was in all respects a mistake. 
" Gen. Pope says it was " just at dark, " that 
" he learned the want of ammunition. The 
" order was written, dated and despatched 
" at sun down, an hour before dark ; it con- 
" tained no reference to the want of ammuni- 
' ' tion ; instead of advising General Porter that, 
" as this testimony suggests the enemy " still 
" confronted Hooker's Division at Bristoe 
" station,' ' it stated the very reverse, i. e., 
" that the enemy had been driven back ; and 
" most emphatically, in words of the present 
" tense, it announced that he was then, i. e., 
"at the date of the order, "retiring along 
" the railroad. " And this, too, was made the 
u basis of a superadded exultant resolve to 
" follow him into the territory to which he 
" had retreated, and thus clear the country 
" of him. It could not be supposed that Gen- 
" eral Pope had in his mind when he dictated 
" this order, the want of ammunition, or an 
*' apprehended assault at day break. 

" The evidence of his somewhat communi- 
" cative messenger, and the whole frame of the 
" order preclude such a view of the case. 
" These facts must have come to General 
" Pope's knowledge subsequently to the trans - 
" mission of the order. Peremptorily enough, 
"to be sure, in § 1 he directed the start at 
" one o'clock ; but, conscious that in § § 2 
" and 3 he had shown the absence of any nec- 
" essity for a night march, he returned to the 
" subject at § 5 and, in what must be deemed 
" an advisory or persuasive shape, expressed 
" the desire for an arrival at daybreak. Pre- 
" liminarily to the expression of this desire he 
" evidently attempted to state some more 



70 



forcible reason for it. But the attempt was 
ineffectual ; for, in fact, none existed except 
that already indicated, i. e. the project of an 
early start from Bristoe in the intended pur- 
suit. The phrase "on all accounts " defined 
no ground of urgency ; and the word " nec- 
essary " was evidently employed as synony- 
mous with expedient. (Rec. p. 19,20.) Inex- 
act writers, and even those who are general- 
ly accurate, often use the word in that sense. 
I have said that this attempt'to engraft upon 
the written order by means of /oral extrinsic 
evidence, a supplement or postscript quite 
inconsistent with its actual terms, must have 
been founded in mistake. Using the ex- 
pression in no inculpatory sense, I must 
say it appears to be a mere after thought ; 
not, indeed, an after thought conceived in 
subtlety but arising from an involuntary 
misconception. Whether such a mistake ex- 
isted or not, is, however, quite immaterial as 
there was no charge except for disobedience 
of the written order. Besides, General Porter 
could not have divined that in giving the 
order, General Pope was influenced by an 
object the very opposite of that which was 
clearly stated and expressed. If the oral 
testimony was correct, the despatch was most 
unwisely framed. It was actually mislead- 
ing in its character and tendency. So great 
is the conflict between the written and oral 
evidence of General Pope's intent and object 
that if the despatch had been lost or sup- 
pressed, there might have appeared to be 
some color for this charge. With that writ- 
ing before the Court, there being no pretence 
that the messenger communicated anything 
about the want of ammunition or theanticipa- 
lion of an attack in the morning, the conclu- 
sion of the Court seems unaccountable. 



77 



" General Pope was ten miles off; the con- 
" dition of Porter's corps as to marching capa- 
" city was quite unknown to him, and the or- 
« der affirmatively indicated that nothing was 
" designed but a general movement in the di- 
« rection of Bristoe Station for the purpose of 
« ' pursuing an enemy then on a retreat. Under 
" these circumstances it seems quite clear, that 
" General Porter acted judiciously in avoid 
"ing the exhaustion of his already fatigued 
« corps by a night march. This, it could be 
"perceived, would enable him to bring them 
"to the point indicated without undue loss 
"of time, refreshed by needful repose and in 
" fit condition to march on still further, if re- 
" quired, in pursuit of the flying foe. His ac- 
« tion was more conformable to the spirit, m- 
" tent and actual import of the order 

"than if he had started at one o'clock, in 
"literal compliance with its first sentence. 
" According to very ample testimony, from 
" sources entitled to the utmost confidence, he 
« judiciously exercised, in conducting the re- 
« quired march, a discretion vested in him by 
"military law; and on this charge he was 
" manifestly entitled to an acquittal. 
The Board then, at 6 o'clock, adjourned until to- 
morrow morning at 10 o'clock. 

West Point, January 11, 1879, 10 a. m. 
The Board met pursuant to the foregoing order 
and adjournment. 

Present : 

Major-General John M. Sohofield, U. S. A. 

Brigadier-General A. H. Term U 8. A. 

Colonel Geof-ge W. Getty, U. S. A. 
And the Recoedeb, also Fitz-John Poeteb, the 
Petitioner, and the several gentlemen of counsel. 



78 

The reading of the minutes of the previous ses- 
sion was omitted with the consent of the 
petitioner. 

Mr. Ciio ate resumed his argument on behalf of 
the petitioner as follows : 

Mr. Choate, said : \n reference to the subject of 
the state ot public feeling at the time the prosecu- 
tion of General Porter was initiated, and to the 
distress and excitement, especially of the authori- 
ties at Washington, where the public feeling culmi- 
nated, I omitted to read a passage or two from the 
report of General Pope to the committee on the 
conduct of the war. I wish to read this morning 
from page 166 of that report, where he describes 
the origin of the complaints— I will not say the be- 
ginning of them, but where they take shape in of- 
ficial form, presented by the commanding-general 
of the Army of Virginia to the authorities at 
Washington. It is in a despatch written by him 
on the 1st of September, at Centreville, and ad- 
dressed to Major-General Halleck, General-in- 
Chief. He says : 

" I think it my duty to call your attention to 
" the unsoldierly and dangerous conduct of 
" many brigade and some division commanders 
" of the forces sent here from the peninsula. 
" Every word and act, and intention, is dis- 
" cou raging, and calculated to break down the 
" spirits of the men and produce disaster. One 
"commander of a corps, who was ordered to 
" march from Manassas Junction to join me 
" near Groveton, although he was only five 
" miles distant, failed to get up at all — worse 
" still, fell back to Manassas without a fight, 
" and in plain hearing, at less than three miles 
" distance, of a furious battle which raged all 
" day. It was only in consequence of per- 
" emptory orders that he joined me next day ; 
" one of his brigades, the brigadier general 



79 

" of which professed to be looking for his 
" division, absolutely remained all day at Cen- 
" treville, in plain view of the battle, and made 
" no attempt to join. What renders the whole 
" matter worse, these are both officers of the 
" regular army, who do not hold back from 
" ignorance or fear. Their constant talk, in- 
" dulged in publicly and in promiscuous com- 
" pany, is that the Army of the Potomac will 
" not fight ; that they are demon) lized by with- 
; ' drawal from the peninsula, etc. When such 
" example is set by officers of high rank, the 
" influence is very bad amongst those in sub- 
" ordinate stations. You have hardly an idea 
" of the demoralization among officers of high 
" rank in the Potomac Army, arising in all in- 
" stances from personal feeling in relation to 
" changes of commander-in-chief and others. 
" These men are mere tools or parasites, but 
" their example is producing, and must nec- 
" essarily produce, very disastrous results. 
" You should know these things as you alone 
" can stoj) it. Its source is beyond 'my reach, 
" though its effects are very perceptible and 
" very dangerous. I am endeavoring to do all 
" I can, and will most assuredly put them 
" where they shall fight or run away. " 

Now, to see what effect these words had, (and by 
and by we shall be able to judge what* measure of 
truth there was in them,) the effect appears in the 
same report at page 189 : 

"I made my personal camp at Ball's Cross 
" roads, and on the morning of the 3d of Sep- 
" tember, repaired to Washington, with a few 
u officers of my staff, and reported in person to 
" the General-in-Chief, the Secretary of War, 
" and the President. Each one of these high 
" functionaries received me with great cordiality, 
" and expressed in the most decided manner his 



80 

"appreciation of my services, and of the con- 
" duct of my military operations throughout. 

11 Gh'eat indignation was expressed at the 
11 treacherous and unfaithful conduct of offl- 
" cers of high rank, who were directly or indi- 
" rectly connected with these operations, and 
"so decided was litis feeling, and so de- 
fter mined the purpose to excecute jusl- 
" ia ii>>,i them thai 1 was urged to furnish 
"for use tothe Government, immediately, a brief 
ik official report of the campaign. So anxious 
" were the authorities that this report should be 
" in their possession at once, that General Ilalleck 
" urged me to remain that day in Washington to 
"make it out. I told him that my pipers, 
" despatches. &c, were at my camp, near 
" Ball's Crossroads, and that I could not 
" well make a report without having them by 
u me. He still urged me to remain with 
" great persistence, but I finally returned 
"to my camp, and proceeded to make out my 
" report. The next day it was delivered to Gen- 
" era! Halleck, but by that time, influences of 
C{ questionable character, and transactions of most 
" unquestionable impropriety which were Avell 
"known at the time, had entirely changed the 
" purposes of the authorities. It is not necessary, 
" and perhaps would scarcely be in place, for me 
" to recount these things here, and I shall there- 
' ' fore only speak of results which followed. 
"The first result was that my report so ur- 
" gently demanded the day before in order 
"that the facts might at once be laid before 
"the country and made the basis of such ac- 
" tion as justice demanded, it was resolved to 
" suppress. The reason for this change of pur- 
" pose was sufficiently apparent. The influences 
" and transactions to which I refer, seemed tothe 
" authorities to make it essential to the tempora- 



81 

" ry interests of the government, that General 
" McClellan should be reassigned to the com- 
"raand, and as a result, that the bad faith and 
" bad conduct which the government was so anx. 
" ious the day before to expose, should, at least 
" for the present, be overlooked." 

Here we have it clearly stated and confessed by 
General Pope himself that the alarm and distrust 
which his despatch of September 1st, from Centre- 
ville, excited in the mind of the Government at 
alleged treachery and infidelity among the generals 
of the army of the Potomac led directly to the 
avowed purpose of executing justice upon them, 
or, at least, as the event showed, of finding a 
victim among them, and that it was to reports 
and information to be furnished, in hot haste, 
by General Pope, the author of the charges* 
that they looked for material upon which to 
base and conduct a prosecution. If General 
Porter was really innocent, and if those were the 
motives in which his prosecution originated, and 
which sustained and carried it through to the endj 
then we are not without proof upon the record of 
the truth of what has been so often observed, that 
General Porter stands in the position of a scape-goat 
for the calamities that had overwhelmed the people, 
and the transgressions which had been committed, 
or which were supposed to have been committed, 
not by him, but by others. And that that matter 
may be tested, I have looked into the original au- 
thority to see what the real character of the scape- 
goat was ; and for that purpose I beg leave to read 
three or four verses from the 16th chapter of Leviti- 
cus, where the matter is fully set forth. 

" And Aaron shall cast lots upon the two 
" goats ; one lot for the Lord, and the other lot 
" for the scape-goat. 

"And Aaron shall bring the goat upon which 



82 

" tli* 1 Lord's lot fell, and offer him for a sin 
" offering. 

" But the goat on which the lot fell to be the 
" scape-goat^ shall be present?- 1 alive" — which 
" may account for the failure of the court- 
" martini to sentence him to be shot, — "before 
" the Lord, to make an atonement with him, 
"and to let him go for a scape- goat into the 
" wilderness. 

"And Aaron shall lay both his hands upon 
" the head of the live goat, and confess over 
" him all the iniquities of the children of 
" Israel, and all their transgressions in all 
" their sins, putting them, upon the Head of 
" the goat, and shall send him away by the 
•' hand, of a fit man info the wilderness." 

" And the goat shall bear upon him all their 
" iniquities unto a land not inhabited ; and he 
" shall let go the goat in the wilderness." 

" And, he, that let go the goat for the scape- 
" goat) shall wash his clothes, and bathe his 
"flesh in water, and afterward come into the 
" camp." 
Now, who is the Aaron of this dramatic perform- 
ance may easily be conjectured ; and how can there 
be much more doubt as to who fills the role of the 
man wlio let go the goat for the scape-goat out into 
the wilderness ; for it was he who thereby secy red 
the washing of his own hands and returned into 
the crimp, by which, 1 understand, that he contin- 
ued in the military service of the United States. 



Operations of August 29. 

Now, we reach the matters of the 29th of August, 
which 1 shall endeavor to disxxtse of as briefly as 
possible. 

The situation on the morning of the 29th of 
August is best displayed by the despatches of 



S3 

General Pope, and whatever we can extract from 
those, certainly the Recorder will not object to. 
The movement of that day originated with a des- 
patch from General Pope, at a very early hour in 
the morning, an hour which he is fond of describing 
as the earliest blush of dawn — 3 a. m. The situa- 
tion then was, that General Porter was at Bristoe 
with his corps, where he had been directed the day 
before to wait and rest his troops, their fatigued 
condition being recognized by the general in com- 
mand. General Pope had gone on expecting to 
concentrate his forces, as I understand, at Centre- 
ville, behind Bull Run, excepting those, which, as 
he then thought, lay between General Jackson and 
Thoroughfare Gap, consisting of McDowell's and 
Sigel' s troops. He was of the belief that, if he had 
a tight, it should be, certainly, somewhere between 
Gainesville and Centreville ; and I think the des- 
patches will show you that he expected to have 
this fight behind Bull Run. Now, quite a contest 
has been made here as to whether General McDow- 
ell disclosed to General Porter, that that was the 
original purpose that morning of the commander- 
in-chief, or whether that had been his view on the 
previous day. But, if the despatches of General 
Pope show you that he expected the tight to be at 
Centreville, which is behind Bull Run, all that con- 
troversy falls out of the case. He sends, at three 
o'clock in the morning, from his head-quarters 
near Bull Run, this despatch to General Porter : 

" General McDowell has intercepted the re- 

" treat of Jackson ; Sigel is immediately on the 

" right of McDowell." 

He was in entire unconsciousness of the retreat of 

McDowell's force from behind Jackson, although 

it had then actually taken place two hours before. 

" Kearney and Hooker march to attack the 

" enemy's rear at early dawn ; Major-General 

Pope, directs you to move upon Centreville 



84 

44 at the first dawn of day, with your whole 
'• command, leaving your trains to follow. It 
" is very important that you should be here at 
* ' a very early hour in the morning. A severe 
11 engagement is likely to take place ," (that is, 
of course, at Centreville,) " and your presence 
" is necessary." 
The Recorder has laid great stress upon this 
statement in the despatch, that a severe engagement 
is likely to take place, and that General Porter's 
presence was necessary. So do I. But in a differ- 
ent direction, I call it to the attention of the Board, 
as declaring as emphatically as words could de- 
clare that he expected Porter to be then at Centre- 
ville, for the purpose of taking part in an engage- 
ment to be had there. That was, undoubtedly, his 
expectation. The heights of Centreville was the 
place where he might hope, if he could find Jack- 
son there, for a successful engagement, as Jackson 
had McDowell and Ricketts behind him. It so hap- 
pened, however, that at midnight of the previous 
day, the whole groundwork of the movement con- 
templated by this despatch, without his knowing it, 
had fallen out ; instead of McDowell having inter- 
cepted the retreat of Jackson, that had failed, and 
his force, as I have said, and as it has been so often 
said, had moved away, leaving the way open behind 
Jackson, at a time too, when everybody knew that 
tin; main army of Lee was pressing forward to join 
him, and was coming through Thoroughfare Gap. 
Now, the Board will observe that the suspicion had 
not yet reached General Pope, and no rumor had 
reached him, that McDowell was not, where this 
despatch places him, behind Jackson, cutting him 
oil' from any relief from the west. General Porter 
proceeded with the execution of that order. He 
advanced from Bristoe as soon as could be done 
after the receipt of this order, in the direction of 
Centreville, and his force arrived at Manassas Junc- 
tion, or Manassas Station, or a little beyond; and 



85 

he, himself, reached Bull Run, or very near Bull 
Run, where it has been testified he found a mes- 
senger from General Pope that morning. 

The Recorder has somewhat gratuitously, I think, 
indicated that there was some delay in the execu- 
tion of this order on the part of General Porter. 
It does not seem to me so, and it is not worth while 
to discuss it. It has been ably and fully discussed 
by Mr. Malfrby. I challenge a careful inspection of 
the record, to bear me out in the proposition that this 
order was faithfully carried out by General Porter to 
the best of his ability, and that he was making rapid 
headway to the point to which he was directed, to 
Centreville, there to take part in a severe engage- 
ment, expected by General Pope to take place, 
when the whole movement in that direction was 
counteracted by the receipt of the next despatch, 
whirh turned him to the right about face to go 
back upon the road upon which he had come, and 
to proceed upon Gainesville — the explanation of 
this being, of course, that General Pope, in the 
meantime, between 3 a. m., when he wrote the des- 
patch, which I have already read, and about 8 or 9 
o'clock, when he wrote this next despatch, which I 
am about to read, had received news of the catas- 
trophe which had taken place by the falling back 
of McDowell's force from behind Jackson. You 
will see that General Pope, in those six hours, had 
got from near Bull Run, where his headquarters 
were during the night and at 3 a. m., to Centreville, 
where this was written, probably at about 8 o'clock 
— from 8 to 9 o'clock. 



" Centreville, August 29th, 1862. 

"Push forward with your corps and King's 
" division, which you will take with you upon 
11 Gainesville. I am folio wing the enemy down 



86 

" the Warrenton turnpike. Be expeditious, or 
" we shall lose much. 

"JOHN POPE, 
" Major -General Commanding, 

" Major-General Fit/ John Porter." 

It is observable that in this order there is no 
mention of General McDowell. The first despatch 
had stated that McDowell had intercepted the 
retreat of Jackson. This despatch, giving a new 
direction to the movements of Porter's corps, 
because of the departure of King's force from the 
turnpike, makes no reference to McDowell, or 
his great army corps, except what is implied in 
the order to Porter to take King's division with 
him. Now, the first question is, what was the 
reason of that? The reason is manifest in the 
conspicuous fact upon this record, that McDow- 
ell at that moment was lost — lost to the com- 
manding general, lost to the army, lost to all the 
world, and had been lost since 4 o'clock on the 
afternoon before ; and it was necessary that King's 
division which had fallen back in the immediate 
neighborhood of Manassas Junction, where Porter 
was, should be put under competent command, and 
it was therefore^placed under the command of Gen- 
eral Porter. The true and touching story of this 
loss of General McDowell is demonstrated by a map 
which 1 propose to offer as a. part of my argument, 
showing the movements of McDowell personally 
from four o'clock on the afternoon of the 28th, 
until midnight, or after midnight of the 28th. 
and where he was during that most important 
period, while his troops, in defiance of positive 
orders were abandoning the very key of the Federal 
position, and throwingaway the only chance of the 
capture of Jackson. His testimony is, that before 
the light, on the turnpike between King's division 
and EwelPs on tic evening of the 28th, being- 
ex idently in ;i state of great anxiety in consequence 



87 

of the situation, he went in search of General Pope, 
and he went for the reason that he was better 
informed as to the situation than General Pope, 
and that General Pope would be benefited by a 
little conversation with him. That, I believe, is 
his exact language. He started out at 4 o'clock 
from a place on the turnpike a little west of where 
the fight of the 28th was ; and he made this 
remarkable ride which will rank in history with 
Sheridan's ride, although under different circum- 
stances. 

[The map was here explained to the Board, and 
will be found in the Appendix as Map F.] 

Thus the temporary disappearance of General 
McDowell is the obvious reason for this order to 
put his troops under the command of General Por- 
ter. 

Now, the immediate military object of this order 
is one upon which I take issue with the Recorder. 
The Recorder says, that the intent was to get this 
force of King's^division, which had retreated from 
the turnpike, increased by Porter's corps to which 
it was now added, back to the very place of .the 
battle of the night before between King and 
Ewell's force, which we will suppose to be Gib- 
bon's woods, a very familiar ground to us now 
through the map, and on the pike just west of 
Groveton. Well, I do not know what military ob- 
ject there could have been in getting them back 
there, if he wished to retrieve the position that had 
been lost the night before by their retreat, because 
the enemy were then understood by everybody to 
be in possession of that battle ground, from which 
our forces had retreated. No; the object of the 
order is evident to everybody. As has been as- 
serted here, on our part, and as has always been 
asserted by General Porter — you will find it in his 
preliminary statement— it was to get this increased 
force back behind the rebel position, between them 



88 

and Thoroughfare Gap, between them, and if pos- 
sible, Gainesville, and at Gainesville, which was 
the commanding position of the whole situation. 
There lias been an attempt made to show by Gen- 
eral Gibbon that it was to put the increased force 
right back into Gibbon's woods; and you know 
that the whole argument of the Recorder on this 
point was, that when he got to Dawkins' Branch, 
Porter was pointed a way proceeding straight up 
to Gibbon's woods, and that he ought to have gone 
there. General Gibbon does not say any such 
thing. I desire to call the attention of the Board 
to exactly what he does say. 

General Gibbon, on page 243 of the new record, 
says : He having been concerned in the retreat, 
and being desirous that the mischievous conse- 
quences of it should be remedied, went early in the 
morning in search of General Pope : — 

" Q. Describe what occurred at that interview? 

"A. I told him what had occured the night 
" before, and that the division had left the line 
"of the Warrenton pike, and that I had rid- 
" den over and gave him the information, be- 
" cause the absence of troops from that point 
"left the way open for Lee's army to join 
" Jackson, and that I thought it was a matter 
" of importance that he should have this in- 
" formation, inasmuch as I presumed if he had 
''any troops to send out to that point, that he 
" would despatch them. After some little con- 
versation, the particulars of which I do not 
"recall, he turned to Colonel Ruggles, his 
"Adjutant-General, and directed him to write 
"an order directing General Porter to move 
ki with his corps out on the Gainesville road, nnd 
" take King's division with him, and gave it to 
' ' nie to let me carry it back to General Porter. 
"The order was given. I was furnished with a 
' ' fresh horse and started back. I rode rapidly 



89 

" asl could to Manassas Junction, and near the 
" junction met General Porter, and delivered 
" him the order. 

" Q. Before leaving the conversation with 
" General Pope, do you recollect General Pope 
4 ' stating to you what he was doing in reference 
" to this probable approach of the enemy 
44 through Thoroughfare Gap, with reference 
44 to the disposition of his troops ? I wish you 
" would try to recall what was said in that con- 
" versation. You informed him, as I under- 
44 stand, that your division by leaving the 
" Warrenton Pike, had left the road open for 
44 Lee's army to get up and unite with Jackson. 
44 Now, what did General Pope say, if any- 
" thing, in reference to the disposition he was 
44 making of his troops, or had made of them, 
44 with a view to prevent that? 

" A. General Pope did not seem to appre- 
ciate, I thought, the fact which I informed 
" him of, that the absence of those troops from 
14 the Warrenton turnpike, left the door open 
44 for Lee's army to come up. He said : ' Why, 
44 we are pressing Jackson now !' — I cannot pre- 
44 tend to repeat the words." 
General Pope, apparently failing fully to realize 
the effect of the falling back of King' s division, and 
still hanging on to the idea that they were pressing 
Jackson in front. 

" As I say, General Pope did not seem to ap- 
44 predate the importance of what I regarded 
" as fatal, that is, the absence of troops from 
44 the Warrenton turnpike, between thedetach- 
44 ment of Jackson and Lee's main army. To 
44 my mind, the fact that he was pressing Jack- 
44 son from the east did not appear conclusive 
" at all that he could ruin Jackson simply be- 
" cause he was pressing him back to Lee's 
44 main army." 



90 

That is important in two aspects. It shows that 
General Pope understood perfectly well that it was 
not any small detachment of the rebel force that 
was pressing through Thoroughfare Gap to relieve 
Jackson, but that it was the main army of Lee, 
from which Jackson's force was a detachment. 
General Porter received this order at Manassas Sta- 
tion, or thereabouts, and just then, singularly 
enough, General McDowell appears. Well, what 
was the situation? It has been claimed that they 
fell under that article of war which provides 
that where forces under different commanders 
are united upon a march, accidentally or otherwise, 
the senior in rank takes command. That was not 
the situation. General McDowell had no troops. 
King's division, which was the only one of his 
corps that was then there, had been given to Porter, 
and lie, under his responsibility, as corps com- 
mander had been compelled to take command of it 
with his own. The conduct of botlfgenerals shows 
perfectly well that that was recognized, although 
1 know that General McDowell has intimated an 
opinion that he did have command or might have 
commanded. Not so. Because, if he claimed com- 
mand, why did he not lead the column ? Why did 
In- ask Porter, as a favor, that he would put King 
on his light in forming his line, so that he could 
have him when General Pope said so ? Why did 
ln> Linger behind at Manassas Station when there 
was this important order, important upon its face, 
to move on Gainesville and be expeditious or they 
Mould lose much — why did he linger at Manassas 
Junction? That is fully explained from his own 
testimony, and from Pope's testimony, namely, 
thai he was impressed with his situation and 
fully realized it ; that while he might be 
senior in rank to General Porter, yet King's 
division had been taken from him and turned 
over to Porter, just as these important move- 



91 

ments were taking place. How distasteful this was 
to McDowell, and how embarassing to Porter ap- 
pears from their interview near Manassas Station. 
You can conceive how awkward and trying it was 
to both of them ; under what restraint it necessarily- 
placed both of them ; how embarrassing to Mc- 
Dowell ; and how ten times more so to General 
Porter. Well, General McDowell, to cure that, 
writes his note to General Pojoe, protesting against 
King's division being taken from him, and asking 
that it might be restored ; and then from that fol- 
lows the joint order, the violation of which is the 
subject now under consideration. 



The Joint Order to McDowell and Porter. 

"Headquarters Army of Virginia, 

" Centremlle, August 29, 1862. 
" You will please move forward with your joint 
" commands towards Gainesville. I sent General 
" Porter written orders to that effect an hour and 
" a half ago. Heintzelman, Sigel and Reno, are 
" moving on Warrenton turnpike, and must now 
" be not far from Gainesville. I desire that as 
" soon as communication is established between 
" this force and your own, the whole command 
" shall halt. It may be necessary to fall back 
" behind Bull Run, at Centreville, to-night. I 
" presume it will be so on account of our sup}>lies. 
" I have sent no orders, of any description, to 
'* Ricketts, and none to interfere in any way 
" with the movements of McDowell's troops, 
" except what I sent by his aide-de-camp, last 
" night, which were to hold his position on theWar- 
" renton pike, until the troops from here should 
" fall on the enemy's flank and rear. I do not 
" even know Ricketts' position, as I have not been 
" able to find out where General McDowell was, 
"until a late hour this morning. GeneralMcDowel 



92 

" will take immediate steps to communicate with 
11 General Ricketts, and instruct him to join 
11 the other divisions of his corps, as soon as 
" practicable If any considerable advantages are 
1 ' to be gained by departing from this order, it 
" will not be strictly carried out. One thing 
"must be held in view, that the troops must 
" occupy a position from which they can reach 
" Bull Run, to-night, or by morning. The indi- 
" cations are that the whole force of the enemy is 
" moving in this direction at a pace that will 
" bring them here by to-morrow night, or the 
" next day. My own headquarters, will, for the 
" present be with Heintzelman's corps, or at this 
" place. 

" JOHN POPE, 
" Major -General Commanding.'' 

" Generals McDowell and Porter." 

This joint order was not received until Gen- 
eral Porter had reached the front at Dawkin's 
Branch, and the messenger who brought it, Dr. Ab- 
bott, declared that, bringing duplicates of it, which 
he took from General Pope about ten o'clock in the 
morning, he found General McDowell somewhere 
between Manassas Junction and Dawkin's Branch, 
and delivered him his copy and then rode rapidly 
on to Porter, found him at the head of the column 
at Dawkin's Branch and gave him his copy. They 
were about a mile apart. That would very nearly 
account for the situation, because General Mc- 
Dowell says that at that time, at least, a full 
brigade of King's division marching behind Porter's 
had passed Bethlehem Church and had got out, as 
I understand it, very near the Five Forks road, 
which the Recorder has now made the wonderful 
discovery was a road which somebody ought 
t<> have taken. Now, when General McDowell and 
General Porter were together near Manassas Sta- 
tion, and had this unpleasant talk — of course, it 



93 

must have been unpleasant to both of them, noth- 
ing could have been more disagreeable — General 
McDowell then declared his willingness to recog- 
nize the situation, stating that King's division had 
been taken from him and given to General Porter, 
and expressed the wish that Porter, when he 
formed his line of battle, would place King's divi- 
sion upon the right of him, so that it would con- 
nect with his own force, which was understood 
to be south of the Warrenton pike, or up at the 
Warrenton pike in the neighborhood of Groveton. 
Now, when General McDowell gets his copy of the 
joint order he rides immediately forward, as he 
says, and overtakes General Porter. How soon he 
reached Porter, after the joint order reached Por- 
ter, you can imagine ; because the messenger was 
only a mile away and he followed the messenger, 
and must have reached General Porter almost im- 
mediately with the joint order. 

Before considering the question of the joint order, 
and as there is no fault found with Porter's con- 
duct up to the time, at any rate, of the receipt of 
that order, and as there has never been any com- 
plaint of his execution, so far as he could, of this 
previous order to push forward with his own force 
and King's division upon Gainesville, I want to 
call the attention of the Board to what he did under 
that order, before the receipt of the joint order, 
because it seems to me that is very important — it 
discloses to us the military situation at which he 
had arrived, and the animus which inspired him 
under that order, under his instructions to move 
upon Gainesville. Now, if Porter had any inten- 
tion of holding back that day, it seems to me that 
is the time when he would have •manifested it, is it 
not ? But what happened ? In the first place, it is 
necessary to understand the point at which he had 
arrived. General Warren has fully described to 
the Court his knowledge of the situation, and the 
Board has knowledge of it, as depicted by the map 



94 

and this makes it unnecessary for me to describe 
the stronghold at Dawkin's Branch, which Porter 
had reached, or that other similar stronghold, on 
the other side of that Branch, which was already 
in possession of the army of Longstreet. Beyond 
the valley was this other commanding situation, 
not unlike that at Dawkin's Branch, which lie had 
already reached, and the bed of which stream was 
the dividing valley. To the right stretched the 
ravine, through which the stream continued, and 
an open space beyond that spread onwards towards 
Groveton, fully commanded in all its parts by the 
batteries of Longstreet from the opposite stronghold 
which he occupied. Not all known to General 
Porter, of course, for he had never been there 
before, but sufficiently known, as a glance at the 
map will show, to enable him to realize the 
importance and strength of that position, which he 
had reached, and of the similar position in front of 
him, which the enemy already held. Then, it ap- 
pears, they halted. Has that halt ever been 
complained of? Not in the least. McDowell 
says: "That up to twelve o'clock," which must 
have been from half-an-hour to an hour after 
the halt, "Porter's movements were unexcep- 
tionable." What kind of a halt was it? Was 
it ordered by General Porter? That does not 
appear. But the reason, appears : it was that 
necessary, spontaneous, involuntaiy halt that any 
column of troops, I suppose, makes, when they 
come into the actual presence of the enemy, placed 
in a position corresponding and opposite to that 
which they had themselves reached, and which, 
in this instance, was quite as inaccessible to Por- 
ter, as Porter's own position on Dawkins' Branch 
was inaccessible, in a military point of view, to the 
enemy across the stream. Now, what does General 
Poller do? You will observe that there is a good 
deal of time from the arrival of General Porter at 
the head of his column at Dawkin's Branch — he 



95 

was near the head of the column when it halted — 
there is a good deal of time between that and Gen- 
eral McDowell's arrival, and the arrival of the joint 
order. He is not yet under the directions of the 
joint order. His direction was to move upon 
Gainesville by the order under which he was then 
acting. The road was the road to Gainesville. 
What did he do ? He prepared, as I suppose any 
wise commander would, to move upon Gainesville, 
according to the order — to continue to move upon 
Gainesville. He deployed his leading division, 
Morell's, on the right and left of the road, he had 
Sykes' division then drawn up in column behind 
Morell ; he sent General Butterfield with his brie:- 
ade across Dawkin's Branch, where this enemy was 
in sight upon the opposite hill ; he sent out his 
line of skirmishers under Colonel Marshall. That 
was the situation when the joint order and General 
McDowell arrived. 

Now, was that right ? Did that show zeal and 
earnestness and skill on his part ? It is for you to 
judge. General McDowell testifies emphatically 
that it was all right. Now, the issue between our- 
selves and the Recorder is right here ; he says that 
without and independent of the joint order, Porter 
was under orders from McDowell to march to the 
right to Gibbon's wood, where Jackson's right 
wing lay, and that he should have done so instead 
of rn-essing forward as he did towards Gainesville 
as he was ordered by General Pope to do, which 
could only be done by the movement which he had . 
already organized before McDowell's arrival upon 
the enemy in his front ; there, says the Recorder, 
was his mistake ; that duty required him to march 
up this road, as he calls it, from Deats to Groveton, a 
road which is no road, a road which I think is a 
fiction of the Recorder's imagination. General 
Warren, when he went to make a map, found none 
there ; I do not understand that the Recorder, when 
he went to make his personal inspection, found any 



road there ; but somebody told him there had 
been a road there, so he marked it down upon his 
map. It is not at all material, as it seems to me, for 
the deciding of this issue, whether there was a road 
there or not. If there was no enemy opposite, the 
country was all one road, for all the way to Gibbon's 
Wood was open, and this resort to an imaginary road 
is wholly unnecessary ; but on the other hand, if 
there was an enemy in force upon the opposite rise 
of ground then it does not matter, I suppose whether 
there is or ever was a road there or not. If there was 
a road, we suppose they could not march by the 
Hank exposed to this enemy in force upon the oppo- 
site rise. On that matter, the testimony of General 
Warren, as to what was the proper mode, suppos- 
ing that a military commander arrived with a corps 
at Dawkin's Branch, in that situation, finding a 
force upon the opposite rise of ground, knowing 
from the cannonading at Groveton, that something 
of a hostile character was going on there, as to 
what was the proper mode, if he wished to make a 
movement to the right, a movement to get over to 
Groveton to take part in what was then going 
on — how he was to do it. That testimony was 
so important, that I beg now to call it to the 
attention of the Board. It is a long while since it 
was taken, but it explains the situation very ex- 
actly and is found on page 43, of the record. He 
is being carefully examined by the president of the 
Board. 

" Q. What is the distance measured along the 

" ridge occupied by Morell, from the wagon road 

" to the railroad ? 

" A. A little over half a mile. 

" Q. Along the same general line from the 

" railroad to the wagon road above. What is 

" the name of that road I 
" A. The Warrenton and Alexandria road. 

" That would be a little more than three quar- 

" ters of a mile. 



97 

" Q. Bearing a little more to the north, keep- 
" ing the military position from Morell's right, 
" following along the edge of the woods to the 
u north ? 

" A. About three quarters of a mile. This 
" ridge (on Dawkins' Branch) continues along 
" till about this place (James Nickerson's) facing 
•' this valle}^. Then these little ridges run on in 
" this direction (Five Forks.) 

" Q. If you turn to the north, would there be 
" any position along there from Morell's right ? 

" A. There would be, no good position any- 
" where in that direction, until this road was 
" obtained. (The Old Warren ton, Alexandria, 
" and Washington road.) 

" Q. The natural position then would be 
" around here if you had to lay a defensive line ? 
" (Around and behind Five Forks.) 

"A. If I had to hold Porter's position perma- 
'' nently, with time to prepare to do so, I should 
" have let the left rest where his was, extend 
'' along the ridge to the right to about the rail- 
" road, then take the highest line to the east and 
" rest the right on Mount Pone ; then I would 
" slash all the timber in front of my line for, at 
" least half a mile." 

That was something, I suppose not to be thought 
of, by one who was ordered to move towards 
Gainesville. 

" Q. What is the character of this country 
" between the forest and the Sudley Spring Road? 

" A. Farming country ; descending very con- 
" siderably towards the southeast. 

' ' Q. Could a column of troops with artillery 
" move through there ? 

" A. Yes ; but they would have to make cross- 
" ings for streams and little ditches and things 
" of that kind. 

" Q. Indicate on the map for present informa- 



98 

" tion, where Reynolds was on the 29th, if you 
" have such information ? 

" A. I have not it very definite ; but it was 
" somewhere in these woods (between Chinn's and 
" Groveton). 

" Q. Can you give the general direction of his 
" line on that day ? 

"A. If he had met the skirmish line, the ad- 
" vance line of Jackson, early in the day, his line 
" would face north ; if late in the day he had 
" seen the approach of Longstreet, he probably 
" would have faced westward. 

" Q. About how far from Groveton was his 
"left? 

"A. That I cannot say; I cannot say where 
*' his left or right was, or where he faced. 

" Q. Give us now the distance from Groveton, 
''the shortest line, where Compton lane strikes 
" the old Warrenton Road? 

" A. About a mile and a half. This map will 

"enable you to see very easily what roads the 

" army used independent of these routes. There 

k were no fences then, or if there were, armies 

" disregarded them. 

" Q. Give the distance from the junction of the 
" Gainesville road with the Sudley road to New 
" Market, and thence to Compton' s house? 

" A. Three miles to New Market, or a little 
"over; to Compton's lane, a little over four 
" miles. " 
Now, here is the important part : 

"Q. What is the nature of this position with 
" respect to an advance of an enemy from the 
"west, (pointing to the Compton house) ; I do 
" not mean that exact point, but this general po- 
" sition, between the headwaters of Dawkin's 
" Branch and of Young's Branch? 

"A. You have got to suppose the position of 

the enemy. Suppose the advance is from the 



99 

•" west, on the old Warren ton and Alexandria 
" road — there really is no good line. This would 
" be the line on the ridge between Chinn's Branch 
" and Holkum Branch, but it would place both 
" flanks into the woods, and render them liable 
" to be got around by the enemy without his be- 
" ing seen. In the woods the flanks would have 
" no effective fire. The natural position to resist 
" an advance from the west is here (parallel to 
" the Sudley Spring's road, between Wheeler's 
" and Dogan's) ; not a very good position either. 

" Q. Not a good position anywhere there ? 

" A. No, sir ; but that is the one that we held 
" finally, and that we held on the night of the 
u 30th? 

" Q. Is this ground here, generally speaking, 
" commanded by this? 

" A. The most prominent ridge runs this way, 

" (from east to west, from Britt's to Compton's). 

" If you form a line here, the enemy coming 

"from the west could flank readily at Britt's. 

" It is pretty nearly the same level. It is a high 

" ridge and this ridge east of Carraco's is high. 
****** 

" Q. I understood this railroad (Manassas Gap 
" Railroad), is such that infantry could move 
" along in column. 

" A. Yes, sir ; rather by the flank than col- 
" umn. 

" Q. Could they deploy along Dawkin's 
" Branch here by the road from the woods ? 

" A. Yes ; I think they might. 

" Q. Could they see the valley in front of them 
" some hundreds of yards % 

'"' A. O, yes ; they could see part of it, and all 
" of the cleared places here (on the southwest 
" side of the high ridge, which lies southeast of 
" of Carrao's). 

" Q. The only difficulty across here would be 



100 



11 the occupation of these heights by the enemy, 
11 as I understand \ 

1 ' A. Yes ; that would be the greatest diffi- 
" cnlty. 

" Q. If yon were forced to connect this point 
" where General Porter advanced with some mil- 
" itary position in the vicinity of Groveton, what 
"point would you first occupy? what would 
" you regard as the key of that position to be 
" first occupied, being compelled by the situation 
11 of the army to hold this point or some point 
" near Groveton 1 Could you get to that place 
" more quickly by coming this way, (around by 
•' the Sudley road) taking into account the un- 
" certainty as to what might be in your front ? 

" A. That, of course, would be a problem I 
" cannot answer. I know very well — take the 
" case as it stood — that a movement made direct 
" from Porter's position toward Groveton on that 
" day would probably have brought on a 
" general battle there. Of course, this occupa- 
" tion of this ridge, either at Britts' or Comp- 
" ton's, would only have have been possible on 
V the supposition that we whipped the enemy. 

" Q. Knowing that part of your army was near 
" Groveton and you arrived 7iere, at Porter's 
" position, with the head of your column, what 
" was the first move to make to secure the posi- 
" tion of the whole army % 

"A. I should have withdrawn the whole army 
" to the east of Bull Run. 

" Q. Suppose you had not the power to do 
11 that. Suppose your force 7iere, where Porter 
" was, was ordered to connect with the other 
" troops, what would you have to do to accom- 
*« plish that? 

■• A. I should think I had a very desperate 
kl thing to do. 

" Q. Suppose you had 30,000 men, and formed 



101 

" yourself with the head of your column on this 
" road to Gainesville, and information that 30,- 
" 000 other men of your own army were here, 
" (east of Groveton) and you were ordered to 
" connect with them so as to form a continuous 
" line of battle \ 

"A. If I had an enemy in here, on the north- 
11 west side of Dawkin's Branch, I should have 
" moved against him to see what he had (toward 
" Vessel's). I don't suppose that I would be 
" be compelled to risk my 30,000 men to save the 
" other 30,000 ; the risk would have to be equal- 
" ly divided and not to risk the destruction of 
" this to save that whi^h could, without danger, 
" be drawn to a safe place, but I should have 
" certainly wanted to see what was the force of 
" the enemy in my immediate vicinity before ex- 
" posing my flank to his line of battle. 

" Q. Considering the general extent of this po- 
" sition, as you now know it, how many troops 
" would you want to make that attack % 

" A. I should feel that reasonably I ought to 
" have a force here superior to the enemy. 

" Q. About what force of the enemy would 
" occupy this position, as you now know it ?" 
(Vessel's toward Carraco and Lewis. ) 

''A. As I now know it, I now know, that all 
u the forces from Groveton could have been 
" brought up, which probably would have been 
" 30,000 men ; that an encounter here in the 
" woods would not have been successful, unless 
" we could have been able to whip 30,000 men. 

'* Q. You would not have felt at liberty to 
" have made that attack with less than 30,000? 

"A. No ; not to engage seriously. At any 
" time that you like you can feel the enemy with 
" a force that you cannot afford to spare. 

"Q. In the case supposed, would not you have 

"taken this course and keep control of this 

" ground, rather than by attempting to force the 



102 

" enemy's position ; you have here a ridge of 
" high ground separating the waters of Dawkin's 
" Branch, from the waters of Young's Branch. 
" To light a battle in as unfavorable a position 
" as that you must have control of that ground? 

" A. Yes, sir. 

" Q. Then this position was a bad one to occu- 
"py? 

"A. It was a bad one to move from, but not 
•' a bad one to defend. 

" Q. If you had to fight a battle against an 
" enemy occupying this general position, and 
" difficult to attack with less than 30,000 men, 
" would not you have moved to occupy this posi- 
'' tion, so as to hold command of the ground 
" between the two positions you now occupy ? 

" A. I don't think I would, because I think 
" the enemy, seeing my object, would get there 
" first. He would get command of that position 
" before I could, in the position in which we 
" were placed here. 

" Q. Suppose you were ordered to connect 
" with the troops at Groveton practically. You 
" see no alternative but to move front and fight ? 

" A. Yes ; move to the front and attack. 

" Q. You thinkj-it would not be practicable to 
'• move a portion of your troops here and occupy 
" this place (near Compton's ) ? 

>k A. I wouldn' t do it. I have seen such attempts 
'' made ; a great deal depends upon who do it ; 
" what kind of troops you liave. I hold it to 
"liea general rule to never try to establish a line 
" of battle that the enemy have any chance to ' 
' get hold of before you do. 

" Q. Success then depends upon a question of 
" time, whether you w r ere there before the ene- 
kk my? 

" A. Yes. Well, it comes under the general 
" head of military principles never to establish 



103 

" your point of concentration inside of the ene- 
" my's line." 

So lie goes on further, at greater length and 
to the same effect, that if he desired to move over 
to the right and occupy the ground which it is 
claimed Porter should have occupied, the way to do 
it, in the eye of a military man, was to move over 
and feel and attack the enemy in front of you, clear 
them out from this rise of ground on the opposite 
side of Dawkin's Branch, advance over Stuart's Hill, 
about which so much has been said, and then you 
would be in a position to move upon Groveton. 
Now, we are obliged to rely upon the testimony of 
a skillful and accomplished officer, as to whose 
capacity there can be no question in a matter of 
engineering and military movements ; and we are 
content to rely upon the testimony of General 
Warren in the obvious situation upon the strong- 
hold that General Porter had arrived at, as demon- 
strating the entire propriety of his movements 
before the receipt of the joint order, and before the 
arrival of McDowell ; and so clear is it, as we sup- 
pose, to military men, that Porter's actual move- 
ments were dictated by the highest military intel- 
ligence and skill, that it is the reason why Mc- 
Dowell has always said that Porter committed no 
fault until after his own departure from the scene, 
and everybody connected with the case heretofore 
has admitted that that is so. But now for the first 
time the learned Recorder advances the theory that 
all this is wrong ; that independent of the joint 
order, independent of anything, independent of 
having that interview with McDowell, and especially 
after that interview, that it was Porter's duty to 
have marched to the right immediately on arrival 
at Dawkin's Branch, and to occupy the battle 
ground of the night before, because the purpose of 
the order was to move to Gibbon's Wood, the scene 
of the last night's fight. Now, the Recorder can 



104 

fight a very good battle, if you get the enemy out 
of the way, I will agree. If there had been no 
enemy, any boy could have seen that when he got 
to Dawkin's Branch, if he was in sight of Groveton, 
and there was no enemy commanding the heights 
opposite, why, lie could go to Groveton. The 
Recorder has gone to great effort to discover this 
road. Singularly enough, some kind individual, 
apparently not connected with this case, but a 
student of it, has made and circulated a map which 
by a happy coincidence exactly conforms to the 
Recorder s idea of the situation, and of what then 
should have been done. 

The Recorder : I should like to ask if that is 
in evidence ? 

Mr. Choate : No ; I propose to ask to have it 
incorporated as a part of my argument. 

The Recorder : As an historical illustration \ 

Mr. Choate : As a geographical illustration. It 
is a singular piece of prophetic foresight in who- 
ever prepared this map that he should so exactly 
have hit the views afterwards expressed by the 
learned Recorder. I suppose I can have it incor- 
porated as a part of my argument, because it shows 
exactly the condition in which the learned Re- 
corder's proposed movement would be a right 
one, and why it would not be exactly the 
wrong one, as demonstrated by General Warren. 
It was wholly unnecessary for the delineator of 
this map to lay out a broad army road from Deats 
to Lewis Lane, through the valley of Dawkin's 
Bianch, because on either condition it does not 
make any difference whether there was a road there 
or not. This road, known only to Lieutenant 
Brooke and the Recorder, occupies a very con- 
spicuous position upon this map. Then, a very 
important condition, a necessary condition, is to get 
the troops out of the way from the held in front, 
from the high ground corresponding to Dawkin's 



105 

Branch, across on the north-west side. That is 
most happily and successfully done by the pro- 
jector of this map, by withdrawing the whole of 
Longstreet's force, after he had got in position, 
and we have proved that when Porter arrived at 
Dawkins' Branch, he had substantially got in posi- 
tion, withdrawing all those forces in the rear of 
Page Land Lane, and placing them exactly half 
way between Gainesville and Groveton, a most ex- 
traordinary thing to do with a rebel army under 
snch an accomplished general as Lee, with such an 
aid as Longstreet, after they had been driving 
through Gainesville three or four hours before, at 
the top of their speed, for the purpose of re- 
enforcing Jackson at Groveton. Then another 
necessary part of the condition is to compress the 
rebel force into such a narrow place into the awk- 
ward position into which he has drawn them, or a 
very large part of them, up behind the rebel bat- 
teries that were posted between Jackson and Long- 
street. What good any of them could do there, it 
is impossible to see, because it is demonstrated by 
the evidence that that was very low ground, and 
they would have had to fire through several ridges 
in order to reach anybody anywhere. That is so 
happily in accordance with the views' of the Re- 
corder, that I skull ask to have it incorporated as 
illustrative of my argument. 

[This map will be found in Appendix as Map G.] 



The Receipt of Joint Order,' and McDowell's 
Arrival. 

Now, what happened when General McDowell 
came up, for that is one of the important questions. 
General McDowell, we have proved, and this he has 
not contradicted, although he says he doesn't recol- 
lect it, General McDowell rushes up with the joint 
order (which, of course, having been just re- 



106 

ceived is fresh in the minds of both and does 
not need much discussion) he comes quickly 
up, having now, however, accomplished a purpose 
which he had in view, in writing to General Pope 
in the morning. He has the joint order which now, 
under the articles of war, places him, for the first 
time, in command of all the forces. Porter now, 
and until they separate, is his mere lieutenant. 
What does he do? He rushes up and sees what 
is going on. Does he not ? He says so. He says 
that the skirmishers were already engaged. What 
does that mean ? Engaged with whom ? Why, 
engaged with the skirmishers of the rebel army on 
the opposite height. That he saw himself. He is 
informed that shots have been exchanged. AVhat 
does he say? He says, "Porter you are too far 
" out ; this is no place to fight a battle." What did 
he mean X Here we come first to the consideration 
of the joint order, as those Generals considered it. 
Now, Avhat was deemed too far out by that joint 
order I Why, there was this : 

" One thing must be held in view, that the 
" troops must occupy a position from which 
" they can reach Bull Run by night, or by morn- 
" ning. The indications are, that the whole 
" force of the enemy is moving in this direction, 
" at a pace that will bring them here by to- 
" morrow night or the next day." 

Another passage which you will recollect is : 

"It may be necessary to fall back behind 
" Bull Run, at Centreville, to-night. I presume 
"it will be so on account of our supplies." 
Such was the situation. Here was Porter, a 

mere lieutenant to McDowell, from the moment of 

the latter' s arrival, after the receipt of the joint 

order. 

We proved by live witnesses, that McDowell 

gave him this order—" Porter you are too far out. 



107 

"This is no place to fight a battle " — two of them 
new witnesses introduced upon this trial, in ad- 
dition to those who testified before. Was it iinding 
on Porter ? Nobody questions. Was it given % 
Nobody can doubt it. Now, what was he to do % 
It thwarted his plan, which had been to feel and 
press the enemy, as he was already doing by But- 
terfield, and the express testimony is, that he 
obeys the order and withdraws Batterfield, leaving 
his skirmish line out. Now, what next happened ? 
What was there in the joint order that they had to 
look to ? 

" You will please move forward with your 
' ' joint commands towards Gainesville. I sent 
" General Porter written orders to that effect an 
" hour and a half ago. Heintzleman, Sigel and 
" Reno are moving on the Warrenton turnpike, 
" and must now be not far from Gainesville." 

Let me pause there, to ask the Board one ques- 
tion, which I do not quite understand. This joint 
order was written by General Pope, at Centreville, 
at 10 o'clock in the morning. Sigel, at least, un- 
der his directions, had commenced a severe skir- 
mish with the enemy, on the turnpike, at six 
o'clock. Tell me, if you can, why no reference is 
made to that in this despatch \ This despatch, as 
expressed, is an order of pursuit, and not an order 
of battle. Was it possible that General Pope, the 
responsible commander of all those forces, was ig- 
norant, four hours after it had taken place, of an 
important skirmish between Sigel 1 s force, and 
Jackson's force, at Groveton ? Was it possible, 
that knowing it, he left it intentionally out of this 
despatch, in so important a communication to 
McDowell and Porter ? But he did leave it out. 
He does not indicate the least suspicion on his 
part, that an immediate action is impending. He 
makes it an order of pursuit, as I. think you will 
see. 



108 

" I desire that as soon as communication is 
" established between this force and your own, 
k ' the whole command shall halt." 
Halt with what view? 
The next word is : 

" It may be necessary to fall back behind 
" Bull Run, at Centreville, to-night. I presume 
" it will be so on account of our supplies." 

Now, in respect to this order, if this was in the 
minds of both generals when General McDowell 
rode up, what did General McDowell mean by say- 
ing: "Yon are too far out. This is no place to 
"fight a battleT' Did not he mean that the time 
had come, hearing this tiring on the right, at Grove- 
ton, and knowing that there the Federal forces had 
probably stopped, did not he mean to indicate — 
was it not plain upon the face of the situation, 
without even this indication, that when he said : 
"You are too far out," he meant that this 
was the time and the place to halt, according 
to the directions of the joint order! I suppose 
so. Then, what was the next thing ? The next 
thing was to obey the joint order, unless they 
should see fit to vary in the exercise of that discre- 
tion which was now McDowell's direction in carry- 
ing it out. "As soon as communication is estab- 
" lished between this force and your own, the whole 
" command shall halt." Well, communication was 
not established ; but there was the place, according 
to General McDowell's indication to make a com- 
munication — not connection. The word is not " con- 
" nection," which 1 understand has a very different 
military significance from "communication ;" but 
communication at least, was possible. Now, what 
do they do ? They proceeded through that un- 
known woods to a point down here [on the railroad, 
nearly half a mile east of Dawkin's Branch], to see 
what there was,, and how it was practicable 
to make communication, the remaining duty en- 



109 

joined by the joint order. They go over across the 
railroad on horseback, and come down and water 
their horses in this stream, which I do not consider 
must have been necessarily Dawkin's Branch, but 
some stream that ran into Dawkin's Branch. 

Now, irrespective of the dispute which appears 
to be in the case, as to what orders General McDow- 
ell gave when he left, let us see what was determined 
at any rate, beyond all dispute. What were they 
there for ? What could be the only object of their 
riding there % Of course, to see about this communi- 
cation with Heintzleman, Sigel and Reynolds, on the 
left of the Federal troops. They came back, didn't 
they ? They found that that could not be done 
there, did they not, unless by this happy device of 
the Recorder, according to that map, which neither 
of them was soldier enough to think of \ They 
found they could not do it. Now, it is suggest- 
ed, and McDowell claims to have originated the 
idea, of his taking King's division around, which 
Porter testified in the McDowell Court of In- 
quiry, that he perhaps first suggested. When 
they met at Dawkin's Branch, is it difficult to see 
how it actually took place ? There is no doubt that 
the request to put King on his right had been 
made in most urgent terms by General Mc- 
Dowell, aggrieved as he felt himself in the 
taking away of King's Division at their unhappy 
conversation at Manassas Junction. Now, then, 
they come up to study this quesiotn of com 
munication. McDowell has stopped Porter's ad- 
vance. Porter says that he suggested it. Well, 
what does that mean % It was the suggestion 
of a lieutenant to his chief, was itnot % — a 
suggestion in deference to what had been said 
at Manassas Junction, before he had come under 
McDowell's command, was it not? And what did 
it amount to % 

Why, "as you cannot get through here in 
" the face of that enemy in front of us, it is 



110 

" possible to carry out your idea, by taking 
" King's division around by the Sudley road, 
" and come up and make this communication. " 

At any rate, that was the plan which McDowell, 
under his then responsibility, conceived ; and it was 
apparently concurred in by General Porter at the mo- 
ment, for he says, in his answer to Secretary Chan- 
dler, which is harped upon here as a contradiction, 
that, when McDowell left him, he understood that 
•hat was his idea. I cannot see any contradiction 
between his various statements on the subject. I wish 
I had time to read them all, and show you that 
they are exactly alike, and consistent with his 
statement as made here, and with the proved posi- 
tion as we claim it. I speak apart from anything 
that was said or any orders given. It was deter- 
mined by .McDowell, whose responsibility it was to 
determine, to take King around by the Sudley road. 
What was that for? What must Porter have un- 
derstood it to be for? Was it for General McDow- 
ell's troops to wander up the Sudley road to the 
turnpike ? No ; it was to make the communication 
required by the joint order, by going around the 
Sudley road, and coming in on the ground between 
him and Reynolds. Is there any question then 
that communication would have been established 
as required by the joint order ? Is there in the 
least a question that it never was established ? 
Whose fault was it ? Was it Porter's ? Is not Mc- 
Dowell and his force the missing link throughout 
this day ? There is a map here, as I have stated, as 
to what they did ; and General McDowell did not 
come in and make a connection or communication. 
Was Porter to doit? Should they both do it? 
General McDowell left him there and went around 
by the Sudley Springs road to make the connection 
which the joint order required. It would have been a 
very stupid violation of the understanding, if, while 
McDowell was going around, Porter had gone over 



Ill 

and occupied the ground to which McDowell had 
agreed to go, would it not ? So, I say, that Porter's 
conduct is justified without am reference to any 
dispute that there may be about what was said. 

Let us see what became of McDowell's troops? 

Now, I introduce a map which I ask to have in- 
corporated as part of my argument to show where 
General McDowell went, upon the evidence, as I 
understand it. Here [along Dawkin' s Branch, and on 
Manassas — Gainesville road] is Porter's force ; here, 
substantially in the same position is where McDowell 
left him ; here, [the prolongation north of Porter's 
line], is where the connection was to be made, some- 
where in a direct line from here to the federal force 
at Groveton. Now, did General McDowell ever 
come there \ Here, [just east of the Chinn house, on 
and near the Sudley Springs road] is King's divis- 
ion at six o'clock. There is not the least symptom 
of any attempt by McDowell to occupy that ground, 
Porter was abandoned by him here, and Ji it was 
the understanding that McDowell should make the 
connection, or form on the left of Reynolds, that 
understanding was never carried out. [This map 
will be found in Appendix as Map E.] 

I desire now to call your attention to what was 
done under the joint order by General McDowell, 
One thing lie certainly did do ; he observed the 
precaution ; he held it in view, that Ms part of the 
troops should occupy a position from which they 
could reach Bull Run that night. General Patrick, 
at pages 189 and 190 of the new record, states what 
was done. Let us see whether General McDowell 
carried out his purpose of making that connec- 
tion. General Patrick was one of General Mc- 
Dowell's brigade commanders ; he describes the 
march ; he describes the orders. Now, I do not care 
whether it was McDowell's responsibility or Pope's 
responsibility ; Pope was fighting that battle, and 
the responsibility lay between them for the move- 



112 

nit 'lit of McDowell's forces after they got up on to 
the Sudley road ; certainly not on General Porter. 

li While I had been at Bethlehem Church, and 
in the interim between the time I had left 
Manassas, and this time I had struck the Sudley 
Springs road, the other brigades of the divi- 
sion, under General Hatch, had moved on up 
the Sudley Springs road on the pike, so I was 
now in the rear instead of leading. They came 
up in this neighborhood, not very far from 
Conrad's, although I don't recollect the house. 
He left me after striking the Sudley Springs 
road, as near as I can recollect, near Conrad's, 
and was gone a little while, and came back, 
and then left again. 

" Q. Did McDowell give you aivy order there? 
" A. He left me here and told me to take this 
" position on the road and to the left of it, I 
" think. I was subsequently moved by General 
" Hatch somewhere up near this road that runs 
" to Chinn's house from the Sudley Springs 
" road ; it was under the cover of a wood. 
" Q. How far from the Sudley Springs road ? 
" A. Close by, a little off to the left, a hundred 
li or two hundred yards ; that was my second 
" position. The first assignment was by General 
" McDowell, and the second by General Hatch. 
" I was then moved, but by whose order I don't 
" now recollect, in past the shoulder of this wood 
" to the east of the Chinn house. I think that 
" must have been by McDowell, to be near to 
" support the Pennsylvania Reserve that were up 
" here in this wood northwest of the Chinn 
" house. All this time I was here, there was 
" artillery firing going on, over along in this 
"direction [north of the pike]. Apparently I 
" could see from certain points what I afterwards 
4t Learned to be the Dogan house. And in that 
" neighborhood and along here there was firing. 



113 

4 ' I wsa the smoke and heard the discharges. In 
" here [woods south of Young's Branch] I should 
" say that at that time there was rather more 
" wood and undergrowth and brush near this 
" creek [Young's Branch] than is represented 
" on the map, but I could not say. I was then 
" ordered by a^staff-officer of General Pope, I 
" don't recollect who — a mounted staff-officer 
" came up to me and said, 'General Pope di- 
" rects you to take your command down directly 
" across to the pike in the neighborhood of that 
" crest where Sigel is at work.' 

" Q. Down by the Sudley Springs road ? 

" A. No. Go right down across ; and, particu- 
" larly in the exhausted condition of the men, it 
" was a very hard march to get down through 
" there. We had reached this stream, Young's 
" Branch, and part over it. I suppose that we 
" were about two-thirds of the way to three- 
" fourths, when a staff-officer of General McDow- 
" ell 

" Q. This is the fifth order that you got ? 

" A. Well, I don't know — directed me to re- 
" turn instantly to my former position, with 
" some other instructions as to supporting Rey- 
*' nolds, and pushing in nearer to him farther in 
" to the west. I came back towards the Chinn 
" house, but farther than I had been when I 
" went in ; I cannot tell exactly where I was. I 
" saw Reynolds before I left and had some con- 
" versation with him. 

" Q. Can you locate where you had that 
" conversation with Reynolds and what he was 
' ' doing ? 

"A. It was in this neighborhood [south of 
"Young's Branch and northwest of the Chinn 
" house], just beyond the point where the wood- 
u road crosses the arrow line. There was skir- 
" mishing going on in there. 



114 

" Q. You got your brigade there, did you ? 

• k A. Yes." 
Either the making of communication by the 
plan thai McDowell agreed upon was impossible, 
or if possible, he did not accomplish it. Either al- 
ternative, is equally satisfactory to us on behalf of 
General Porter. 



Disobedience of the Joint Order. 

Now, we come to this question of the disobedi- 
ence of the joint order. As I understand this joint 
orderj it docs not direct an attack, it directs a pur- 
suit. But, of course, the Recorder says, that you 
cannot say it does not contemplate an attack. Any 
movement in pursuit of a liying enemy contem- 
plates the possibility of an attack. But the not 
making an attack is not a disobedience to the joint 
order ; that is a disobedience to the military rules 
that control the situation. How was it in this 
case? It has never been claimed by anybody, by 
General McDowell, or General Pope, or by Judge 
Advocate Holt, or by the Recorder, that the joint 
order, taken by itself, was disobeyed. Not a bit of 
it. \Vh;it is the claim \ Why, that the joint order 
as modified by General McDowell was disobeyed, 
asserting the right of McDowell on leaving Porter 
to modify it. So the Judge Advocate, and General 
Pope, and General McDowell, say, that a violation 
of i he joint order was committed ; a violation of the 
joint order, as modified by McDowell, because 
Genera] McDowell directed him to make an attack. 
Now, what does the learned Recorder say? He 
says that Porter violated the joint order as modi- 
fied by McDowell, not because he did not make an 
attack, he should not have made an attack, says 
I he Recorder. That was an unmilitary movement ; it 
was contrary to the recognized principles of war- 
fare— but he violated the joint order, as modified 



115 

by McDowell, because, when he got to Dawkin'e 
Branch, he did not wheel around and march up to 
the right, straight to the front of the enemy at 
Groveton. General McDowell, at Governor's 
Island, protested against being defended by the 
Recorder. I see now, perhaps, what he meant, 
although I do not believe the Recorder then dis- 
closed this view. It is a complete going back upon 
all of my learned Mend's antecedents. Nobody 
heretofore has suggested this view ; and as I said 
at the beginning of my argument, if we are to take 
him as the authoritative mouth-piece of this prosecu- 
tion on this important part of the case, we need not 
consider it any further. For, he now asserts that 
McDowell was all wrong ; that General Pope did 
not know anything about it ; that the Judge Ad- 
vocate General was entirely in the clouds, and that 
Porter's error, joint order or no joint order, and 
particularly under the order of General McDowell, 
ordering him to go to the right, was in sending But- 
ternVkl across, in pressing the enemy upon the 
other side of Dawkin's Branch, that he should 
have marched up to the right— they said that he 
should have attacked, and attacked more vigorous- 
ly. Well, I must leave them to settle their hash 
between themselves ; I certainly cannot solve that 
problem. This, at least, is absolutely clear, that if, 
on arrival at Dawkin's Branch, it was the obvious 
duty of Porter to proceed, at once to the right to 
make the Gibbon's woods, that was as obviously 
the duty of McDowell when he arrived at the front 
in command of the united forces. If it was the 
right thing to do, why didn't McDowell do it ? 

Now, I fall back briefly upon the consideration of 
the case as it stands. We must either leave McDowell 
out or the Recorder out ; and it does seem to me 
that his presentation of the case disposes of itself. 
Now, I propose to leave him out, and consider a 
little further the case, as made without him. Now' 



116 

how is it ? Here is a case presenting this remark- 
able situation. I did intend to read what Generals 
Pope and McDowell said on that subject. I think 
I will briefly call your attention to that, because it 
bears on the question of the construction of the 
joint order. "Was it, as the Recorder now claims, 
to go right up to the battle-field of the night before, 
or get in behind that battle-field and reach Gaines- 
ville ? General Pope, at page 14 of the general 
court-martial record, says : (I think it is refreshing 
after the views that have been presented, to go back 
to what he and McDowell said on the former trial). 

" I then sent a joint order to Generals Porter 
" and McDowell, directed to them at Manassas 
" Junction, specifying, in detail, the movement 
" that I wished to be made by the troops under 
" their command — the withdrawal of King's di- 
" vision, of McDowell's corps, which, during the 
" greater part of the night, I had understood to 
" be on the ^Yal•renton turnpike, and west of the 
" troops under Jackson. Their withdrawal to 
" Manassas Junction, I feared, had left open 
" Jackson's retreat in the direction of Thorough- 
" fare Gap, to which point the main portion of 
" the army of Lee was then tending, -tore-enforce 
" him. I did not desire to jmrsue Jackson be- 
" yond the town of Gainesville, as we could not 
" have done so on account of the Avant of supplies 
" — rations for the men and forage for the horses. 
" My order to Generals Porter and McDow r ell is, 
" therefore, worded that they shall pursue the 
" route to Gainesville, until they effect a junction 
" with the forces that are marching upon Gaines - 
" ville from Centreville — the forces under Heint- 
" zleman, Sigel and Reno : and that when that 
" junction was formed, (as I expected it would 
'• have been very near to Gainesville,) the whole 
" command should halt, it being, as I stated be- 
" fore, not feasible with my command in the con- 



117 

" dition it was in, on account of su'pplies, to 
" pursue Jackson's forces further." 

Then at page 30, General Pope further says — 
now, here is a pretty good answer to the Recorder. 

" Q. Will you state on what road you intend- 
" ed General Porter should march to Gainesville, 
" in the execution of your written order, referred 
" to in the joint order of the 29th of August? 

" A. I intended him to march on the direct 
" road from Manassas Junction to Gainesville. 

" Q. Would that road have brought theaccus- 
" ed and his command to the battle-field at 
" Groveton?" 

Now, my learned friend insisted that you should 
construe the joint order, so that it would have 
brought them on to the battle-field at Groveton. 
Then at page 33 : 

" I knew the position of the enemy, who oc- 
" cupied a line perpendicular to the Warrenton 
" turnpike, and at or near the town of Groveton ; 
" I was sure, from the orders I had given him, 
" that General Porter must be somewhere between 
" Manassas Junction and Gainesville, on the 
" road to Gainesville." 

So that you see a departure from the road to 
Gainesville, would have been a departure from 
General Pope's idea. 

" So far I knew, within certain limits, though 
" not exactly, the relative positions of General 
" Porter and of the enemy. My belief was that 
" the road from Manassas Junction to Gaines- 
" ville, either passed by the right flank or was 
" occupied by that flank of the enemy, and that 
" Porter's march, if pursued, conducted him 
" either to the right flank of the enemy or past 
" the right flank of the enemy, towards his 
" rear," 

But it is not necessary to occupy any further 



118 

time in rending from the record about that, it is so 
clear what the understanding of Pope and Mc- 
] )( >w ell was about it, that they were to move towards 
Gainesville and not in any other direction. This 
new figment of the imagination about turning off at 
Dawkin's Branch, is to my mind a wild and delusive 
one. Now, how was it \ If you cannot impute 
any violation of that joint order except as modified 
by McDowell, was there any modification of it 1 
General Porter says there was, b}^ General Mc- 
Dowell telling him to remain where he was. Gen- 
eral McDowell says there was, by his giving Porter 
an immediate order to make a vigorous attack upon 
the right flank of the enemy in front of him. Now, 
which is right 1 Did General McDowell give any 
such order as he claims to have done? He says, he 
told him, "put your troops in here ;" but you will 
still recollect his description of it which has been 
brought to your attention by Mr. Bullitt — his in- 
terpretation of those words given on the former 
trial — when he is brought to the point of what he 
meant, saying: "I meant just what is stated in 
'• the 4:30 P. M. order." Well, there is no doubt 
about what that was, and what that order directed, 
because that is just what McDowell testified on the 
former trial that he meant to say, and did say by, 
"Put your troops in here." The 4:30 p. M. order 
says : 

"Your line of march brings you in on the 
k ' enemy's right flank. 1 desire you to push for- 
" ward into action at once on the enemy's flank, 
" and if possible on his rear, keeping your right 
"in communication with General Reynolds. 
•• The enemy is massed in the woods, in front of 
" us." 

Now, did General McDowell give any such order 
as that ? We say he did not. lie swore upon the 
former trial that he did. The case went against 
General Porter on the violation of this joint order 



119 

upon the belief of the court-martial, that General 
McDowell did give such an order. Now, did he do 
it ? In the first place let us see what the two gen- 
erals knew on the subject of the force in front of 
them at that time. We have seen, up to the time of 
General McDowell's arriving, that General Porter 
was not very fully informed ; he saw there was 
a force there, and he was proceeding to feel it and 
press it ; he had taken a couple of scouts who said 
it was Long-street's force, and that opened his eyes. 
What came with McDowell ? McDowell brought 
a despatch from Euford. What did that tell him ? 
Why, if they were not fools, it told them every- 
thing ; it told them that all of Longstreet's force 
was there. Because you will observe in what I have 
read from General Pope's testimony, that he un- 
derstood perfectly well that it was the main army 
of Lee that was pressing through Thoroughfare Gap 
to re-enforce Jackson ; no small detachment, no 
room for any quibbling about divisions or brigades, 
but it was the main army of Lee that was pressing 
through, and nobody knew it better than McDow- 
ell. Had he not been stationed in front of Lee on 
the Rappahannock when Jackson broke off from 
him ? Do not his despatches subsequently show that 
he knew well that what Lee was fearing was that 
he could not get through Thoroughfare Gap in time 
to relieve Jackson ? That was obvious without any 
special information ; it se^ms to me that the young- 
est lieutenant in the army might have guessed it, 
and ought necessarily to have inferred it. Now, 
the Recorder says that the captured scouts may 
have been two of Robertson's troopers, and that 
Robertson's troopers were not with Longstreet: they 
were with Jackson. Was that quite ingenuous ? 
Did he suppose that he could mislead the minds of 
this Board by such a suggestion as that % What 
does this despatch of Buford's say ? 



120 

" Headquartees Cavalry [ 
Brigade, 9:30 a. m. f 

'^Seventeen regiments, one battery, five hun- 
" clred cavalry, passed through Gainesville three 
" quarters of an hour ago, on the Centreville 
"road. I think this division should join our 
" forces now engaged at once. 
" Please forward this. 

John Buford, 

Brig. General." 

That was Buford who had been sent to keep 
watch of them. The Recorder has saved me the 
trouble of counting those troops. They were 14. 100 
men, he says— more than one-half of the main army 
of Lee that was pressing forward with all speed to 
relieve Jackson, as they all understood it. What 
had happened? Why, a quarter before nine, just 
about the time that General Porter received his or- 
der to reverse march at Manassas Junction, they 
had, what? Come through Thoroughfare Gap? 
No. Reached Gainesville ? No ; \mt passed through 
Gainesville — the main army of Lee that was 
coming through Thoroughfare Gap, that was 
what ,had come. I do not mean the en- 
tire army that had come up from Rich- 
mond. I mean the main army ; the portion 
that Jackson had left or broken himself off 
from, when he came through Thoroughfare Gap. 
Now, then, if they came to re-enforce Jackson 
post-haste and had passed through Gainesville, 
which is nearer to Dawkin's Branch by far ; a little 
more than half as far as the distance from Man- 
assas Junction to Dawkin's Branch; if those two 
generals were not fools, didn't they know who and 
what was in front of them \ There were, at least, 
14,100 men. I do not care whether they were at 
Stuart's Hill, or between there and the turn-pike, 
or between there and this road ; they were there ; 
they commanded this position on the other side of 



121 

Dawkin's Branch, whichf General Warren has de- 
scribed as a stronghold, corresponding to this 
stronghold on which Porter was. General Mc- 
Dowell disavowed knowing anything about Long- 
street, and led the court-martial to believe that he 
did not believe they were there. But you must 
put yourselves in the places of Generals McDowell 
and Porter, when they read that despatch of Bu- 
ford on that ground, and found that those two scouts 
had reported Longstreet's men in front of them. 
What ought they to have understood? But we 
are not left to that. We are not left to any mere 
calculation, because McDowell himself says what 
he thought about it. At page 803, of the new re- 
cord, it does seem to me this question is settled 
beyond all dispute. Here is the passage to which 
I call the attention of the Board. 

"Q. When you testified on the former trial 
" of General Porter, were you of the belief that 
" the force mentioned by General Buford's 
" despatch was the whole rebel force in. front of 
" General Porter that afternoon ? 

" A. Did not I answer the question a little 
" while ago % 

" Q. I now call your attention to later in the 
" afternoon % 

" A. I left General Porter about noon. After 
" that time I knew nothing of what occurred in 
" his front. 

" Q. You knew of no increase of rebel force 
" in his front? 

" A. I knew nothing of what occurred in his 
" front. 

" Q. When you testified on the court-martial, 
" it was with the belief that the rebel force in 
" front of Porter all that afternoon was limited 
" to the troops mentioned in Buford's despatch ! 

"A. I didn't say that." 
Of course, we knew that he would not stultify 



122 

himself by saying that, so we pressed the ques- 
tion. 

U Q. I ask you ? 

"A. No; I don't. I say that was not a 
" question that came up. I acted upon that 
11 tiling up to twelve o'clock." 
That is, on Buford's despatch ? 

''After I went away from there I had no 
" further concern personally with that question. 
" / took it for granted that there toould be other 
"forces come up." 

Of course, they took it for granted. They were 
educated at West Point, were they not ? They 
knew that here was an army of 25,000 men, more 
than half of which had passed through Gainesville 
at a quarter before nine, and the question was at 
twelve, where were they? Were those troops in- 
terfering with their progress? Longstreet was 
another name for the main army of Lee. How 
much was it? Fourteen thousand one hundred 
men certainly already there, and they took it for 
granted that the rest were coming. General 
MdDowell says, " That under those circumstances 
" he told General Porter to attack at once with his 
" whole force." That he swore to on the former 
trial. Was he mistaken about it? May he have 
been mistaken about it? I will not re-argue that 
question. It has been so fully argued by Mr. 
Bullitt. Of course, he was mistaken. Of course, 
this lamentable result of the first trial upon General 
Poller came from that testimony. 

Bui though I will not argue it, this feature of the 
case is of such vital importance to General Porter 
thai 1 must, at the risk of some repetition, call the 
attention of the Board to the direct and absolute 
inconsistency between General McDowell's evidence 
at the court-martial and his new evidence before 
this Board in respect to the nature and effect of the 
directions claimed by him to have been given to 



123 

General Porter when they were together at Daw- 
kins' Branch, and jnst before they separated. 

On page 85 of the Court-Martial Record, General 
McDowell testified as follows : 

"The question with me was how, soonest with- 
in the limit fixed by General Pope, this force 
"of ours could be applied against the enemy. 
"General Porter made a remark to me which 
" showed me that he had no question but that 
" the enemy was in his immediate front. I said 
"to him: 'You put your force in here, and I 
" ' will take mine up the Sudley Spring Road, on 
" ' the left of the troops engaged at that point 
" ' with the enemy,' or words to that effect. I 
" left General Porter with the belief and under- 
" standing that he would put his force in at that 
"point," 

And again, on the same page, he testifies : 

"After seeing the larger part of my troops on 
"the Siidle}^ Spring road, I rode forward to the 
"head of the column. I met a messenger from 
" General Pope. I stopped him and saw that he 
" had an order addressed to General Porter alone. 
" I do not recollect more than t\\e general pur- 
" port or tenor of that order. It was to the effect 
" that he should throw his corps upon the right 
" flank or rear of the enemy from the position he 
" then occupied." 

The order being shown him, he says : 

"I can only say that the order that I saw in 
" passing was of that same import." 

And that order I have already read to thp Board. 
It is a positive direction to Porter in these words : 

"Your line of march brings you in on the 
" enemy's right flank. I desire you to push for- 
" ward into action at once, on the enemy's flank, 



124 

" if possible on the rear, keeping your right in 
11 communication with General Reynolds." 
On page 87 he testifies : 

" Question. When did you first see the order 
" of which you have spoken in your testimony - 
" in-chief,— that of 4:30 P. M., of the 29th of Au- 
" gust, which directed the accused to turn the 
" right flank and attack the enemy in the rear? 
" You have been understood as saying that that 
" was the effect of the joint order. That is not 
" your meaning, is it ? 

"Answer. It was the effect of the joint order, 
" as modified by me, when I left General Porter, 
" so far as I had the power to modify that order, 
" and so far as the understanding with which I 
" left him at the time. 

"Question. Are you to be understood as say- 
"ing that before you saw the order to General 
" Porter of 4,30 p. m. of the 29th of August, you, 
" under the discretion you supposed was reposed 
" in you by the joint order to yourself and Gene- 
" ral Porter, had directed him to attack the 
" enemy's right flank and rear ? 

"Answer. To that effect, yes, sir , I knew I had 
"that discretion." 

Again on page 92, he testifies : 

" Question. When you saw the order from 
" General Pope to General Porter, the one sub- 
sequent to the joint order, did you give, or 
"had you given any order to General Porter, 
" which would interfere with his obedience to 
"it? 

" Answer. None. 

"Question. The orders you had given to Gene- 
"ral Porter, were not in opposition, or, at least,t 
" not of a different character, from the one tha 
" came to him from General Pope \ 

"Answer. They concurred. The arrangements 
" that I supposed to exist when I left General 



125 

"Porter, concurred with the order which I after- 
" wards saw, from General Pope to General Por- 
"ter. They were to the same effect, except as to 
"details, which General Pope may have given. 
" I gave no details." 
And on page 95 he testifies : 

" Question. When you left General Porter, 
" for the purpose of taking the Sudley Spring 
"road, did you or not expect that he would 
" attack the enemy as soon as he could reach 
" them, and did you or not consider it his duty 
"to do it? 

"Answer. I have already said as much, I 
" think ; at least I meant to say it. 

"Question. Had the accused made a vigorous 
" attack with his force on the right flank of the 
"enemy, at any time before the battle closed, 
" would or would not in your opinion, the decisive 
" result in favor of the Union army of which you 
"have spoken, have followed ? 

"Answer. 1 think it would." 

Here, then, as plain as language can state it, was 
the evidence of General McDowell to the Court 
Martial, that before leaving General Porter, he ad- 
dressed to him the words ;" Put your troops in 
here," thereby, meaning to instruct him to make 
an immediate attack on the right flank and rear of 
the enemy posted in front of him, upon the other 
side of Dawkins' Branch ; and that this was the 
sense, in which he was doubtless understood by the 
Court Martial, as doubtless he intended to be, 
and also, how deeply this piece of evidence weighed 
against General Porter upon that trial, appears 
from the use that was made of it by Judge Advo- 
cate General Holt, in his notorious paper to the 
President. 

Now, in contrast with this testimony, it is my 
painful duty to call your attention to the new and 
wholly different version of this transaction, given 



126 

by General McDowell on his examination before 
you at Governor's Island. 

On pages 802-3 of the Board Record, he testiiies 
as follows : 

"Question. Didn't you think that when you 
"left him, he was left to the unrestrained opera- 
" tions of General Pope's joint order ? 

"Answer. No, sir; as modified by me. It is 
"for the Board to decide that question. 

"Question. Suppose that General Porter as- 
" certained, after you left him, that the rebel 
"force in front of him was twice what you had 
"supposed it to be, and spoken of to him, and 
" twice Porter's own force, do you think then 
"that he should have made an attack ? 

"Answer. I think he should have found out 
" the force. 

"Question. You say he should have tested 
" and found out the force? 

"Answer. 1 think so; that is a question for 
" this Board. 

" Question. Now, having tested and found out 
" a force quite as large as his own, do you think 
" he should have attacked them ? 

" Answer. He should have made some fcenta- 
" tive operations. There are a number of ways 
" of attacking ; you attack headlong, or you 
"skirmish, or you shell; but to do nothing 
" whatever, certainly would not be complying 
44 with the order — to make no effort with the 
" troops. 

"Question. Now, I ask you, if after making 
" efforts necessary for the purpose, he had ascer- 
" tained there was a force there double his own, 
" after you left him and took King away ; do you 
" say that he should have attacked? 

" Answer. He should have made an attack) 
" yes. 

"Question. He should have made an attack 
" just as yon ordered it? 



127 

" Answer. My order was, I confess to you 
" a very vague one. It was made to a 
" person whose zeal and activity and energy I 
" had every knowledge of. I did not pretend 
" to give him any particular instructions ordirec- 
" tions that he should skirmish, or shell, or 
" charge, or anything of that sort ; I merely in- 
" dicatedthe direction in which his troops should 
" be applied. Further than that I did not think, 
"and would not think now, if I had the thing 
" to go over again to direct. 

" Question. You did not construe it as an 
" order given by you to an inferior general ? 

" Answer. Certainly I did. 

" Question. What did you mean, then, by 
" giving orders that were vague, anda*mounted 
" to nothing? 

" Answer. I did not say that. 

" Question. Well, gave orders of the kind you 
' ' have described ? 

"Answer. What orders? 

" Question. What did you mean by giving 
" orders 'vague' and merely an indication? 

" Answer. I meant just what I said, that 
" General Porter commanded a corps. I did not 
" tell him that he should deploy so many troops, 
" or that he should put in so many skirmishers, 
" or so many batteries, and do this, that or the 
" other. Those are questions of detail which, as 
" an army corps commander, he was to carry 
" out. All I did was to give line to his opera- 
" tions. 

"Question: You meant that with the indica- 
"tion you gave him, he should act on his own 
1 ' discretion ? 

"Answer Yes, but he should act. 

"Question. Now I come back to the question 
" I put to you before. If after acting, he ascer- 
" tained the presence of a rebel force in front 
" of him twice as great as his own, twice as great 



128 

" as you on leaving him had supposed it to be, 
"he should have brought on a general fight with 
" them? 

"Answer. He should not have brought on so 
" general a fight as to have thrown the whole 
" of his force headlong upon this supposed dou- 
" ble force of the enemy." 

And on pages 814-15, he testifies : 

"Question. When you left him did you ex- 
" pect that within an hour he would be engaged 
" with the enemy ? 

"Answer. Yes, sir. 

"Question. Then you do not think it would 
"have taken him an hour. 

" Answer. You just asked me that question — 
" if I thought that within an hour he would be 
" engaged with the enemy ; I said yes, I thought 
" he would. 

" Question. Short of an hour ? 

" Answer. I did not say short of an hour. 

" Question. Well, that is what I understood 
" by 'Within an hour. 

" Answer. I say at the end of an hour, if you 
" want to get at the exact time. 

" Question. Did not you expect by the end of 
" that time to get your force well around and 
" connect with Reynolds? 

" Answer. I hoped to do so. 

" Question. Then, as you left General Porter, 
" I understand your plan was one of co-opera - 
" tion ? 

" Answer. With him ? 

"Question. With'.him and with Reynolds. 

" Answer. We were all co-operating to the 
" same point. 

" Question. But you did not expect that he 
" should become engaged with the enemy, until 
" you should get around to the left of Reynolds? 

" Answer. I did not make any such calcula- 
" tion ; I have said nothing of the kind. 



129 

" Question. You said something very near it ; 
" and I want to know whether that was your ex- 
" pectation— that he would be in a general en- 
" gagement with the enemy before you got 
" round on the left of Reynolds ? 

" Answer. You want to make me say what he 
" would be doing at a certain time, and where I 
"should be; I say no such calculation entered 
" into my mind. 

" Question. You said by the end of an hour 
" you expected to be well around on the left of 
11 Reynolds with your troops ? 

" Answer. No, sir ; I did notjsay well around 
4 'to the left of Reynolds. 

" Question. What did you say ? 

" Answer. Well around. 

" Question. Well around where % 

"Answer. In the direction where I was going. 

"Question. Around to the Sudley Road, and 
"on the left of the Sudley Road, toward Rey- 
nolds? 

"Answer. I say you are putting that in. 

" Question. Well, the record will show what 
"you did say. Did you intend that he should 
" get into a general engagement with the enemy 
" while you were removed from the scene back 
<• on the Sudley Road, so as, to be out of all pos- 
" sibility of rendering him immediate assistance? 

"Answer. I do not want that question put in 

"that way. 

"Question. That is the one I want you to 

" answer. . . 

"Answer. Because you are putting words in 
"my mouth, and putting plans in my head 
" which were not suggested there. 

"Question. Then you can merely say it was 

"not the case. 

" Answer When I left General Porter, I left 
" him a corps commander, for him to operate in 
« the direction indicated. How quickly he was 



130 

" to get in an engagement, whether an hour or 
" an hour and a half, and how he would do it y 
" whether in one may or another, I did not indi- 
" eate, nor did J take if into my mind ; it was 
" simply that he was to operate on the left, and 
" necessarily, when he got over there, the na- 
" dire of his operations would, be determined bp 
li tin condition of things that he would find. 
" What those conditions would, be I could not at 
" that time tell." 

And on page 817 lie testifies : 

" Question. Did you expect General Porter to 
" engage the enemy alone, when along the rest 
" of the line there was nothing but artillery en- 
' ' gaged V ' 

" Answer. He would not be engaging the ene- 
" my alone, if the rest of the line were engaged 
" with artillery. You seem to think artillery is 
" of no consequence. 

" Question. What kind of an engagement did 
" you expect him to enter into, while no other 
" but artillery fighting was going on along the 
" rest of the line ? 

"Answer. As I have tried to make myself under- 
" stood on several occasions, the nature of the par- 
" ticular kind of contest which he was to engage 
" in, was not a matter which I ventured to im- 
" pose upon him. As a distinguished and zealous 
' ' officer, with his corps under his command, I 
" did not venture to do any ting more than indi- 
" cate the place where I thought he was to apply 
" that force. Whether he was to skirmish or 
" have a very deep line, or extended one, was a 
" question which I did not go into at all, nor 
" think of going into." 

"Question. Then a skirmish line would have 
" answered your expectation when you left Gen- 
" era! Porter, if in his discretion, that was more 
"advisable? 



131 

" Answer. It would depend upon the nature 
" of the skirmish — how it was done ; how vigor- 
" ously carried out ; whether the circumstances 
" required it, and it only. It depends upon a 
" great many things, that you must make a great 
" many suppositions about, before I can give an 
' k intelligent answer. If you want to know a 
" general principle, I believe it is laid down by 
" military writers, that a body of men should be 
"in a condition to offer battle or decline it; 
" whether the main body shall be advanced or 
" retire on the reserve, and many other posi- 
" tions ; all of which are conditions upon which 
" battles are determined." 

" Question. And determined upon the discre- 
" tion of the corps commander ? 

" Answer. Yes ; provided he acted energeti- 
" cally. 

" Question. Provided he acted according to 
" the best of his discretion as a soldier ? 

" Answer. Yes, sir." 
I have thus shown you, that General McDowell 
was utterly reckless in his testimony, on the 
court-martial, producing a wholly false impression 
on which Porter was convicted, and which he has 
now been compelled to retract and correct. On the 
court-martial, he swore that he lefc Porter with a 
positive order to attack at once. For not doing so, 
as ordered by him, General Porter was convicted 
and disgraced. 

Now, he swears, that only indicating the place of 
operations, he left all to the discretion of Porter, 
and that the right and sufficient thing for Porter to 
have done, under his indication, was exactly what 
Porter is proved to have done. How far, or from 
what motives the error arose it is not for me to say. 
There may be various explanations of it. I should 
think, perhaps, he might have been angry, so as to 
disturb his good judgment, but he denies that we have 
ever seen him angry. Perhaps he had the night- 



132 

mare, as he says this campaign has been a night- 
mare to him from the time of its occurrence. I 
took occasion to see what effect that would have, 
and I find that it might disturb any man's judg- 
ment if it was operating upon him when he was 
testifying. A very recent scientific authority 
describes a nightmare as " a terrific dream, in which 
" there appears to be a disagreeable object, as a per- 
" son, an animal, oragoblin present, and often upon 
" the breast or stomach of the sleeper, accompanied 
" by an inability to cry out, or move or call for help." 
Well, somethingliappened to destroy his judgment 
or his presence of mind, or his recollection upon 
the former trial, and he swore to that. Now, at 
Governor's Island he came and said that he meant 
no such thing as he had been understood to mean, 
and had sworn at the court-martial that he did 
mean — nut that he did not use the words, "Put 
" your troops in here," but that he didn't mean any 
such thing as was imputed to his language at the 
court-martial, but that all he meant was to do just 
what General Porter did do, act upon his discre- 
tion, feel the force of the enemy in front of him by 
a skirmish line, if in his judgment that was the 
proper tiling to do under the circumstances, and 
any other method that he, as a corps commander, 
left as sole master of the situation, might deem 
sufficient and proper. What we claim is, that 
General Porter, acting under that discretion, did 
what he did, and that it was the best thing under 
the military circumstances to do. If it was left to 
his discretion, the question is, whether his discre- 
tion was exercised honestly and in good faith, and 
not whether it was the best thing that might have 
been done? McDowell conies to Governor's 
Island, and says that he did not mean what was 
imputed to his language before, but that he did 
not think there could be much doubt about it, be- 
en use when lie said it, he indicated by a gesture 
what he meant by " Put your troops in here." 



133 

Now, his testimony on that subject is very remark- 
able. One would suppose that if he said, "Put 
" your troops in here," and indicated by a gesture 
he would know where the gesture indicated. Now, 
here is the cross-examination on that subject: 

" Q. You are quite positive, I understand, 
"as to your recollection of the exact words 
"which you used to General Porter about put- 
ting in his troops, as you stated on page 85, 
" You put your force in here." Is it your re- 
collection of those being the exact words? 
" A. Yes, sir. 

" Q. Was then and is now? 
" A. Yes, sir. 

" Q. Then you did not say " Put your troops 
" in there ?" 

" A. Is not that what you said ? 
" Q. No ; Put your troops in here ? 
"A. It was accompanied by a motion'of the 
" hand, here or there. 

" Q. I want to know whether it was here or 
" there ? 
" A. That I cannot tell you. 
" Q. Would it make a difference whether it 
" was here or there ? 

" A. No ; one might be a little more critically 

" correct as an expression, but here or there" 

" would have been understood." 

Well, it would have been a very singular order 

for him to say to General Porter, " put your troops 

in here or there." 

" Q. I look for your recollection of the real 
" words, whether you said, put your troops in 
" here, or, put your troops in there ? 
" A. I could not tell you as to that. 
" Q. You say that here or there would make 
" no difference? 

" A. No ; in connection with the movement of 
" the hand, as indicating the place. 



134 

" Q. Do you recollect the movement of your 
" hand « 

"A.I cnnnot tell you whether it was the right 
" hand or the left. 

" Q. Can you recollect which way you were 
" facing \ 
" A. No, sir. 

" Q. Can you recollect whether you moved 
" your hand north, or south, or east, or west? 

"A. It was not in reference to the direction of 
" the compass. 
" Q. No ; can you recollect that fact? 
" A. I could not." 
I do not think the order is helped out much by 
the gesture, and when you come to see that there 
was no order, but only a gesture, added to this wild 
and unintelligible " here" or " there," east, west, 
north or south, it left General Porter in the position 
which I will now indicate. 

General Porter swore before the McDowell Court 
of Inquiry, which I am much obliged to the Re- 
corder for putting in evidence, that when McDow- 
ell left liim he said no such thing as "put your 
" troops in here;" but that when Porter said,in view 
of this idea of taking King away, "what shall I 
" do ?" he, McDowell, said nothing, but waved his 
hand and rode off as fast as he could. Is there any 
corroborating testimony to that ? Yes, Captain 
Monteith, aide-de-camp to General Porter, was 
present and heard the question and saw the wave 
of the hand, and saw the departure without an an- 
swer, Now, what '. Why, General Porter was left 
there alone, down near the place where the horses 
were drinking, and lie came back alone to his com- 
mand. As he came back, he saw, as he swears be- 
fore the McDowell Court of Inquiry, the enemy 
gathering in his front. Beknew well enough what 
that meant, did he aol I That those troops reported 
l»y Buford were there, and, as he thought then, coin- 
in- down upon him. What was the natural move- 



135 

ment ? What was the natural suggestion ? He had 
thought before McDowell arrived, and when he was 
in command of 17,000 men, 9,000 of his men 
and 8,000 of King's, which had been placed 
under his special command — he had thought 
the wise course was to press the enemy in front, and 
if possible, go over to attack him ; but McDowell 
having now left him, without any answer even to 
his suggestion that now was a time when he might 
make a communication by taking King's division 
around on the Sudley Spring's road ; (these tilings 
shifted with every changing view from the enemy, 
did they not?) And, as he rode back, he saw the 
enemy gathering in his front, and he says : " Now, 
"if ever, is the time to attack. Don't we 
know that the force reported by Buford is 
here — don't we take it for granted, as Mc- 
Dowell says, that all the rest are coming 1 Now or 
never is the time to attack ! " What does he do ? 
Why, he renews and continues his movement to 
press the enemy, and in that view pushes Morell 
over to the right beyond the railroad ; he is prepar- 
ing a new or a forward movement beyond Dawkin's 
Branch. Well, on what view was that possible ? On 
what theory had it always been possible and prac- 
ticable in his idea % Why, it was not with 9,000 men 
against from 14,000 to 25,000 over there, wherever 
they weie. I don't care whether they were within a 
few rods of Dawkin's Branch, or anywhere that the 
Recorder pleases to put them. No ; it was not with 
any such idea. It was, that with 17,000 men he 
might try it ; and that was the only time, as it 
seems to me that military men will say that an at- 
tack should have been tried. So, on the impulse of 
the soldier, knowing that there is a snppor ting- 
force within reach of him, namely, King's division, 
not yet at any rate in motion to the rear, he sends 
to King to hold on. What was that for? That he 
might press with Morell ; that he might bring 
Sykes out here (in support), and make the move- 
ment described by Warren as the necessary move- 



136 

ment and the only practicable one, with King's force 
to be held in reserve while Morell deployed, and to 
come up as he and Sykes advanced. Now, the learn- 
ed Recorder sees fit to dispute what, as we claim, im- 
mediately followed, viz. : that General McDowell, 
on being appealed to by Porter, to let King's 
division stay where it was,, peremptorily refused, 
and instead, ordered General Porter to stay where 
he was. I never have seen how it can be disputed. 
I never could see how, at least, General Porter could 
help believing that it was so ordered by General 
McDowell, and acting on that belief. He sends 
General Locke after King's force. The answer 
comes back from McDowell in place of King, 
"Give my compliments to General Porter, and 
" tell him to stay where he is ; I am going 
''to the right, and I will take King's di- 
" vision around with me." Now, if that was 
the time to attack, who is responsible for it's not 
having been done? Porter, who wanted to do it, 
Porter who began to do it ? or McDowell, who re- 
fused to join or support him ? 

And now I wish to call attention to the Record- 
er's imputations upon our evidence that what 
I have thus stated did really happen. Mc- 
Dowell said he didn't recollect it. That is all 
he said. General King said he didn't recol- 
lect it. Well, if it turns out that General King 
was not there, and that it was some other officer, 
there is pretty good reason for King not recollect- 
ing it, apart from the terrible illness under which he 
was suffering, which might naturally affect his mem- 
ory, an illness which it is proven upon the record, 
did overcome him, and from which he had been suf- 
fering, and in a disabled condition for the whole of 
two weeks before. Well, but says the Recorder, 
Porter knew that King had gone away, and, when 
Porter says that he sent Locke to King, he tells a 
falsehood. Now, it would be something, if Porter 
knew that King had gone. The Recorder has made 



137 

the deliberate statement, witli the intent that you 
should believe it, that this record shows, by the 
evidence of Patrick and Judson, that Porter knew 
that King had gone. I deny it. I say it does not 
show any such thing. At page 104 is the testi- 
mony of Judson, upon which he relies, which is 
this : 

"Q. What time did you reach that position 
" (Bethlehem Church) ? 

u A. I cannot state the hour ; it was early in 
" the morning of the 29th, I think. 

" Q. Then your division knew the way very 
" well from Bethlehem Church to where the 
" lighting was the night before ? 

" A. Yes, sir. 

"Q. In the morning were you still posted on 
" that road when General Porter' s division came 
" along marching towards Gainesvilleg? 

"A. We were. 

" Q. Did they come by you ; the head of the 
" column on the road ? 

" A. My recollection is such. 

" Q. Was General Porter with them ? 

" A. He was. 

" Q. Did you see him ? 

" A. I saw him. 

" Q. Did you have any conversation with him ? 

"A. I did. 

" Q. State that. 

" A. General Porter asked me where the com- 
" manding officer of these troops was. 

Now this was a man in Hatch's brigade. 

"A. I conducted him to General Hatch. 

"Q. Had General McDowell at that time made 
" his appearance ? 

" A. I have no recollection of seeing General 
" McDowell since the day before until that 
" time." 



138 

Is that an indication even to Porter that probably 
King was not there? Not in the least; there is 
not a word of suggestion about King. Judson 
may have taken him to Hatch as the immediate 
commander of the brigade, which he was, or King 
may have been temporarily away. There being no 
reference to King, how unfair it is to impute to 
Judson' s testimony knowledge on Porter s part, 
that King had gone. It does not help the matter 
any more to refer to General Patrick, at page 187, 
because it shows that, when Patrick says that King 
came up to say good-bye, Porter's column had al- 
ready gone past. 

"I think General King was the first whom I 
" saw. It was somewhere about eight or nine 
" o'clock, while my commissariat and personal 
" staff were hunting up supplies, &c. General 
" King rode over to my headquarters, and told me 
" that he was not fit to be in command, that he 
" was going to Centreville, and came over to bid 
" me good-bye. I think Colonel Chandler, his 
" adjutant general, and I do not recollect who 
" else, were with him at the time ; he came to 
" say good-bye, and I do not know that I saw 
" him after that. 

" Q. In the mean time had you found the prom- 
" ised supplies ? 

" A. We got some somewhere. 

" Q, You found after a while the rest of the 
" brigades of your division ? 

"A. No; I have no personal recollection of 
" seeing them there at all. 1 must, I think, have 
" seen them or knew of their being thereabouts 
" from some source. 

11 Q. What happened next after King's de- 
" parture for Centreville ? 

"A. I was ordered, I think, by McDowell in 
" person, to move as soon as I could in the rear of 
" General Porter ; Porter having just passed 
" through, or passing through near Manassas 



tion, to go back to the scene of our tight 
" the night previous." 
Clearly, when General King came there to bid Gen- 
eral Patrick good-bye, Porter had already gone to 
the front. How puerile is it then to say, that Porter 
must have known that King had gone, and therefore 
he could not have sent this message by Locke to 
King, when it appears that he was all day (and the 
Government produces the despatches) sending des- 
patches, not to McDowell and Hatch, but to McDow- 
ell and King. Oh, says the Recorder, those despat- 
ches were properly described by a little word of three 
letters, seldom used among gentlemen and never 
among soldiers. "Well, will that go down with the 
common sense which we claim for leading military 
minds ? Of course not. This message was sent by 
Locke to McDowell, and this was the answer : And, 
mind you, it corresponds in substance with what 
McDowell said at Governor's Island, that he meant 
by, "put your troops in here;" — "I meant to 
" indicate the point at which he should operate." 
For there is not much difference between that and — 
"give my compliments to General Porter, and tell 
" him to stay where he is." There is no denial 
anywhere of Col. Locke's very positive testimony 
that he did bring and deliver this message to 
Porter, and it seems to me to put the finishing 
touch to the alleged disobedience of the joint 
order. Was there a disobedience of the joint order ? 
nobody claims that there was, except as modified 
by McDowell ; and it was not modified by Mc- 
Dowell, except to thwart what General Porter 
thought ought to be done with the 17, coo men, 
and to leave him there with his force of 9,000 
or 10,000 men — a force utterly insignificant — as 
compared with what they both knew was 
over on the other side. I will not enter into 
a dispute with the Recorder, as to where each di- 
vision of the enemy's troops was. They were there 
as everybody knew. Longstreet, Wilcox, Marshall, 



140 

and Williams have told you where they were. 
Corporal Solomon Thomas and his reverend associ- 
ates, and the medical assistant surgeons of this, 
that, and the other regiment, may come and tell 
you to the contrary, but there is the evidence. 
It hardly needed more than Bu ford's despatch 
to demonstrate it. 

Well, both the Recorder and the Judge- Ad- 
vocate-General say, that there was. a retreat, 
and that that was a violation of the joint or- 
der. It is pretty late in the history of this 
discussion, as it appears to me, for us to be 
arguing the question upon the evidence, as to 
whether there was a retreat that day. I think 
we will be stultifying ourselves to discuss that 
matter any more, unless we accept the learned Re- 
corders military view. If you do, then there was 
a retreat. He says, that when General Morell's 
force, in obedience to the order of McDowell, was 
withdrawn from beyond the railroad and brought 
back to the road, and placed under cover to " come 
"the same game" upon the enemy, as they were evi- 
dently coming upon him, and so Sykes' brigade was 
withdrawn, 100 or 200 or 300 yards, to make room 
for them, he says that was a retreat. Well, it 
seems to me that there was a pretty emphatic ex- 
pression upon the countenances of the several mem- 
bers of the Board about that, when the evidence was 
coming in. It seemed to be a pretty plain indica- 
tion that some of us did not know what the word 
"retreat" meant. We do not pretend to dilate 
now upon that question. There it stands upon the 
record. All the witnesses, as it seems to me, sub- 
stantially agree that there was not any retreat, that 
there was nothing in the nature of a retreat — there 
were movements back and forth. If a brigade is 
moved up 100 or 200 yards, we do not call that an 
advance upon the enemy ; and if they withdraw to 
give place for the movements of other brigades, we 
do not call that a retreat. Well, that is all there 



141 

was that day affecting in the least the situation. 
It is true, that under the circumstances which j 
shall xu'esently describe, there is claimed to have 
been an order to General Sturgis, or so stated by 
him, and forgotten from the outset by General 
Porter, there was a direction to General Stnrgis, who 
was in the rear of Sykes, to go back to Manassas 
Junction ; and then there was aparently an almost 
immediate recall, and they came back before they 
had got anywhere near Manassas Junction ; and it 
is not far from the junction of the Sndley Springs 
and the Manassas and Gainesville road to Manassas 
Junction. Ah, but says the Recorder, there was an 
intention to retreat ; and in a case of petit larceny, 
he says, the taking of a watch or other chattel and 
having it in your hand, even for a moment makes 
out the crime. Well, is this a petit larceny Court ? 
We think, that sometimes he has had that idea. 
We supposed it was a great military tribunal, exam- 
ining into a question, according to the recognized 
maxims of warfare, not to judge that there was a 
retreat, unless there was a retreat, and when there 
was no retreat, finding that there was none. But, 
if this Board is going to be degraded into a police 
justices court, I for one, beg leave to retire. I 
should retire beyond Manassas Junction. It seems 
to me that we should be imposing upon the good 
nature of the Board, if we took up the details and 
answered the criticisms of the learned Recorder 
about the movements in the nature of a retreat. 
He said a good many other ingenious things ; it 
seemed to me, that a good many nights must have 
been employed in digging them out, keen and 
crisx^y criticisms upon the evidence. But, how any 
of them fairly weigh upon the mind of the Board 
as indicating a retreat, it is impossible for me to 
guess. It would be a waste of time to discuss that 
question. They all admit of the obvious answer, 
that a great deal of the testimony upon which 
they were founded was from utterly incom. 



142 

petent men. Dr. Faxon, who is he? Dr. Fax- 
on wns assistant-surgeon of a Massachusetts 

regiment. His office required him to attend to 
his pills and powders, his lances and his cutting 
knives ; he did not notice anything in particular, 
but he thought there was a retreat. Bat Morell, 
and Butteriield, and Sykes, and Warren, and Grif- 
fin, all skilled leaders, didn't see it. Well, it is 
the medical view of the situation. We do not believe 
it will be a valuable use of the few remaining 
hours of this day to discuss that question of a 
retreat, and so we leave the subject of the 
joint order. All pretences of disobedience of 
that order have long since been exploded. If it 
was violated it was not violated by Porter. If it 
was varied from he could not vary from it, because 
the responsibility was on other shoulders. He 
wanted to do with a force which possibly might 
have been adequate, what here and there in this 
case it has been claimed he ought to have done, but 
he was thwarted by the peremptory refusal of his 
superior officer. In that same connection we 
call the attention of the Board to a most remark- 
able document, and one that has excited no little 
curiosity, one that was sent here by the Secretary 
of War, or under his authoritative sanction. We 
have tried to get the Recorder to admit its pater- 
nity, but he does not see fit to do so, and we have 
had to look at the internal evidences, which are 
sometimes quite conclusive. Tlie external evidences 
are considerable, because on the back of it is this 
endorsement which does not say who wrote it, or 
where it came from, but which indicates, it seems 
to me, its source. 

"Washington, June 15th, 1878. 

11 Respectfully referred to Major A. B. Gard- 
" ner, Judge Advocate, U. S. A., Recorder of 
" Board appointed by S. O., of 8th Apr. 12, 1878, 
" from this office. 



143 

" It is understood that General Pope wishes 
" Major T. C. H. Smith, Paymaster U. S. A.,, to 
" attend the trial, and the Secretary of \Ya 
li thinks it would be well to subpoena him, as he 
" is quite familar with the facts. 

" By order of the Secretary of War, 

" (Signed.) E. D. TOWNSEND, 

A djutant General. ' ' 

The Recorder : Do I understand that that is in 
evidence \ 

Mr. Choate : No ; I am using it as part of my 
argument. 

The Recorder : Then I shall bring it to the notice 
of the Board, that the gentleman is arguing upon 
what is not in evidence. 

Mr. Choate : None of my argument is in evi- 
dence. 

Mr. Maltby : That was admitted and shown to 
the Board during this session, though the name of 
the author was not required. 

The President of the Board : Not admitted 
as evidence, but as a suggestion of a line of argu- 
ment. 

The Recorder : Is it put upon the record to be 
printed as the rest ? 

The President of the Board: Not at all; it 
is received as a line of argument. 

Mr. Choate. — I will ask leave to incorporate it 
in my argument. There is some little indication of 
its authorship. It is sometimes said that the style 
is indicative. I think the style is very indicative, 
and if you can attribute a part of it to anybody, 
perhaps you can impute the rest of it to the same 
author. Now, I find in a letter of Gfeneral John 



144 



Pope to the Compote de Paris, written from Fort 
Leavenworth, Kansas, December 21st, 1876, this 
sentence : 

" Tli e greater the force of the enemy in our 
"front, the greater need titer e was of the help of 
" Porter s corps, and the greater his obligation 
" to render it, and if you could prom that the 
" whole Southern Confederacy was in front of 
"him on that day, you would only succeed in 
" blackening his crime ; the crime of deserting 
" the field of battle and abandoning his comrades 
" to the unequal odds he left behind him." 
Now, in the document thus indorsed by the 
Secretary of War, I find this : 

" The greater the force of the enemy in front 
" of Porter, the greater the necessity of his aid, 
" and if the whole Southern Confederacy had 
" been before 7dm, it only made his desertion of 
" the rest of the army the more shameful. 1 '' 
I should not suppose that better external and 
internal evidence could be furnished or required 
than this, of the authorship of this remarkable doc- 
ument which has been sent here under the imprim- 
atur of the Secretary of War for you to consider ; 
and I trust you will consider it. I care not whether 
it originated with General Pope, whose language it 
evidently bears, or with Colonel Smith, whose name 
is upon the back of it, or from some unknown source, 
which appears to be pressing this prosecution from 
behind. It is the last authoritative statement, prior 
to the Recorder's, of the argument, and in that point 
of view I want to read it. If it differs from what 
was claimed on the former trial, if it differs from 
what General Pope then olaimed, if it differs from 
what General McDowell then claimed, if it differs 
from what he claimed at Governor's Island, if it 
differs from what the learned Recorder now claims, 
I give the Government the benefit of the doubt ; they 
may choose between their various theories when 



145 

they get through. Now, I will read this. The 
theory of it is this, that Porter was at fault for not 
attacking when General McDowell was going 
around on the Sudley road. Was ever anything 
so preposterous as that heard before, in view of 
the claims that have now been made, and all the 
evidence that has been laid before you ? After 
McDowell's refusal to let King stop a moment 
that he might make an advance, they say. Porter 
was at fault in not making an attack any time 
while McDowell, with King's division andRickett's 
division, was going around where they w nt. Now, 
there is a remarkable circumstance connected with 
this theory, the cardinal idea of which is, that King 
and Ricketts were within supx^orting distance, al- 
though they were being ledby their commander away 
from the scene of action in which he refused to let 
them participate, and away from this theory ; that 
is to say, around upon the Sndley road where we 
always supposed King and Ricketts both went up. 
But some clergyman or sutler, or possibly Corporal 
Solomon Thomas, having said that he saw Ricketts' 
division around on what is called the new road, the 
gentleman who got up this fancy map, as we will 
call it, which harmonizes with the Recorder's view, 
put Ricketts away around ; not on this road to 
Sudley, but away around here [on the "New 
" Road," from Manassas Station to the Sudley 
Springs Road] several miles further off. Now, 
in the light of that consideration, we will observe 
what this paper says about their being in sup- 
porting distance as a reason why Porter should 
have made an attack between 12 and 2 o'clock. 

" At 12 o'clock m., on the 29th of August, 
" 1862, a severe battle was going on, and so con- 
" tinued until dark, between the right wing of 
" the Union army, and the Confederate forces 
" under General T. J. Jackson, at Groveton, on 



146 

" the turn-pike leading from Centreville to War- 
" renton, Va. 

" The line of battle was perpendicular to the 
" turn pike, the left of our force and the right 
" of the enemy's being just south of that 
" road." 

If this came from General Pope, it is an em- 
phatic denial of the Recorder's theories about 
a contrary position of his own troops 

" At 12 o'clock noon." 
That is the objective point of time. 

''When the battle of the right wing was at 
" the hottest"— 

Just think of that, in view of the clear proof to 
the contrary — 

"These two corps, Porter's leading, had 
" reached a point west of the Bethlehem Church. 
" At that church the road to Sudley Springs 
" branched to the right, (north) and passed di- 
" rectly through the lines of battle. 

" The orders of these two corps, which di- 
" rected their march from Manassas Junction 
" upon Gainesville, are given in the testimony 
" before the Porter court-martial, and required 
" their march to be continued toward Gaines- 
" ville until they connected bj^ their right, with 
" the right wing of the army. When they 
" reached Bethlehem Church, about half way be- 
" tween Manassas Junction and Gainesville, they 
" were in full hearing of the battle going on, on 
" the right, and found their advance in the pres- 
" ence of a force of the enemy." 
The writer of this paper thought the enemy was 
there. 



147 

4 ' McDowell finding the whole road in front 
" of him toward Gainesville, blocked up by Por- 
" ter's corps, which was stretched ouc in column, 
" and knowing how necessary it was for him as 
" well as Porter, to go immediately into action, 
" told Porter to attack at once where he was, 
" and that he (McDowell) would take the Sudley 
" Spring's road, on which the rear of Porter's 
" column rested, and join the battle on the right." 

See how this differs from McDowell at Governor's 
Island, and from the Recorder here. 

" That McDowell would have attacked, as he 
" told Porter to do, had he been in front, there 
" is not the faintest shadow of a doubt." 

McDowell declares that he thought that he then 
had so far advanced that they were close up to the 
pike, and that there was not room for any consider- 
able force of the enemy between them and the pike. 
And it is clear from an examination of his whole 
testimony and his false position admitted in it, 
that he thought they were very near the pike at 
12 o'clock. 

" At that time and for two hours afterwards 
McDowell's corps was still with Porter." 

What an outrageous proposition that is. Porter 
sends back for King's division. McDowell says : 

" You cannot have it," and takes it away with 
him, and this paper says that at that time, and 
for two hours afterwards, all the while they were 
getting up to the Henry house, McDowell was still 
with Porter. 

" Or so near that its rear, as it marched to 
" the right up the Sudley Springs road from 
" Bethlehem Church, must have been still in 
" view, so that Porter's attack could and would, 



148 

'• if necessary, have been supported by McDowell. 
•■ At the time Porter's attack, by every rule of 
11 warfare, and of military obligation, should 
• have .been made, and for hours afterwards 
l> there were present on the ground, "not much (if 
'• any) less than twenty thousand Union troops, 
••viz: the corps of McDowell and Porter, less 
" Ricketts' division, but plus Piatt's brigade of 
'• Sturgis's division which was with Porter's 
iw corps, in addition to his own two divisions." 

The substance of it all is that Porter was at fault 
for not attacking while McDowell was going off to 
make connection on the right, after having positive- 
ly refused to let him have a man. That is about a 
fair specimen of the ground upon which this pros- 
ecution has been pressed. 

The Board then at one o'clock took a recess of 
one hour. 



Mi:. Choate resumed his argument, as follows: 

Pouter's Testimony before the McDowell 
Court of Inquiry, ix January, 1863. 

I desire now to call attention to what I regard as 
a most authentic and true statement of the situation 
then and there, I mean the sworn statement of Gen- 
eral Porter before the McDowell Court of Inquiry. 
Much criticism has been passed on that. 

I desire to incorporate it as a part of my argu- 
ment, because it will stand any criticism that can 
be brought to bear upon it. The facts were then 
fresh in the mind of General Porter. 

It is tint' that the examination was under the 
most consl rained circumstances. It is not true, and 
the Recorder has been misinformed, when he said 
that General Porter volunteered his evidence there 



149 

He was brought compulsorily before the Court. It 
is one of those little errors which seems to me of 
very little consequence, but which give a coloring 
to the argument for which they are presented, like 
the statement that General Hunter was invited to 
sit upon the court-martial by General Porter, and 
was one of his intimate friends, both of which are 
denied by him. But the circumstances under 
which Porter was examined were these : it. was 
after all the evidence in his case had been closed ; 
it was after McDowell had given destructive testi- 
mony against him before that Court, which he then 
knew and we now know, was not true. It was 
pending the time between the closing of the evi- 
dence and the publication of the sentence. He was 
not permitted to testify fully and freely ; he was re- 
stricted to certain questions which bore upon the 
question of this joint order, and of the relations of 
Porter and McDowell. Fortunately you will find 
the matter stated, with perfect consistency, not only 
with its various parts, but, as we claim, with all the 
subsequent statements that General Porter has ever 
made. The ground of criticism as to inconsistency 
in itself, is this. He speaks of various movements 
and intentions as to his operations at Dawkin's 
Branch, after General McDowell left him, and of 
the effect of what General McDowell said to him. 
But the Court will see when they come to examine 
it, that he had always in his mind, the effect of 
these three things ; the recognized presence of the 
enemy in front, General McDowell's injunction to 
remain where he was, and the fact of General 
McDowell taking King with his 9,000 men away 
from the combination, away from any possible 
operation under the joint order. It is said also, that 
the statements in this deposition are falsified and 
contradicted by the despatches which are now pro- 
duced in this ; that General Porter said, it would 
be " a fatal military blunder, " to move over to the 
front, or to the right and front, as it was insisted 



150 

that General McDowell had directed him to do. It 
is said that by these despatches it appears that he 
did afterwards direct movements over to the front 
or to the right and front. That certainly is not so. 
The only movement to the right and front was that 
which was put an end to by General McDowell ; 
the only movement to the right, was that made 
through Morell's deployment over beyond the rail- 
road, exactly to the right, after General McDowell 
had personally quitted General Porter, and before 
the message had been received through Locke, for 
him to remain where he was, and that he should 
take King with him. Now, I will read a few pas- 
sages of General Porter's testimony before the Mc- 
Dowell Court of Inquiry, because, in view of the 
argument I presented this morning, it seems tome 
that it will come in as a complete corroboration. 

"Q. By Court— What order did General Mc- 
" Dowell give, or what authority did he exercise 
" over you* and in virtue of whose order % State 
" fully and particularly. 

k 'A. General McDowell exercised authority 
" over me in obedience to an order .of General 
•• Pope's, addressed jointly to General McDowell 
" and me, and which I presume is in possession 
" of the Court. 1 have no copy of it. Our com- 
" niands being united, he necessarily came into 
" the command under the Articles of War. 

'• The witness here stated in substance to the 
" Court that the question leads to many things 
•• pertaining to the recent Court in his case, the 
•■ decision of which has not yet been announced. 

" The question requires a statement of what 
■• transpired, and he felt, at this time, some deli- 
" cacy in answering, both so far as General Mc- 
" Dowell and himself are concerned. I would 
" have to state the orders under which I was 
• moving in that direction. 



151 

" The Court decided that the question was a 
" proper one. 

" The witness continued" : 

" That joint order refers to a previous order 
" given to me, of which this is a copy. 

" The witness produced a copy of an order 
" from Major-General Pope, dated Headquarters 
" Army of Virginia, Centreville, August 29, 
" 1862, which was read by the Recorder, and is 
" appended to the proceedings of the day, and 
" marked 'A.' 

" The witness continued " : 

"Under that order, King's division constituted 
'* a part of my command. 1 was moving toward 
" Gainesville when I received the joint order, 
" and was joined by General McDowell, who had 
" also received a copy of the joint order. I had 
" at that time received notice of the enemy being 
" in front and, had captured two prisoners. My 
" command was then forming in line, prepara- 
" tory to moving and advancing towards Gaines- 
" ville. General McDowell, on arriving, showed 
" me the joint order, a copy of which I acknowl- 
" edged having in my possession. An expression 
" of opinion then given by him to the effect that 
" that was no place to fight a battle, and that I 
" was too far out, which, taken in connection 
" with the conversation, I considered an or- 
" der, and stopped further progress towards 
" Gainesville for a short time. General Mc- 
" Dowell and I went to the right which was 
"rather to the north, with the view of seeing 
" the character of the Country, and with the 
" idea of connecting, as that joint order re- 
" quired, with the troops on my right. But very 
" few words passed between us, and I suggested 
" from the character of the country, that he 



152 

"should take King's division with him, and 
"form connection on' tin right of the timber 
" which was then on the left of Reynolds, or 
' ' presu m ed to be Reyn olds. He left me suddenly, 
"not replying to a call from, me to the effect, 
'"What should I do,' and with no understand- 
ing on my part how I should be governed, I 
"immediately returned to my command. On 
"the way bach, seeing t?te enemy gathering on 
" my front, I sent an officer {Lieutenant- Colonel 
"Locke, my Chief of Staff), to King's division 
"directing it to remain where it was for the 
"present, and, commenced moving my command 
" towards Gainesville, and one division to tlie 
' right or north of the road. 1 received an an- 
" swer from General McDowell to remain 
"where I was, he was going to the right 
"and would take King with him. He did 
"go taking King's division, as I presumed, to 
" lake position on the left of Reynolds. I re- 
" mained where I was. When General McDowell 
" left me, I did not know where he had gone. 
"No troops were in sight, and 1 Jcneio of the 
" position of Reynolds and* Si gel, who were on 
"our right, merely by the sound of SigeV s can- 
" non and from information that dag that Rey- 
" n olds was in the vicinity of Groveton. The 
" head of my corps was on the first stream after 
"leaving Manassas Junction on the road to 
" ainesville, one division in the line of battle, 
" or the most of it. 

" Q. By Court. — Did you consider the expres- 
" sion of General McDowell, as stated by you, that 
" you were too far to the front, and that this was 
" no place to fight a battle, in the light of an or- 
"der not to advance, but to resume your origin- 
" al position ? 

"A. 1 did, when King's din's ion was taken 
"from me, and as countermanding the first order 
"of General Pope, under the authority given 
"him by that joint order. 



153 

" Q. By Court.— Was such an order a proper 
" one under the circumstances. If not, state 
"why? 

" A. I did not think so, and for that reason 
"when General McDowell left me I continued 
" my movement as if I had not seen the joint 
" order. My previous order required me to 
"go to Gainesville, and from information re- 
" ceived by the bearer of the first order, General 
" Gibbon, I knew it was to prevent the junction 
" of the advancing enemy and Jackson's force 
" then near Groveton, and that the object was to 
" strike the turnpike to Gainesville before the 
" advancing column should arrive. The sooner 
" we arrived there the more effective would be 
" our action. That order directed me to move 
" quickly or we would lose much. That order had 
" been seen by General McDowell, and when he 
" altered it, as I conceived he had the authority, 
" I presumed he knew more fully than I did the 
" plans of General Pope. I will add that the 
"joint order contemplated forming a line con- 
" necting with the troops on the right, and as 
" I presumed, as General McDowell acted, taking 
" King's division with him, that he intended to 
" form such a line. 1 thought at the time 
" that the attaclc should have been made at once 
" upon the troops as they were coming tons, and 
" as soon as possible.^' 

" Q. By Court.— State, so far as you know, 
" what followed, so far as the movements of 
" General McDowell's troops and your own were 
" concerned, and what orders you subsequently 
" received from General McDowell? 

" A. General McDowell took King off to the 
"right. I know nothing further of his move- 
" ments. I remained where 1 was until 3 o'clock 
" next morning. A portion of the command left 
"at day -break. I received no orders whatever 
" from General McDowell. 



154 

"Q. By Court. — But for this order, what 
" movement would you have made, and have you 
" reason to suppose that if you had, not been 
" stopped, the junction of Longstreet and Jack- 
" son would, have been effected ? 

"A. 1 shoidd have continued moving to- 

" wards Gainesville, and until we got out to the 

" turnpike, or met the enemy ; I presume ive 

" would have prevented the junction or been 

" whipped P 

-* * * * * * 

"Q. By General McDowell.— Under what re- 
" lations, as to command, did you and General 
" McDowell move from Manassas and continue, 
" prior to the receipt of General Pope's joint 
" order 2 

" A. I did not know that General McDowell 
" was going from Manassas, and I have no recol- 
" lection of any relations whatever, nor of any 
" understanding. 

"Q. By General McDowell. — Was there nothing 
" said about General McDowell being the senior, 
" and of his commanding the whole by virtue of 
" his rank \ 

" A. Nothing that I know of. 

" Q. By General McDowell.— What time did 
" you take up your line of march, from Manassas 
k " Junction for Gainesville? 

"A. The hour the head of the column 
" left, I presume, was about 10 o'clock, 
"it may have been earlier. Ammunition had 
11 been distributed to the men, or was directed to 
" be distributed, and the command to be put in 
" motion immediately." 

"Q. By General McDowell. — When you re- 
" C( ived the joint order where loere you person- 
" ally, and where was your command ?" 

"'A. 1 was at the head of m y column, and a 
"portion of the command, or the head of the 



155 



"column, loas then forming line in front: 
" one regiment, as skirmishers, was in advance, 
" and also a small party of cavalry which I 
" had as escort. The remainder of the corps was 
" on the road. The head of my column was in 
" the Manassas road to Gainesville, at the first 
" stream, as previously described by me." 

" Q. By General McDowell. — The witness 
" says he received an order from General McDow- 
" ell, or what he considered an order, when Gen- 
" eral McDowell first joijied him, which order he 
" did not obey. Will witness state why he dis- 
" obeyed what he considered an order? 

" A. The order I have said I considered an or- 
" der in connection with his conversation, and 
" his taking King's division from me. I there- 
" fore did obey it. 

" Q. By General McDowell.— What did you 
" understand to be the effect of General McDow- 
" ell's conversation ; was it that you were to go 
" no further in the direction of Gainsville than 
" you then were ? 

" A. The conversation was in connection with 
" moving over to the right, which necessarily 
" would prevent an advance. " 
That is in connection with McDowell's taking- 
King over to connect on the right. 

It will be observed from what follows that Gen- 
eral Porter had not the least impression of any di- 
rection from McDowell after he left him with King, 
to go to the front, or right and front. 

" Q. By Gen. McDowell. — You state you did 
" not think Gen. McDowell's order (if it was one) a 
" proper one, and that for that reason you continu- 
" ed your movement as if you had not seen the 
" joint order. Is the witness to be understood that 
" this was in obedience of what he has stated to 
" be General McDowell's order % 

" A. I did not consider that an order at that 
" time, and have tried to convey that impression, 
"but it ^was an expression of opinion which I 



156 

"might have construed as an order ; but when 
" General McDowell left me, he gave no reply to 
" my question, and seeing the enemy in my 
11 front, / considered myself free to act accord- 
" ing to my own judgment until 1 received no- 
u tice of the withdrawal of King. 

" Q. By General McDowell : What was the 
" effect on your movements of the message you 
" state was brought to you by Colonel Locke, 
"(your chief of staff), from General McDowell ■, 
" that you were to stay where you were, that he 
" was going to the right, and would rake King 
11 with him 5 \ 

" A. The effect was to post my command, or a 
" portion of the command, in line where the head 
" of the column then was, prepared to resist the 
" advance of an enem}^ in that direction, and turn 
" a portion of the command a little back on the 
" load. After doing this, I sent messengers to 
" General Pope, informing him of tne fact. 

tk Q. By General McDowell : Informing Gen- 
" eral Pope of what fact? 

"A. Of my present position and what there 
" was in my front. I will say that I sent several 
" messengers conveying, to the best of my recol- 
" lection, the general information of my location, 
" and one telling him that King' 's division had 
" been I a ken to the rigid. Some of those messen- 
" gers never returned to me, and I presume were 
" captured. 

" Q. By General McDowell : Did you re- 
" ceive any further message from General McDow- 
l> ell, other than the one you state that Colonel 
" Locke brought you, as before stated, which you 
" considered an order ? 

"A. None thai ! recollect of. I had memo- 
" rainla which I sent to General Morell, and 
" which convej^s the general impression that I 
" had received messages from General McDow- 
" ell, but I have no recollection of receiving 



157 

" tliem, nor were tLey brought to mind, till their 
" appearance before the Court. That memoran- 
" da says General McDowell informs me all is 
" going well on the right, or something to that 
"effect. 

" Q. By General McDowell : Is witness to 
" be understood he did not on the 29th, after 
" seeing General McDowell the second time, re- 
" ceive any instructions or directions or orders 
" from General McDowell, to move his troops 
" from where he states he was directed to re- 
"• main? 

" A. I have no recollection, and lam confident 
" I received no message or order from him, other 
" than those that I have mentioned." 

The witness speaks of the effect of General Mc- 
Dowell's message as brought by General Locke, to 
cause him to remain in position. 

" Q. By General McDowell. — How far was 
" it from the head of witness' column to Gaines- 
" ville? 

"A. I do not know ; I had never been over that 
" portion of the country, and have not been 
" since. 

"Q. By General McDowell. — How long had 
" the witness' head of column been halted when 
" General McDowell joined him ? 

" A. I cannot say, but not long. It had halted 
• " before I arrived there. 

*' Q. By General McDowell.— Witness speaks 
" of the effect of General McDowell's message 
" (as brought by Colonel Locke) to have been to 
" cause him to remain in position at the place 
" where General McDowell first saw him. How 
" long did witness' troops continue in this posi- 
" tionl 

" A. A portion of the command remained there 
" until daybreak the following morning, and 
" some till after daybreak. The most of Mor- 



15S 

" ell's division was on or near that ground all 
" day. 

" Q. By General McDowell : Did witness 
" conceive himself prohibited from making or 
" attempting to make, any movement to the 
" front, or to the right, or to the front and 
"right? 

" A. By that direction or order taken in con- 
" nection with the joint order, I considered my- 
" self checked in advancing, especially taken in 
<v connection with the removal of King' s division. 
" 1 did not consider that I could more to the 
" right, and 1 considered that General McDowell 
" took King's division to form a connection on 
" the right, or to go to the right and form such 
" a connection, as was possible. I add further, 
" that 1 considered it impracticable to go to the 
k ' right. 

" Q. By General McDowell : Did witness 
" attempt to make any movement in either of 
" the directions above named \ 

"A. Not directly to the right. I did to the 
" right and front, and when I received the last 
" message from General McDowell to remain 
" where I was, I recalled it.' 1 

Showing that the attempt referred to is the one 
stated in the subsequent message from himself to 
McDowell, that he had made an attempt to get Morell 
over to the right, and before the message came by 
Col. Locke to remain where he was. 

Then the Recorder has insisted that the orders to 
Morell ' f to push over to the aid "of Sigel'' wer« in 
express contradiction of this statement that he made 
no attempt either to the right or the right and front. 
But the direction to Sigel was not to the right or 
right and front. McDowell and Porter together had 
found it impracticable to enter the woods to the 
right. What was the direction to move to the aid 
of Sigel ? Why, it was to move over and strike 



159 

upon the road by which King was marching ; that 
was the movement ; not into and through the 
woods to the right, beyond where McDowell and 
Porter had gone together, but further back in the 
direction to strike the Sudley road, which was the 
road by which King was moving. 

"Q. By General McDowell. — Did you make 
" no attempt to go to the front or the right, or 
" the right and front, after that message ?" 

"A. I made no attempt with any body of 
" troops. I sent messengers through there to 
' ' go to General Pope, and to get information 
" from the troops on the right. 

" Q. By General McDowell. — After General 
" McDowell left the witness, did the witness not 
" know he was expected by General McDowell 
" to move to the right or to the right, and front ? 

"A. I did not." 

My learned friend says, that these subsequent 
messages to go to the aid of Sigel show that 
he did know that McDowell did expect it. 
There is not the least warrant for that on 
a fair reading of this testimony. This point, 
and the bearing and connection of the despatches to 
what took place that afternoon are so fully explain- 
d by Mr. Bullitt, that I pass on. 

"Let us read it, however, once more : 

"Q. By General McDowell.— Witness speaks 
" of having reported to Genral Pope. When 
" did witness conceive himself as no longer under 
" General McDowell?" 

'•A. My messages were addressed to General 

" McDowell, I think all of them. The messages 

' ' were directed to deliver them to General Pope, 

" if they saw or met him. I considered myself as 

■ " limited in my operations under General 



ltfO 

"McDowell's orders, until I should receive di- 
"rections from General Pope. 

"Q. By General McDowell. — How long was 
" witness and General McDowell together 
''before they moved to the right 'with a 
"vie^v of seeing the character of the country' % 

"A. I do not think we were together more 
"than four or five minutes, though I have no 
" distinct recollection. 

"Q. By^ General McDowell. — How long were 
" they together, after moving to the right ? 

"A. It may have been ten or twelve minutes, 
' ' perhaps longer. 

"Q. By General McDowell. — You have stated 
"'when General McDowell left me, I did not 
"know where he had gone.' Have you not 
" stated before the recent court-martial, in your 
•"defense as follows: 'We' (General McDow- 
"'ell and yourself), soon parted, General 
" ' McDowell to proceed towards the Sudley 
"' Springs road, I to return to the position at 
" ' which he first spoke to me, after our meeting ' ? 

"A. I know now where General McDowell 
" went. I did not know then. 

"Q. By General McDowell. — After General 
" Do well left yon, you say you sent an officer to 
" King's division, directing it to remain where it 
"was, for the present. What was the necessity 
" for this order i Had the division, so far as you 
" then knew been ordered elsewhere ? 

"A. J sent the message to that division to re- 
" main where it was for the present, in order 
•• not to bring it to the front, where I was form- 
" ing a line, before I to as ready for it ; and in- 
" tending to use it as the main support. 

"Q. By General McDowell.— Why did you 
"continue to regard King's division as attached- 
•• to your command after the receipt of the joint 
" order 1 

" A. I never thought of the point before, but 



161 

" General McDowell had left meand, as Iunder- 
" stood, in no wise changing the relations of 
" King's division to my corps. 

" Q. By General McDowell.— Did not the joint 
" order itself modify the first order yon received 
" from Genera] Pope? 

"A. It placed all under the direction of Gen 
" eral McDowell. 

" Q. By General McDowell.— If it placed all 
" under General McDowell, how did you regard 
" the fact of its being addressed jointly to yon and 
" him, and not to him only, if he was the sole 
" commander? 

"A. I had reason to believe that order was 
" written on an application made by me to Gen- 
" eral Pope, for orders to be given to me in writ- 
" ing ; this, in consequence of having received 
" verbal orders from Iiim, by persons whom I 
" knew nothing of, and which were contrary to 
" some instructions which I had received in writ- 
" ing. I presume the order was written by Gen- 
" eral Pope, because I had a portion of General 
" McDowell's command with me, and the order 
" was intended for both. 

" Q. By General McDowell. — Did witness send 
" any written order to King's division? 

" A. No, sir. 

" Q. By General McDowell. — How long was it 
" after you left General McDowell, before you 
" sent Colonel Locke to King's division ? 

" A. I sent him as soon as I returned to my 
" command after leaving General McDowell. I 
" returned immediately. 

I do not know, nor do I care, whether there 
was any different statement by General Porter as 
to the legal effect of the joint order. I have not been 
able to find it. But if there was, it had no releA an- 
cy whatever to this case. The pretended contra- 



162 

dictions and inconsistencies imputed by the Re- 
corder do not exist ; and 1 submit that that piece 
of testimony from which I have now read these ex- 
i nuts is one of the strongest pieces of testimony in 
this case, that has been presented by the Govern- 
ment, and that it is fatal entirely to the prosecu- 
tion in this respect. 



'The 4:30 p. m. Order. 

Now, a few words as to the pretence of a disobe- 
dience on the part of General Porter, to the 4:30 p. 
m. order of the 29th. So much has been said 
already on that subject, that I am only called upon 
to answer what the Recorder has said about 
it. 

"Headquarters in the Field, 

" August 29, 1862, 4:30 p. m. 
" Your line of march brings you in on the 
" enemy's right flank. I desire you to push for- 
" ward into action at once on the enemy's flank, 
" and, if possible, on his rear, keeping your right 
" in communication with General Reynolds. The 
" enemy is massed in the woods in front of us, 
" but can be shelled out as soon as you engage 
" their flank. Keep heavy reserves, and use your 
" batteries, keeping well closed to your right all 
; ' the time. In case you are obliged to fall back, 
" do so to your right and rear, so as to keep you 
" in close communication with the right wing. 

" JOHN POPE, 

' ' Major- Gen era I Com in a n din g . 

• ' Major-General Porter.'' 

The Recorder's first and main proposition is, 
that there is no new evidence before this Board, and 
that the case isnot changed from the attitude which 



163 

it held on the former trial. It does seem to me that 
such a statement ignores all the real evidence in 
this case. But, I suppose, it is necessary, in at- 
tempting to make an argument against General 
Porter, at this stage of the case and on this subject, 
to ignore and forget all material evidence. No new 
evidence ! What do you say to the evidence of 
General Ruggles, one of the most important; pieces 
of testimony introduced into this case, in respect to 
the 4:30 p. m. order? 

General Ruggles was the man who wrote that 
order. It was very material to know whether the 
" 4:30" which is on it, could be taken as a certain 
indication of its actual date. Why was that so ? 
Because Captain Pope had undertaken to say that 
he knew that he started with the order at 4:30, be- 
cause that was the date of the order ; but he had 
no other means of knowledge, and no other founda- 
tion for his recollection. Now, then, if General 
Ruggles had written the order, and had dated it 
upon delivery to Captain Pope, there would have 
been some sense and substance to Captain Pope's 
testimony, some foundation as to the beginning of 
the half hour to two hours, which, from his various 
statements, it must be regarded that he has said it 
took him to go with it. But Ruggles says his 
habit' was, and he knows it was followed in this 
instance, when he and General Pope began the work 
of preparing the order, he acting as scribe, and 
General Pope as dictator, to date the order first, and 
whether, after writing the " 4:30 p. m.," there were 
interruptions, or whether the whole order was writ- 
ten consecutively and immediately afterwards, or 
whether he and the general went about other busi- 
ness in the meantime, he has no means of stating. 
Neither he nor any one else has any-jmeans of stat- 
ing. So that the very foundation of Captain 
Pope's evidence entirely falls out of the case, viz., 
immediate connection between 4:30 as the time of 
the beginning of the order, and 4:30 as the time of 



164 

its delivery to Captain Pope. Now, when the Re- 
corder says that there is not any new evidence in 
the case, he must have forgotten that. Then is 
there no other new evidence in the case? What 
does lie say to the testimony of Captain Randol of 
the regular service, who came from Boston Harbor, 
where he is now stationed ? The Board cannot have 
forgotten his clear and strong statement. If my 
recollection does not fail me, he saw the delivery of 
that order to General Porter. He saw the officer 
come up and deliver it ; and adds his testimony to 
that of five or six witnesses, who were produced on 
the trial before the court-martial ; that it was sun- 
down— 6:30, not 5 o'clock or 5:30. Had the Record- 
er forgotten that when he said there is no new evi- 
dence ? Should he say that there is no new evidence, 
in face of the fact of the complete demolition of all 
the Government evidence on the former trial? Is 
the testimony of Captain Moale, and of Lieutenant 
Jones, no new evidence ? It is true they were not 
present on the scene of action there, and they did 
not witness the delivery or the receipt of that or- 
der ; but the} r had a far more fatal piece of new 
evicTence to produce, to the destruction of the Gov- 
ernment case on ihis head; and what was it? 
Why, that Captain Pope, when he was no longer 
in the immediate service of his uncle, when he was 
in a remote part of the continent, years afterwards, 
when there was no anticipation of any new trial for 
Porter, when it was not supposed that any such 
transaction could take place, in friendly discourse 
with his associates, with his mess in the company 
to which he belonged, he confessed— that is 
the word to use — confessed that his testimony on 
the former trial was not true. He had said on the 
former trial, that he presumed (hat he got that or- 
der al 4:30, because ii was dated 4:30, and he ac- 
complished the journey in half an hour, and deliv- 
ered I he older to General Porter at 5 o'clock ; with 
great precision, as if he had a clear recollections 



165 

about it, lie said, perhaps within three minutes after 
five. But to Captain Moale and Lieutenant Jones, 
he confessed that on the way with that order he got 
lost, and to one of them lie said he was from one to 
two hours, and to the other he said he was a very- 
long time, making the same statement, that he had 
lost his way in carrying the order. Now, where is 
the substance of the evidence for the prosecution 
on that part of the case? Where is there any evi- 
dence whatever, to meet that offered by General 
Porter, that it was received at 6:30 p. m., sun-down 
or after \ I cannot, as a lawyer, see any. And 
how a military man can discover any substance of 
evidence, whatever, left on the part of the prosecu- 
tion, it is impossible for me to imagine. Further 
than that, you have had Captain Douglass Pope 
recalled. He has endeavored to show you how he 
came. You have had Duffee, the orderly, recalled, 
and he, too, has tried to show you how he came. 1 
submit that their evidence on this subject, on this 
new examination, independent of all new evidence, 
independent of the demolition of their former state- 
ments, by the testimony of Captain Moale and Lieu- 
tenant Jones, shows that they had not the least idea 
which way they went, and that they have not now. 
They tried to pick out a path upon the map ; but 
you have positive proof that Duffee said that until 
he went and viewed the ground, he thought he 
went around through Five Forks. Wha t then is the 
fair conclusion from all the testimony as it stands? 
Is it not that the testimony of Douglass Pope and 
of Duffee on the former trial ought not to have 
been credited, and that now it cannot be credited 
in the least % The fact is established of their having 
lost their way, of their seeing no troops on the 
Sudley Road, which from below the old Alexan- 
dria pike is where they pretend to have come, when 
King's division and Pickett's division must have 
been blocking up that road entirely, so that the 
passage of any one would have been a work of 



166 

extreme difficulty. Yet, they did not see a soldier. 
What is the inevitable conclusion]? That they got 
down to the junction somehow after wandering in 
the woods, whether by "Wheeler's or down Comp- 
ton's Lane, or somewhere else; and that they 
struck the Alexandria road and came down to the 
junction of the Sudley road is probable. But it is 
not possible that from there they went down the 
Sudley road, t because then they must have met 
these troops. The ingenious map-maker for the 
Government has attempted to relieve that difficulty 
by getting Ricketts off the road. But it will 
hardly serve the purpose. Ricketts was on the 
Sudley road right behind King. General McDow- 
ell has so sworn, and General Pope, in his argument 
sent here, acknowledges it ; and all the testimony 
proves it. There is but one way that they could 
not have seen a soldier, and that was to cross 
directly the Sudley road, and go down the continu- 
ation of the old Warrenton, Alexandria, and 
Washington pike from their junction in the direc- 
tion of Manassas, and get around some way on the 
Manassas road, and come up by the junction by 
Bethlehem Church, and that is the way they took, 
and that accounts for their being so long upon the 
way, and shows the 

Time of delivery of 4:30 order. 

There is one other remark to be made in connec- 
tion with the 4:30 p. m. order as to the time of its 
delivery. There was testimony on the former trial, 
and 1 think there is testimony now, that they came 
up to the junction from the direction of Manassas 
to the headquarters of General Porter, and it seems 
to me that there is nothing left whatever of the 
case, but to conclude, taking all the parts of the 
testimony together, that they did come around by 
that way, and must necessarily, receiving that 
order some time after 4:30, and that they, by some 
round about way, must have got lost. Then you 



167 

make all the evidence coincide. You accept as 
true these six witnesses introduced on the part of 
General Porter, all credible, all intelligent, all 
respectable, that it was received not before sun- 
down. But there is one other fatal circumstance 
which I must not omit to mention. In all cele- 
brated cases, I think the experience of every lawyer 
will permit him to testify that before the case 
concludes, there is some piece of false evidence 
foisted upon the case, sometimes even by vol- 
untary evidence from some unknown source, 
originated and promoted by some unknown 
party. That has actually taken place in this 
instance. A third party, a second orderly, one 
Dyer, has been produced here, who pretends to have 
accompanied Captain Pope and orderly Duffee on 
that expedition. But Duffee does not recollect his 
presence ; if you can accept Duffee' s testimony, it is 
that he was not there, and the most convincing proof 
that he was not there is what he says himself. I 
will not recall all the particulars of how he recog- 
nized the road when he went down there. He went 
over the ground with Duffee to find the way, and 
he found it by an unmistakable landmark of a 
house with a four square roof. That was the way 
he recognized it, as he rode over. He says he went 
with Captain Pope sixteen years ago, and then saw 
the same house which he recognized last week. 
"Unfortunately for that statement, it turned out 
that that four square house was built after 
these battles were over. He said he did not 
go quite up to General Porter's headquarters, 
but that he saw the church by which his 
headquarters were, and he recognized the 
church, knew it was a church by the steeple. 
Well, it turned out upon authentic testimony, 
which cannot be disbelieved or doubted, that the 
church never had a steeple. The Recorder has an 
idea that it was in ruins, a melancholy ruin, and 



108 

rhat perhaps two of the walls had fallen in, so that 
anybody could see that it was a sacred ruin. But 
that did not impress the man Dyer. He saw a 
steeple which never had existed. Then he saw 
General Porter come out of his tent with Captain 
Pope. But the evidence is clear that General 
Porter had no tent. And the evidence on which 
General Porter was convicted before, and which 
was re-asserted by Judge Advocate Holt in melan- 
choly tones in his paper to the President, was that 
General Porter was lying down under a tree, and 
continued lying under the tree for several minutes 
after the order was received. But this man Dyer 
pretended to have seen him come out from around 
the corner of his tent with Captain Pope. But to 
crown all, he swears that he went back with Cap- 
tain Pope, and went direct to General Pope's head- 
quarters. Well, how was that ? Captain Pope 
testified that it was about 8 o'clock when he 
reached the scene of headquarters on his return, 
and he was confused at so many camp fires ; he 
could not tell General Pope's headquarters from 
those of anybody else, and he had to go to General 
McDowell's headquarters to inquire which General 
Pope's headquarters were. But this witness says 
they got there before dark, and saw no camp fires, 
and did not go to McDowell but went straight to 
Pope. Now we are known by the company we 
keep, and when you find these three witnesses now 
1 nought, thus standing together, Douglass Pope, 
Dufl'ee and Dyer, what remains to sustain the 
ground of this prosecution on their evidence and 
accusation? It seems to me that they all tumble 
out of the case together. 

But there is another new and startling piece of 
evidence which demonstrates that the 4:30 p. m. 
older was not received by Porter until sunset. At 
page 810 of the new testimony, there is a 
fatal piece of evidence — two of them, and the 



169 

Recorder must have been slumbering when he failed 
to recollect them. The necessary part of the case 
of the prosecution is that this 4:30 p. m. order was 
received at 5 or 5:30 o'clock, in time for General 
Porter to have made an attack before dark. But 
here is a dispatch which General Porter wrote at 6 
p. m., which absolutely negatives, in every line of 
it, all possible idea of his having received this order 
to attack, not only from the fact that he says he 
lias no cavalry, and Captain Pope brought him 
some orderlies as now ajypears, left three with him, 
but the whole tenor of the dispatch shows that he 
had heard nothing from McDowell or Pope for a 
long time, and did not know what the situation 
was. Let me read this dispatch. 

"Failed in getting Morell over to you. 
" After wandering about the woods for a time, I 
" withdrew him, and while doing so artillery 
" opened on us. My scouts could not get 
" through. Each one found the enemy between 
" us, and I believe some have been captured. 
" Infantry are also in front. I am trying to get 
'' a battery, but have not succeeded as yet. From 
" the masses of dust on our left, and from reports 
" of scouts, think the enemy are moving largely 
" in that way. Please communicate the way this 
" messenger came. I have no cavalry or messen- 
" gers now. Please let me know your designs ; 
" whether you retire or not. I cannot get water 
" and am out of provisions. Have lost a few men 
" from infantry firing. 
" Aug. 29—6 p. m. 

"F.J. PORTER, 

" Maj.-Oen. Vols" 

Now when he wrote that dispatch at 6 p. m., had 
he yet received the 4:30 p. m. order? That i« im- 
possible. 

Another thing I must refer to in order to 
refute the suggestions made about this. He 



170 

says: "I have no cavalry messengers." Where 
was he when lie wrote that? He was at his head- 
quarters at Bethlehem Church. "Oh," says the 
Recorder, "he had cavalry." Yes; there were 
cavalry up by Morell, because, shortly afterwards. 
not getting any cavalry from McDowell under this 
message, he sends to Morell for some cavalry. The 
meaning is, not to deny that he had cavalry up at 
the other end of his line, but none at his headquar- 
ters. And that leads me to this, (in this place, I 
may as well say it as in any other) that as to the 
alleged variations and inconsistencies in the various 
statements of General Porter, and particularly in 
his opening statement before this Board, there are 
just exactly two. And the wonder to me always 
has been, and the wonder to me when General Por- 
ter's opening statement was prepared was, that it 
was possible, or could be possible to make a state- 
ment in which there should be so few omissions or 
fail ures of memory as compared with the facts which 
now appear demonstrated here. There are two. One 
is a difference of recollection between him and 
Sturgis, whether he knew of the presence of General 
Sturgis, and ordered him back to Manassas with 
his 840 men on that day. There is a direct differ- 
ence of recollection between them, and judging it 
by the ordinary laws of evidence, it looks to me 
as if Sturgis' s recollection was the better. But I am 
thrown into confusion upon that when I refer to 
Porter's examination upon the McDowell Court of 
Inquiry in January, 1863, when he testified that he 
knew nothing of the movements of Sturgis on that 
day. The other failure of memory which the 
Recorder regards as so destructive to General Por- 
ter, is, in this matter of forgetting that he had some 
cavalry with Morell that day, a part of a Pennsyl- 
vania troop. A troop that Morell, to whom the 
commander says he was to report, but don't recol- 
lect reporting, and Locke and Martin who were in 
the front, did not see or have any knowledge of. 



171 

So if the testimony of those cavalrymen is to be 
taken, that must stand confessed, that failure of 
memory. But it does not in the least affect the 
merits of this case ; nor in respect to any material 
point the deductions that are necessarily to be 
drawn. That ends what I have to say upon the 
4:30 p. m. oider, because I assume it to be demon- 
strated that not being received till sunset, it was 
then too late to make the attack which was directed 
by it. That Porter, acting upon the natural im- 
pulse of a loyal and devoted soldier, receiving such 
an order as that from his chief — that his first im- 
pulse was to carry it out, is manifest. What did 
he do ? Did he, as was pretended by the Judge 
Advocate, and I think is still insisted by the Re- 
corder, send an order to move forward two regi- 
ments supported by two more % No. It appears 
now clearly proved upon the record, that that had 
all been already done upon some previous, but false 
report that the enemy before him were retreating. 
But he sent an immediate order to General Morell 
to make an attack with his whole force, and he 
followed it up in person instantly to the front, and 
with such speed, that he was guilty of a possible 
omission which has been charged upon him as an 
act of criminal neglect. What was that ? Why, 
that Sykes being with him at headquarters, he hur- 
ried forward to the front where Morell was ready to 
begin an attack, in such haste that he omitted to 
tell Sykes of the receipt of the order. To my mind, 
that is only clear proof of Porter's zeal to carry out 
the order. He found that he had been under a mis- 
apprehension about the withdrawal of the forces 
behind Bull Run, indicated by his dispatches 
shortly before. He found that General Pope now 
was insisting that he should make an immediate 
attack, and he hastens forward. What is in his mind 
is to carry out that order. He first sends Locke ahead 
with his order to make an immediate attack with 



172 

his whole force. He goes to the front, and if it is 
true if Sykes' memory is not at fault on this point, 
he went forward without ordering Sykes or com- 
municating the order to him, If I understand the 
military manceuvering the order was properly to 
be given as it was given to Morel] to make the 
attack. Sykes, with his division was right hehind, 
ready to be brought np into instant support. He 
was in immediate contact. Now what is all his 
parade of rhetoric and of assertion about this 
failure to exhibit this order to Sykes? It only 
shows the instant zeal with which Porter sprang to 
obey that order. Then what happened % He got 
to the front ; he found Morell about ready to obey 
that order, and darkness was already upon them. 
I accept the military authority that has been 
brought into the case, to the effect that it was im- 
practicable then to make an attack. General 
McDowell said on the former trial that he might 
have made an attack within an hour after receiving 
the order. He confessed, on the present examina- 
tion, that he knew he was wrong about this, con- 
fessed that Porter's position was in fact not so far 
advanced as he had supposed; he will not say 
exactly how much, but it would have taken much 
longer to make the attack here ordered than he had 
previously supposed. Colonel Smith, who before 
testified, to the destruction of General Porter, that 
that attack might have been made within an 
hour, concurring in the opinion then given 
by McDowell, now comes and frankly states 
that it would have taken not less than two 
hours. Suppose it to have been in the neigh- 
borhood of 7 o'clock, already nearly dark, when 
Porter got to the front, could he but concur 
wilh the conclusion of his skillful subordinate 
Morell, that it was too late— two hours — 9 o'clock, 
to complete the movement, and push forward into 
contact with the enemy? I suppose it is a mili- 
tary absurdity to pretend that. It has never been 
claimed that Porter should have made a night at- 



173 



tack under this order — and we suppose that in view 
of the situation as it then was, and so utterly dif- 
ferent from what the order contemplated, such a 
proceeding would have been the height of folly. 
So I leave that branch of the case. 1 . 



Violation of the 52nd Article of War. 

Now, in respect to those more grievous charges, 
as they seem to me to be, having acquitted Gen- 
eral Porter oi all that can possibly be charged 
against him under the head of disobedience. Now 
comes the question of whether he was guilty of the 
frightful crimes charged upon him in the specifica- 
tions under the second charge, imputing to him 
shameful treachery and misconduct in the face of 
the enemy running away when he knew that a 
battle was 1 aging on his right, in which the rest of 
the forces were engaged, by which even the capital 
of the country itself was involved in danger, and 
moving off without the least effort, or lying still 
upon his arms all day without the least effort to 
assist. You will observe that all this has prac- 
tically been disposed of in our discussion of the 
previous question under the joint order, if there 
was no retreat. The whole pretence of a retreat 
was based upon the despatch to McDowell and 
King, that, as the sound of battle seemed to retire, 
indicating to him that the main part of our forces 
were withdrawing behind Bull Run, as the joint 
order had contemplated the necessity of doing, he 
had made up his mind to retire also. I never have 
been able to discover any just ground of complaint 
as to that suggestion of his. If the circumstances 
were what he supposed, and what the despatch 
shows he supposed, it was not acted upon ; there 
was no movement whatever, such as the despatch 
contemplated ; there was no retreat. The sub- 
stance of the information upon which he had writ- 



174 

ten that despatch was immediately contradicted, 
and lie moved forward and directed an advance 
instead of a retreat. But under the application 
of the joint order, under General Pope's reiterated 
injunction in that order that it might be necessary, 
;iik1 that it probably would be necessary, for all of 
thai army to fall back behind Bull Run that night, 
and under no circumstances to get into any posi- 
tion by which they could not fall behind Bull Run 
thai night, if at 3 or 4 or 5 o'clock in the afternoon 
he became satisfied from the sound of battle, as 
this dispatch shows he did, that the rest of the 
army was falling behind Bull Run, what ought he 
to have done? Ought he to have left his little 
baud of nine thousand or ten thousand men ex- 
posed to the whole rebel army of now fifty thou- 
sand instead of twentj^-five thousand ; and he the 
only outpost and wholly unsupported? Well, I 
know nothing of soldiery, but it does seem tome 
to be the obvious dictate of common sense that if 
that was his belief the purpose of following the 
rest of the army behind Bull Run, as indicated in 
this message to McDowell and King, was not only 
eminently proper, but under the circumstances, was 
absolutely necessary; and when that information 
was contradicted, then you find that the first thing 
he does is to move forward. 

As to the numbers of the respective armies that 
day, I do not propose to afflict you with any 
further discussion. I have taken it for granted 
that, from all the statements that have been made 
up to this time Porter's force consisted of ten 
thousand men ; that is the x>roof upon which he 
was tried before ; that is the theory upon which 
this case has been tried throughout, until the day 
before yesterday, when the Recorder, upon what 
we regard as mistaken and fictitious methods, 
figured it at twelve thousand or fifteen thousand. 
Pope thought it was twelve thousand, but the ac- 
tual figures show ten thousand. TS T either do I know 



175 

or care what the exact number was of the rebel 
forces opposed to him on Dawkin's Branch, or be- 
tween there and the Pike, they were all in support- 
ing distance of each other. It was one united 
force, and an attack by him upon that force at any 
time after McDowell left him would have brought 
down together concentrated upon any part of that 
ground, the whole of Lee's and Longstreet's force. 
And what had he reason to believe they were ? He 
and McDowell agree upon the testimony as it now 
stands upon the record, that they knew there were 
at least 14, 100, who must have got there before they 
did, and they took it for granted that the rest 
were coming. Now what is the nature of the 
question under this specification \ We have got 
the question of disobedience out of the way. 
That is all gone. I assume that we have made a com- 
plete case in answer to the charge of disobedience. 
The question on this part of the case then is, the 
retreat being out of the way, whether it was his 
duty to make an attack between the time of Mc- 
Dowell's departure, taking King with him, and the 
receipt of the 4.30 p. m. order. Now, I am perhaps 
not capable of discussing the military principles that 
must govern such a question ; but I can state upon 
the one side, the theory upon which he was found 
guilty, because he did not attack, and I can state, 
upon the other, the facts as they now stand, and I 
think you will agree that if those facts as they have 
now been proved, had been before that court-mar- 
tial, there never would have been the least idea of 
convicting him. In the first place, we have the 
fact of the actual force that he had ; and, substan- 
tially, there is no difference between the former trial 
and this, in respect to that. King and Ricketts hav- 
ing been withdrawn from him, he was left with, say 
in round numbers, ten thousand men. The Recorder 
pretends, by a novel method of reckoning, that he 
had 33,000 men. The triumph of the science of 
mathematics is here well illustrated. He had hi s 



176 

own 13.000 [magnifying this 10,000 to 13,000] ; then 
he had King's and Rickett's 17,000 ; then lie had 
Bank's 10,000 — 40,000 ; a groat many more than I 
supposed. Forty thousand men, so says the learned 
Recorder, and that he ought to have made an attack. 
Well, }^es ; if he had 40,000 men, I agree that he 
ought to have made an attack. But, when it is 
necessary for the Recorder at this late day to resort 
to such marvellous calculations, is it not a pretty 
clear abandonment of the case as it always stood 
before, and as we think it stands now. Why bring 
into this case all this rubbish about Banks? Was 
Banks under the command of Porter ? Why didn' t 
Pope, anxious as he was to have Porter's con- 
viction stand in former years, make that sugges- 
tion? Why didn't the Judge Advocate General, 
reciting to the President all the evidence there was 
against Porter, say anything about Banks ? That is 
the triumph of the Recorder's ingenuity ; that is 
a new invention ; and, I think, a weak invention 
of the enemy. General Banks, (says the Recorder) 
was at Bristoe, or Kettle Run. There has been 
quite a deal of dispute and discussion, raised by 
him upon the evidence of Professor Andrews, and 
of his superior officer, General Gordon, as to the 
precise point where Banks was, whether at Bristoe 
or at Kettle Run. I don't know where he was 
The Recorder says it is quite manifest that it was not 
Porter's force, but it was a brigade of observation 
from Banks' force, sent out half a mile or a mile 
from Bristoe, that caused the transportation of 
Wilcox' force over to their right wing in the after- 
noon of the 29th. But, is it not too obvious for dis- 
pute that it was some movement of Porter's 10,000 
men close upon the enemy, so close that Longshvet 
would not let Lee attack, although Lee wanted to 
at tad;, that dictated to them that precautionary 
transfer of Wilcox? If that was not sufficient cause 
for transferring Wilcox over there with his three 
brigades, how was the advance of a single brigade 



177 



of observation, away down within a mile of Bristoe, 
cause for the transfer of Wilcox ? The Recorder 
says the enemy in that movement was waiting for 
something to turn up. Well, something had al- 
ready turned up. Porter had turned up, and was 
there with his 10,000 men close upon them. It was 
undoubtedly some threatening movement upon Mo- 
rell'spart; something done, or apparently threat- 
ened to be done, that called for that transfer. So, I 
do not think it worth while to discuss that question 
any more. The character of the position at Daw- 
kin's Branch, held by Porter for offence and de- 
fence is proved by the maps and surveys, and the 
testimony of Warren, of Morell, of Sykes, and oth- 
ers. Did the former court-martial understand that ? 
The maps that were before them show that they 
did not. For all that they knew, Porter, wherever 
he was, had nothing but the clear open country 
before him, without a single rebel soldier interven- 
ing between him and Jackson's right wing. On 
their theory, an attack was just as practicable as it 
is upon the Recorder's theory, as evidenced by the 
map which I have been enabled to incorporate into 
my argument, because there was nothing to prevent 
his attacking. Now, here is this new fact of the 
introduction of anywhere from 14,000 to 25,000 men 
absolutely commanding and closing the way. They 
outflanked him on his left, and they outflanked him 
on the right, clear away to the Warrenton turn- 
pike. Now, where is the soldier, we challenge 
him to come forward — who will say that, under 
these circumstances, General Porter ought to have 
made an attack i General Pope does not dare say 
so. If he could have said that, he would have 
been here to say it ; he would not have waited for 
any subpoena ; if he, as a soldier, could have demon- 
strated to you, as soldiers, that Porter, in that sit- 
uation ought to have attacked, he would have come, 
because he is anxious to support this prosecution, 



178 



and keep General Porter under this brand of infamy 
which lie has laid upon his head. No ; I don't be- 
lieve there is a soldier in this or any other country, 
who dares to come and say that Porfeer, under those 
circumstances, should have made an attack. 

Then, what else is there? There is the difference 
of position. I speak not now of the ignorance of the 
court-martial, of the ground which has been so 
clearly laid down before this Board. I speak now 
of the confessed difference as to Porter's position, 
the relative position of Porter to the right wing of 
the rebel army as it was then believed to be, and as 
it is now demonstrated to have been. It is involved 
in the question of the then supposed absence of the 
confederate force which we now know, and was 
then by Porter asserted assuredly, to have been 
present bet ween Jackson and Porter. They thought, 
and all thought, apparently — McDowell certainly 
thought — that Porter was much nearer the Warren- 
ton turnpike than lie was. They all thought that 
Porter had reached the second run that crossed the 
Manassas and Gainesville road, one mile in advance 
of where he was. The maps show it. The sworn 
stai'unents show it. And then they thought that 
he was behind the right wing of the rebel army, 
and very near to it; that there was nothing I here 
but Jackson's force, as has been demonstrated to 
you over and over again — nothing there but Jack- 
son, and that there was no pretence of execution on 
Porter's part of his recognised duty, the situation 
being what they supposed it was, of going in, 
orders or no orders, and attacking the right Hank 
and rear of Jackson's force. 



Was a Battle " raging " all Day ? 

There was another thing. The court-martial be- 
lieved, and it was so sworn, that there was a battle 
raging all day in his plain sight and hearing. 



179 

Well, was there ? You all know about that now. 
The Recorder called a host of witnesses to prove 
that there was a battle. It has enabled us to 
develope exactly the situation. There was not a 
battle raging with continuous fury from daylight 
until dark, as Pope, in his despatch of the next 
morning, asserted. There was a series of successive 
spurts, as Heintzelman said ; there were skirmishes 
all along the line from just below the Warrenton 
pike up to Sudley Springs and Sudley church. 
Was there no battle? Why, yes ; there were lots 
of them. Every regiment, apparently, and every 
brigade, had a battle of its own. But they were no 
more connected than if one had been in Maine and 
another in Florida, and the rest in interlying 
States. There was no support of one attack by 
another attack. Let me read what General Schurz 
said upon that subject, He was there ; he was en- 
gaged in it. Heintzleman says there were succes- 
sive spurts. General Schurz says : 

" If all those forces, instead of being frittered 
" away in in sola led efforts, had co-ox^erated with 
" each other at any one moment, after a common 
" plan, the result of the day would have been far 
" greater than the mere re-taking and occupa- 
" tion of the ground we had already taken and 
'' occupied in the morning, and which, in the 
" afternoon, was for a short time at least lost 
" again." 

We have prepared, and will give you, a synopsis 
in print of what these successive spurts were, where 
they were, and when they took place. It de- 
monstrates that there was no continuous battle, 
and they account for the fact that General Porter, 
who, you will remember, was left alone, without a 
word from General Pope all this time, never heard 
anything but artillery firing. The Recorder says, 
" O, yes, he did." General Marshall, in charge 
of his skirmish line, makes very strong statements 



180 

of seeing, from that skirmish line, on the other side 
of Dawkin's Branch, the rebel army and Pope's 
army in fight, moving backwards and forwards, 
heard their yells, and that there was no man in our 
force who did not feel assured that Pope's army 
was being driven from the field. General Marshall 
stated that. I have no doubt that, so far as he was 
concerned, it was entirely true. There is not the 
least evidence that he made any such statement to 
General Porter. But what was it ? He does not 
iix the time on his first examination ; but on this 
new trial he does. What was it ? What conflict 
was there that day that answered all these condi- 
tions, that could possibly be seen from any ground 
in the neighborhood of Dawkin's Branch? It 
was the fight between King's division and Hood, 
when King was thrust down on the turnpike just 
at dusk. There is not any other fight that day, on 
that held, that could possibly have been seen or 
heard from that part of the country, that could 
answer the conditions described by General Mar- 
shall, and that does answer exactly to them. Mr. 
Maltby tells me, from a very careful inspection of 
the record, that until that tight with King's divi- 
sion, on no part of the line was there, at any time, 
a larger force than eight regiments concerned in any 
one of these skirmishes or conflicts. There was a 
great deal of slaughter, undoubtedly. What prin- 
ciple it was conducted upon no historian has ever 
yet stated. We have a promised history of OoL >nel 
Smith's, which may probably explain it, but theie 
never yet has been any explanation of that method 
of warfare. Well, I have one which I will give you 
presently. I think it Avas conducted upon the 
general laws of war as laid down by General Pope, 
when he took command of the army, upon the 
principles of attacking whenever you see anybody 
to attack, without regard to the circumstances or 
the consequences, exactly according to the mili- 
tary code of the Irishman at Donnvbrook fair. 



181 

But now, what is the real fact, as to its being a 
continuous battle, within sight and hearing of 
General Porter, and raging all day? We have 
produced the evidence of every man in his division 
who is worth believing, that until General Marshall 
saw the fight between Hood and King they saw 
nothing. They heard only artillery tiling. And 
there was General Porter awaiting news from 
Pope and McDowell. The news from McDowell, 
that he got, said that all went well with 
him towards Bull Run. It didn't go well 
anywhere else. The evidence shows' that King, 
or rather Hatch (as King was absent), marched up 
the Sudley Spring road, going to and fro on contra- 
dictory orders from Pope and McDowell, and that 
he did not get into any action until this disastrous 
run on the pike, when he was rushed down through 
all the other forces at about sunset, or after. 
1 suppose that a corps commander, as I have had 
occasion to say on this subject, is bound to take 
notice of the situation, and if he was aware of cir- 
cumstances and facts wholly unknown to his com- 
manding general, at the other end of the line, he 
was bound to act upon what he saw before him— 
was he not? Now, was there any time that, day 
when he ought properly to have attacked, and 
when it would not, on the contrary, have been a 
fatal and stupid blunder, for which he would have 
been grossly culpable, and chargeable with all the 
destruction of life that would have been occasioned, 
if he had made an attack— was there anything 
known to him that would have justified the sacrifice 
of his corps by an attack that day ? We know now 
that if he had sacrificed his whole corps by the 
blunder of an attack, it would not have afforded 
any relief to Pope's army. There is a demonstra- 
tion of this, as it seems to me, in this case, that the 
whole world would be content with, in confirmation 
of Longstreet's testimony, that it was Porter's 
presence there that prevented an attack by Lee 



182 

that day. And, what is the demonstration? What 
happened next day when Porter was withdrawn by 
the orders of General Pope from this position! 
What is the evidence? What is the irresistible con- 
clusion from the proofs as to what happened on the 
30th \ Why, that it was only Porter holding on to 
where he was, against every threat and every doubt, 
that prevented on the 29th the slaughter that was 
consummated 01 the 30th. What could have justi- 
fied Portei' in withdrawing his force from there on 
the morning of the 30th but the positive orders of 
General Pope, who still remained, or claimed to 
have remained, in absolute ignorance of the inter- 
vening situation ? Remember that day of the 3()th. 
When General Pope withdrew General Porter's 
force and brought it up with him to Groveton, he 
could not believe, Reynolds and Porter together 
could not convince him, that the rebel army, 
under Lee and Longstreet, was there. Had 
not he said in his despatch of the previous day 
that they were coming at such a rate as would 
bring them in by the night of the 30th or the 
31st? No, he could not believe that the whole 
rebel army Avas then already there. He said ihey 
were in full retreat even then, that morning of the 
30th. He launched his army upon them supposing 
that they were in full retreat, when they were there 
in that fortress, that impregnable fortress, upon 
the Independent railroad cut, and thence stretching 
away upon these heights down to the situation 
where Porter had left them that morning. Well, 
you know what slaughter took place on the 30th. 
You know it was when Porter was withdrawn from 
the position which on his judgment lie had main- 
tained the day before. It seems to me that the 
truth as to rhe situation of the 29th, and the pro- 
priety of Porter's conduct on the 29th, are demon 
strated by what appeared to follow on the 30th, 
when, contrary to his own judgment, he was with- 
drawn from this fortified position on Dawkins' 



183 



Branch, which had up till that time held the main 
force of the rebel army in check, and the whole 
Federal force was huddled together on the inside of 
the circle in front of the Independent railroad cut, 
and upon the successive heights, beginning with 
Douglass height and extending down to the Manas- 
sas and Gainesville road, all along which the rebel 
arm y was entrenched. 

At this point, if the Board please, let me call your 
attention specially to two maps, one called Map No. 
4, showing what we claim to be the positions of the 
respective forces during this time which is covered 
by these general specifications, under the second 
charge, and irrespective of any specific order to 
attack, showing what we now know to have been 
the situation, and what General Porter then sub- 
stantially believed to be the situation. That map 
has been criticized, and unjust reflections cast upon 
Captain Judson in regard to it. So I will beg 
leave to state the facts in regard to it. The map 
itself is one of the Government maps made for this 
case, made by General Warren and by Captain 
Judson— the great map from which this is reduced. 
When the evidence was all in substantially — the 
evidence of those positions especially upon which 
we rely, we desired General Porter to have a map, 
that soldiers would understand, prepared, depicting 
the resj)ective positions of the confederate and 
federal forces, from 6 o'clock until 12 on the 29th. 
Captain Judson was employed by him personally, at 
his own expense, outside of his official time — that 
is, not involving his official time — to do what \ To 
make these positions ? No. Simply to project them 
upon the map as given to him from the evidence. 
General Porter and his counsel, from the evidence, 
defined these positions, and we believe and are certain 
that they will be sustained by all the evidence in 
the case that is worth considering. What Captain 
Judson did in that matter I cannot see the least 



184 

impropriety in his doing, any more than if onr 
learned friend, the Recorder, is employed, as I 
hope he often is, to try and argne cases at private 
expense for some party when the Government does 
not require his services. There is no time now to dis- 
cuss these positions. Whether they are right or not 
this Board will have to determine. The only point of 
conflict appears to be in respect to these movements 
sworn to by Sigel and Schenck in the neighbor- 
hood of the Warrenton pike, which took place on the 
noon and afternoon of the 29th. We believe these 
positions fixed upon this map to be true, although 
they refer } T ou not to the original, but to the alter- 
ed time of the movements, as stated by Sigel and 
by Schenck. [This map has already been referred 
to as Map DJ. 

Sigel alters his testimony from his first state- 
ment. If you look at his second statement, you 
will find, that it substantially accords with these 
positions. If you will take the time stated in 
Heintzelman's diary, for the movement by Reno, 
and then take the testimony of the only man from 
Reno's force who has been examined, the only man 
of substance, Stevens, and then take Benjamin's 
testimony, and that of Gen. Reynolds, as it stands 
in the old record, you will find that they all fully 
substantiate the testimony of the confederate 
generals, and accord with these positions. But, in 
the view Ave take, it matters very little for the pur- 
pose of these general charges, that I am now con- 
sidering, exactly where the force of Longstreet was, 
if only it was in such a position that it could and 
did command these heights on the other side 
of Dawkin's Branch, and could reach them be- 
fore Gen. Porter could. And to accompany the 
map just produced, I offer another map pre- 
pared in the same way, showing what happened 
on the 30th, and I believe that is the last map that 
1 shall ask to have incorporated in my argument. 



185 

This probably, puts to the test the wisdom of Por- 
ter's course on the clay before. ( Map shown to the 
the Board). There, (on map No 4, map D) are the 
forces as they were substantially from 12 to 6, on 
the 29th ? 

How is it possible that with Porter's force, where 
it is thus shown to have been, this federal force 
under Pope could be destroyed % 

Here on map No. 6, of the 30th, is the situation, 
when by Pope's orders, Gen. Porter was drawn 
over into the very centre of the circle formed by 
the confederates, whereby the confederates were 
enabled to advance unobstructed to their final pos- 
itions as here shown and surround and slaughter 
our forces as they did upon the 30th. 

I suppose that this Board can never forget the 
touching testimony of Gen. Warren as to the com- 
plete and hopeless slaughter of his entire force, 
when this position as depicted on this map was 
consummated. 

That event came about by an abandonment of 
what Gen. Porter had deemed a wise position, and 
had maintained against all hazards and doubts the 
previous day. [This map of the position on the 
30th, will be found in the appendix as Map H]. 
Despatches of the 29th. 

Now, if the Board please, the recorder has had 
a great deal to say, in respect to the despatches that 
passed between General Morell on the 29th, and 
General Porter. I do not propose to weary the 
Board with a re-consideration of these. That has 
been done in the statement presented by Mr. Bul- 
litt, and most carefully perfected by him. 

These despatches show no inconsistency ; they 
fully explain the much complained-of message to 
McDowell and King, on the strength of which Por- 
ter was convicted of retreating. Now there are some 
things to be said in regard to these despatches. Gen 
eral Porter remained at the front after McDowell left 



186 

him. McDowell did not go until somewhere be- 
fcween 12 and 1 o'clock ; that is certain. Porter 
remained a long time after that at the front, and 
came to the rear, and established his headquarters 
at Bethlehem Church, somewhere from 2 to 3 
o'clock, probably at 3 o'clock. These written des- 
patches between him and Morell must have begun 
about that hour. I do not suppose there was any need 
of written despatches when both were at the front. 
It is not likely that)we have all the despatches. If 
we could have all that Genera] Porter wrote that 
day, if none were withheld from us by the prose- 
cution, there would not be a single circumstance in 
all the details of that afternoon left unexplained. 
If we could have the dispatch that General Porter 
sent to General Pope by Weld ; if we could have 
the other dispatch that he sent to Gen. Pope, in 
answer to the 4.30 P. M. order, that came by 
Douglass Pope, explaining the situation then in 
regard to the force in front of him, in regard to the 
time, showing the exact time when that was re- 
ceived ; if we could have the other despatch sent to 
General Pope, which told him that General Mc- 
Dowell had taken King away, and which is testi- 
fied to before McDowell's Court of Inquiry, we 
should have everything. But it does seem tome, 
that those despatches now before you tell substan- 
tially the whole story, and make out a perfect case, 
under all the charges, in respect to the conduct of 
General Porter on the 29th. 

The Recorder, for some reason or other, has 
seen fit to say, that Porter's headquarters 
were two and live-eighths miles from the head 
of his column. Well, if it were so, I don't 
kimw that there would be anything wrong, 
if his column were two and five-eighths miles long ; 
but unfortunately for the statement his column 
was only a mile and three-quarters ; Morell, at one 
end of it. and he at the other. I think you will 
find it admitted by Judge Advocate Holt, on his 
written argument, that Sykes,whowas with Porter 



187 

at liis headquarters, was in the proper place. I 
suppose that is an admission that General Porter 
was in his proper place, where he could not only 
command his whole force in front of him— where 
he could command his own force, and get the 
promptest intelligence of everything that was going 
on in front, and at the same time be in a situation 
)o communicate with Generals McDowell and 
Pope, and to receive the messages that General 
Pope did not send him. General Lee, it seems, 
had his headquarters in the rear of his force, on 
the 29th and 30th. Gen. Pope started out in the 
morning, with his headquarters at Centreville, 8 
or 10 miles away, and did not come on the held 
until after 1 o'clock, and then he established his 
headquarters a little farther from his foremost 
force than General Porter was from his. General 
Pope said that he was in the presence of the enemy 
when he was at Centreville, so that I do not think 
there is any difficulty in this matter, of the dis- 
tance of General Porter's headquarters from his 
front. 



Value of Government Testimony — General 
McDowell, 

The whole case, so far as the facts go, has now 
been completely disposed of. There is not a rag 
left of the Government case against General Por- 
ter ; and yet there is something that remains. 
There are the opinions of two witnesses, who, if 
their opinions were entitled in this particular ease 
to weight, ought to receive great consideration. 
Those are the opinions of Generals McDowell and 
Pope. What I propose further to say, in respect 
to them to complete this review of the affairs of 
the 29th, is, that General McDowell and General 
Pope have placed themselves in such a position be- 
fore this Board, that you must utterly reject their 



188 

opinions when given adversely to General Porter. 
About General McDowell enough doubtless has 
already been said. The fatal mistake that he made 
oa the former trial, or that he alleged was made, 
was in allowing his testimony as to what he said to 
Porter, to be construed into an order, to make an 
immediate attack with Porter's whole force on the 
right Hank and rear of the enemy in front of him. 
He claimed this time, and said that he didn't mean 
any such thing ; he didn't mean that General 
Porter should have done anything more than we 
have fully proved that he did do. Well, I think 
that should have removed General McDowell's evi- 
dence, and the weight of his opinion, if there is a 
shred ot his opinion still left in the case, should 
have removed it all. But I must call attention to 
two or three circumstances in respect to General 
McDowell, which would wipe out, as it seems to 
me, from the case, the weight of his opinions, be- 
cause of bias and hostility from some cause — I 
don't know what — to General Porter. Let us see. 
In 1870, I think it was, he, in answer to the peti- 
tion or application of General Porter to the Presi- 
dent of the United States for a reopening of his 
case, prepared for circulation, and distributed cer- 
tain evidence, as he called it, to counteract that 
claim. What was it ? It was an account by Gen- 
eral Jackson of the battle of the 30th, but pur- 
porting to be of the battle of the 29th. With 
what object % To show that General Porter must 
have known that there was a fierce contest going 
on between the Federal troops and the Confederate 
troops at Groveton. Well, it now so happened 
that that account of General Jaokson related not to 
the 29th, but on its face related to, and purported 
to relate to the 30th. And the worst part of it was, 
that the ferocious federal onsets referred to by 
Jackson, which were intended to be a dem- 
onstration of Porter's knowledge on the 29th, 
from his distant position at Dawkin's Branch, that 



189 

there was a furious battle raging, were Porter' sown 
fighting of the 30th. It was his impetuous attack ; 
it was his brave troops of the Fifth Army Corps on 
the 30th, that made such a demonstration — such 
onslaughts, such irresistible attacks upon Jackson's 
front, that he was compelled to call for reinforce- 
ments, and that was put forth to the public by- 
General McDowell as a demonstration that Porter, 
in his distant position on the day before, must have 
known that that very state of things was going on 
then, and thus to find cause to condemn his inac- 
tion on the 29th, the day before. Well, the ques- 
tion is, as to General McDowell's purpose in this. 
I am going to read to you Jackson's account of 
what then happened on the 30th, because, with that 
map of the 30th before you, it can be more easily 
followed. You know what took place, and you 
know who did the great deeds of that day. As 
General McDowell now admits, it was General Por- 
ter and his troops that bore the brunt of that fight. 
Now, the question is, whether General McDowell, 
who was charged with the superintendence of that 
whole work of the 30th — who was charged with 
the whole business of the pursuit — in the first place, 
whether he ever read this, which I hope he never 
did ; and if he did read it, whether he could for a 
moment have remained of the impression that it 
referred to the 29th. This is Jackson's account of 
that fight, and you will see that nothing approach- 
ing this or anything like it, happened on the 29th 
— that it was all Porter's magnificent fighting on 
the 30th ; and as General McDowell, on being con- 
fronted with the very book from which he took 
this extract, was forced to admit, the events des- 
cribed are there expressly stated to have taken 
place on the 30th, and not on the 29fh : 

" After some desultory skirmishing and 
" heavy cannonading during the day, the Federal 
" infantry, about 4 o'clock in the evening, moved 



190 

" from under cover of the wood, and advanced in 
" several lim j s, firs! engaging the right, but soon 
<l extending its attack to the centre and left. In 
" a few moments our entire line was engaged in a 
" fierce and sanguinary struggle with the enemy. 
" As one line was repulsed another took its place, 
•' and pressed forward as if determined, by force 
" of numbers and fury of assault, to drive us 
" from our position. So impetuous and well 
" maintained were these onsets as to induce me 
" to send to the commanding general for rein- 
" forcements ; but the timely and gallant advance 
" of General Longstreet, on the right, relieved 
" my troops from the press in-!' of overwhelming 
" numbers, and gave to those brave men the 
" chance of a more equal conflict. As Longstreet 
" pressed upon the right, the Federal advance was 
" checked, and soon a general advance of my 
" whole line was ordered. Eagerly and fiercely 
" did each brigade press forward, exhibiting in 
" parts of the held scenes of close encounter and 
" murderous strife, not witnessed often in the tur- 
" moil of battle. The Federals gave way before 
" our troops, fell back in disorder, and fled pre- 
" cipitately, leaving their dead and wounded on 
" the held. During their retreat, the artillery 
" opened with destructive power upon the fugi- 
" tive masses. The infantry followed until dark- 
" ness put an end to the pursuit." 

An exact description of the transaction of the 
30th, of which General Porter bore the brunt. Now. 
is it possible for General McDowell procuring that, 
publishing it, putting a heading on it that it referred 
to the transactions of the 29th, to have read it and 
not seen at once that it referred not to the 29th, but 
to Porter's fight, as we may well call it, of the 30th % 
I do not wish to throw the least discredit upon any 
general ; I am only speaking as I have a right to 
speak of what stands recorded here, and to speak 



191 

of the weight to be given to General McDowell's 
opinion, as adverse to General Porter's. If it had 
stopped there it would have been bad enough. But 
what more have we ? Why, when that came out, Col. 
Smith, who seems to be a deluded, but a reasonably 
truthful witness, at once protested that it was not 
true ; that that was a mistake, that it referred not 
to the 29th, but to Porter's light of the 30th. Well, 
the question was raised, and it became a public, 
bruited, agitated question among military men. 
What happened % That question came to General 
McDowell's ears. What should have happened % 
I suppose fair play is a rule among soldiers as it is 
among civilians. Here was this report gotten up by 
General McDowell, circulated by him for the pur- 
pose of thwarting Porter's application for a rehear- 
ing, which necessarily must have been to his infinite 
damage and jtrejudice, because of this injection into 
the 29th of the very different facts of the 30th. The 
question was publicly raised, whether General Mc- 
Dowell had not made a mistake in his dates — 
whether he had not erroneously published the events 
of the 30th as the events of the 29th. • I should 
suppose that the first instinct of a soldier in such a 
case would have been to find out whether he had 
made a mistake or not. It would be the first im- 
pulse of anybody outside of the army, and it seems 
to me that it would be of every man in the army. 
Well now, what di d General McDowell do ? Know- 
ing that the question was agitated, and that he was 
suspected of having made this mistake, to the great 
damage of his brother soldier, who was suffering 
under this undeserved ignominy, what did he do ? 
He did nothing. He let it go uncorrected. Why ? 
Now, do not let me do him any injustice. Let me 
show you his own words. Why did he let it go un- 
corrected. I read from page 768 of the record : 

"Q. Now, when this doubt was raised, 
u whether it did, in fact, refer to the 29th or the 



192 

" 30th, did you take any pains to find out ? 

" A. I did not ; but the ' pains ' were taken in 
" that being sent on to Washington, to see 
" whether it was a correct extract, and they said 
"it was. 

" Q. Did it occur to you then, that if this mis- 
" take had been made, and it, in fact, referred to 
" the 30th, and not to the 29th, an injustice had 
" been done to General Porter, which might be 
" corrected then ? 

" A. You must understand, that up to within 
" a few minutes, I never knew what I have since 
" admitted to be the fact, that that statement did 
" not refer to the 29th. 

" Q. But when it did become a matter of ques- 
" tion, whether it referred to the 29th or 30th, 
<k you did not take any pains to find out which it 
"did refer to ? 

" A. No, sir. 

" Q. Did it occur to you, at that time, that if 
" it was a mistake, an injustice had been done to 
" General Porter by that, which might, and 
" should then be corrected, at that time r i 

" A. No, it did not, because I did not think it 
" my province to do it." 

Not his province to correct an error, which he him- 
self had made to the prejudice of another soldier, who 
was suffering under this ignominy ! It cannot be 
that he wants fair play for General Porter. It can- 
not be, that any opinion that he expressed, ought 
to be for one moment considered. There is one 
other little matter, in respect to General McDowell, 
to which I call your attention in that same 
connection, although it seems to me that what I 
have just shown is enough. That is fatal, is it not, 
to the impartiality of any opinion of his involving 
the conduct of General Porter. 

But the other fact is quite as bad for General 
McDowell, as illustrating his bias and hostility to 



193 

General Porter, and the consequent worthlessness 
of his adverse opinions. I refer to his suppression 
on the court-martial of the three despatches of the 
29th of August, 1 received by him from General 
Porter — despatches now produced by General Mc- 
Dowell, but which on the former trial were in his 
possession, but were not then produced though 
called for, and which would have gone very far in- 
deed towards the vindication of General Porter. 
Those three despatches are to be found at page 
810 of the new record, and are as follows : 

"General McDowell.— The firing on my right 
" has 1 so far retired that, as I cannot advance, 
" and have failed to get over to you, except by 
" the route taken by King, I shall withdraw to 
" Manassas. If you have anything to communi- 
" cate, please do so. I have sent many messen- 
" gers to you and General Sigel and get nothing. 

" F. J. PORTER, 
1 ' Major- General. ' ' 

" An artillery duel is going on now — been 
'■' skirmishing for a long time." 

"P. J. P." 

" General McDowell or King. — I have been 
" wandering over the woods and failed to get a 
" communication to you. Tell how matters go 
" with you. The enemy is in strong force in 
" front of me, and 1 wish to know your designs 
" for to-night. If left to me I shall have to re- 
" tire for food and water, which I cannot get here. 
" How goes the battle ? It seems to go to our 
" rear. The enemy are getting to our left." 

" F. J. PORTER, 

" M. G. Vols." 

" General McDowell. — Failed in getting Mo- 
" rell over to you. After wandering about the 
" woods for a time, I withdrew him, and while do- 



194 

11 ing so, artillery opened on us. My scouts could 
" not get through. Each one found the enemy 
" between us, and I believe some have been cap- 
" tured. Infantry are also in front. I am trying 
" to get a battery, but have not succeeded as yet. 
" From the masses of dust on our left, and from 
" reports of scouts, think the enemy are moving 
" largely in that way. Please communicate the 
" way this messenger came. I have no cavalry 
" or messengers now. Please let me know your 
" designs, whether you retire or not. I cannot 
" get water and am out of provision. Have lost 
" a few men from infantry liring. 

"F. J. PORTER, 

" Major-Gen. Vols. 

" Aug. 29, 6 p. m." 

They show many things which General Porter 
was struggling to show on his former trial, and 
which the withholding by General McDowell of 
these despatches prevented from clearly appearing. 

The}' show how completely he was abandoned all 
that day by both Pope and McDowell, and how 
eagerly he was waiting and looking for tidings 
from them. They shed a flood of light on the 
much perverted and much complained of despatch 
to McDowell and King, the despatch which was so 
fatal to Porter in the judgment of President Lin- 
coln, as indicating the purpose to retreat, while the 
rest of the army were lighting — a purpose which 
the President was falsely told by the Judge Advo- 
cate-General, that Porter had carried out — these 
show the true meaning of that despatch that he 
was tli inking of retiring in obedience to the in- 
junctions contained in the joint order, because 
of his belief that the rest had retired be- 
hind Bull Run. They show the great strength 
of the enemy in his front, and on his 



195 

left — and finally, as we have already seen, 
they show that at 6 o'clock, when the third of these 
despatches was written and dated, General Pope's 
4 30 P. M. order had not yet been received. The 
despatches were carefully preserved by General 
McDowell ; they were in his possession ; all de- 
spatches that he held were pointedly called for 
when he was under examination upon the court- 
martial, and these were not produced. While 
another, which, taken alone, was very prejudicial 
to Porter, but which these would have fully ex- 
plained, and to his credit, was vauntingly exhib- 
ited and put in evidence. Will it do tor an eminent 
general, swearing away the good name, or perhaps 
the life even, of a brother officer, to shelter himself 
from the charge of suppressing such material evi- 
dence behind the plea that he forgot them, or did 
not realize their importance, or look to see what 
they were ? 

We submit, therefore that these three facts, so 
distinctly proved upon General McDowell, viz : 
his statement upon the former trial, now utterly 
retracted, that he meant by "put your troops in 
here," to order Porter to make an immediate at- 
tack with his whole force ; his publication of the 
falsely dated extract from Jackson's report to de- 
feat Porter's application for a rehearing ; and his 
suppression of these three important despatches, 
do completely destroy any weight or consideration 
which might otherwise have been claimed for the 
opinions of this celebrated witness. 



General Pope's Testimony. 

Now, I come to General Pope, whose opinion 
is so much relied upon by the prosecution, and, in 
fact, his is now the only remaining opinion. I sup- 
pose it may fairly be said to have been abandoned 



196 

by his contemptuous refusal to come before this 
Board and support it. But, understanding that it 
in.i\ be claimed differently, let us see how he stands. 
It seems to me that there is exhibited upon this 
record, a deadly hostility on his part to General 
Porter, and a confession by him of personal inter- 
est in the question of Porter's guilt or innocence; 
and there is something more exhibited, if I under- 
stand the matter right. He has a most peculiar 
congenital defect ; I mean his way— constitutional 
with him and peculiar to him— of looking at things 
and stating things ; his method of stating the 
truth, if that is the proper word. He will tell the 
biggest kind of a "truth," that is out of all rela- 
tions, not only with all truths known to other 
people, but with his own truths as he has seen 
them, and stated them the day before. Now, if 
that be so, his opinion certainly ought not to be re- 
garded as of any great force. In respect to that, I 
shall be under the necessity of calling your atten- 
tion to only a few instances. There is a disease 
called "colorblindness," when a man cannot dis- 
tinguish one color from another, when he will look 
at the red diamonds of a colored window, and say 
that they are green, or at a yellow light, and de- 
clare that is blue. It is no fault on his part, It is 
a natural, inherent, constitutional defect. So it 
seems to me that there is such a thing as blindness 
to the truth, and inability to recognize the exist- 
ing relations of things. That seems to be the in- 
firmity of this general. Let us see — he did declare, 
did he not, in the presence of General Ruggles, on 
the 2d of September, that he was entirely satisfied 
with all of General Porters explanations, in regard 
to these much complained of matters. He met him 
cordially at Centreville, in the presence of the wit- 
nesses, General Webb and General Green, and 
General William F. Smith. Now, that would seem 
to be a pretty strong contradiction of all his 



197 

opinions and "charges before. But, as to tins 
natural infirmity of his, I want to call the attention 
of the Board to certain written statements. At 
page 234 of the court-martial record, is his account 
of the battle of thef,29th. I will only read one 
sentence. It was written on the morning of the 
30th, at 5 a. m. : 

" We fought a terrific battle here yesterday, 
" with the combined forces of the enemy, which 
" lasted with continuous fury from daylight un- 
•' til after dark, by which time the enemy was 
" driven from the field, which we now occupy." 

If he did not know anything of the presence of 
Longstreet, it is a very curious thing to find here 
a statement that he had been fighting against the 
combined forces of the enemy ; and if he knew 
that, as he swore upon the court-martial, he came 
upon the field about twelve or one, and practically 
put a scop to hostilities until about four, it is a 
very remarkable thing that on the next morning 
he saw the truth to be in this way : 

" We fought a terrific battle yesterday with 
" the combined forces of the enemy, which last- 
" ed with continuous fury from day -light until 
" after dark" 

Then, at 9 p. m. on that day, he wrote another 
despatch, which is contained in General Porter's 
opening statement, at page 101. You know the 
facts of the battle of the 30th, that it was brought 
on by an assault which General Porter was directed 
under General McDowell to make, and that the as- 
sault was directed upon the assurance that the ene- 
my were flying and in full retreat. Well, they 
made an assault. They were almost cut to pieces. 
Blood flowed like water. Thousands of brave men 
perished, and this is the account that General Pope 



198 

gave of it that same night, 9:45 p. m. from Cen- 
tre ville. 

"We have had a terrific battle again to-day. 
" The enemy largely re-enforced assaulted our 
"position early to-day. We held oiir ground 
" iirnily until 6 p. m., when the enemy, massing 
" very heavy forces on the left, forced back that 
" wing about half a mile. At dark we held that 
" position. Under all the circumstances, both 
" horses and men having been two days without 
" food, and the enemy greatly outnumbering us, 
" I thought it best to draw back to this place at 
" dark. The movement has been made in per- 
" feet order and without loss. The troops are in 
" good heart, and marched off the field without 
" the least hurry or confusion. Their conduct 
" was very fine." 

That refers to Porter's troops especially. 

" We have lost nothing, neither guns nor 
" wagons." 

Well, General Ruggles, his aide-de-camp, who 
was required to pen this dispatch for him, says, at 
the time it was written, " General, I saw some 
guns lost, I saw some wagons lost ; you are mistak- 
en there, are you not?" He said, " Well, write it. 
WeUiave lost nothing, neither guns nor wagons !" 
Then he comes to Washington and is stung to 
madness by the telegrams upon which the Re- 
corder has relied so much, and that madness, as it 
seems to me, has continued until this day. 

Next I want to call your attention to his report 
of September 3d, at page 1,116 of this record. That 
is one of the most remarkable manifestations of 
this peculiarity of General Pope, that I have ever 
found. We know exactly, now, the orders that 
General Pope gave on the morning of the 29th. 



199 

The history of this report is that it was written for 
the purpose of laying the foundation for the prose- 
cution of delinquent officers, as claimed or stated 
in his report to the committee on the conduct of 
the war. They wanted the actual truth, and here 
he states it, as he then saw it, speaking of what 
happened on the morning of the 29th. You know 
what the orders were then \ There was a written 
order to Porter to march upon Centre ville at day- 
light. Then a verbal message, followed by a writ- 
ten order for him to march upon Gainesville, and 
then the joint order. Now, here is the way Gener- 
al Pope states it. 

" I also instructed F. J. Porter, with his 
" own corps and King's division of McDowell's 
" corps, which had for some reason fallen back 
" from the Warrenton turnpike toward Manassas 
*' Junction, to move at day -light in the morning 
" upon Gainesville along the Manassas Gap 
" Railroad, until they communicated closely 
" with the force under Heintzelman and Siegel, 
" cautioning them not to go further than was 
" necessary to effect this junction, as we might 
" be obliged to retire behind Bull Run that 
*' night for subsistence, if nothing else." 

It shows also his construction of what he got 
jumbled up here with the joint order, cautioning 
them not to go further than necessary to effect this 
junction. Did the Recorder ever see that? 

" Porter marched as directed,, followed, by 
" King' s division, which was by this time join- 
" ed by Ricketts* division, which had been forc- 
" ed back from Thoroughfare Gap by the heavy 
" forces of the enemy advancing to support Jack- 
" son. As soon as I found that the enemy had 
" been brought to a halt, and was being mgor- 
" ously attaeked along Warrenton turnpike, 
" sent orders to McDowell." 



200 

Now, here are two orders which nobody else has 
ever heard of. 

" To advance rapidly on our left, and at- 
" tack the enemy on his "flank, extending his 
" right to meet Reynold' s left, and to Fltz John 
" Porter to keep his right well closed on McDo- 
" welV s left, and to attack the enemy in jlank, 
" and rear, while he was pushed in front. This 
" would have made the line of battle of McDow- 
" ell and Porter, at right angles to that of the 
" other forces engaged." 

Can you conceive of a General who had com- 
manded three or four days before, and had issued 
these written orders which we have been consider- 
ing- here, that he should state it in this way, unless 
he was suffering from the disease which I have im- 
puted to him ? 

Pope's Report of January 27th, 1863. 

Then what is the next ? His official report made 
to the Government, and withheld, for some reason or 
other, from publication, until the evidence in Gen'l 
Porter's case was all in. There are some rousing 
statements of " truth " there to which I would like 
to call the attention of the Board. Referring to the 
29th, on page 19, he says: 

" I sent orders to General Porter, whom I 
" supposed to be at Manassas Junction, where 
" he should have been In compliance with my 
" orders of the day previous, to move upon Cen- 
" treville at the earliest dawn." 

Well, that whole history has been explored, and 
nobody but Gen'l Pope has ever known of any or- 
der to General Porter that day, the 28th, but to stay 
at Br istoe until lie was wanted, and it was at Bris- 
toe that he was ordered to move upon Centreville. 



201 



On page 20. 



"I also sent orders to Major General Fitz 
John Porter, at Manassas Junction, to move 
forward with the utmost rapidity, with his 
own corps and King's division of McDowell's 
corps, which was supposed to be at that point, 
upon Gainesville, by the direct road from 
Manassas Junction, to that place. I urged 
him to make all speed, that he might come up 
with the enemy, and be able to turn his flank, 
near where the Warrenton turnpike is inter- 
sected by the road from Manassas Junction to 
Gainesville." 



And at page 23. 



" It was necessary for me to act thus 
" promptly and make an attack, as I had not 
" the time, for want of provisions and forage, to 
" await an attack from the enemy ; nor did I 
" think it good policy to do so under the circum- 
" stances. 

" During the wliole night of the 29t7i, and the 
" morning of the 30th, the advance of the main 
" body under Lee, was arriving on the field to 
" re-inforce Jackson." 

Think of this. Months after the events he 
still insists that the main army of Lee came through 
Thoroughfare Gap, during the night of the 29th, 
and the morning of the 30th, to get on to the field. 

"Every moment of delay increased the odds 
" against us, and I therefore advanced to the at- 
" tack as rapidly as I was able to bring my forces 
" into action. Shortly a^ter General Porter 
" moved forward, to the attack along the Warren- 
" ton turnpike.'''' 



202 

This is the 30th. See how he recognizes the 
truth on the 30th. 

%i And the assault on the enemy teas made by 
Heintzelman and Reno on the rigiht" (Heintzel- 
man and Reno made no attack on the right, on 
the 30th), "it became apparent that the enemy 
" was massing his troops, as fast as they arrived 
" on the field, on his right, and was moving 
" forward from that direction to turn our left, at 
" which point it was plain he intended to make 
*' his main attack. I accordingly directed Gener- 
k> al McDowell to re-call Ricketts' division imme- 
" diately from our right, and post it on the left 
" of our line with its left refused." 

Now here 

" The attach: of Porter zoas neither vigorous 
li or persistent, and Ms troops soon retired in 
" considerable confusion.'''' 

Certainly the mind that penned that sen- 
tence knowing and seeing what he did of Porter's 
conduct and of the conduct of his glorious troops 
of the 5th Army Corps, on the 30th, is certainly 
suffering under some serious perturbation. Now, 
the report to the "Committee on the Conduct of the 
War" made by General Pope, at page 190, has an- 
other startling "truth." It is, however, the one 
which shows his hostility to Porter. His claim of 
the authorship of the prosecution, and his claim for 
reward from the administration for having carried 
it successfully through show, as I think, his infi- 
nite bias against General Porter. And the map 
which is attached to that report must now be taken 
in view (.f the facts as they now stand, as a confes- 
sion <>f his bewilderment or ignorance, to state it in 
the mildest way, of the transactions of the 29th, 
when he testified on the former trial. I want to read 
to you a letter that he wrote in answ r er to Gen- 



203 

eral Porter's appeal, addressed to General Grant, re- 
cognizing the fact that General Porter is trying to 
get a re-hearing. 

" Headquaters Third Military District, 
" Atlanta, Georgia, September 16, 1867. 
" General U. S. Grant, 

"Washington, D. C, 

"General:— As 1 am one of the principal parties 
''concerned in the case of Fitz John Porter, and as I 
"learn that he is in Washington City seeking a re- 
' 'opening of his case, on the ground that he has come 
"into possession of testimony since the close of the 
' 'war which has an important bearing on the subject, 
"and as I suppose it is not unlikely that a commis- 
"sion may be ordered to examine that testimony, 
' 'and report upon it, I consider it my duty , as well 
"as my right, respectfully to submit to your atten- 
tion, or that of any commission that may be order- 
"ed, the following remarks, for such consideration 
"as they merit. * * * 
I am , General, 
Very respectfully, 

Your obedient servant, 

JOHN POPE, 
Bvt. Maj. Gen. U. 8. A." 

Then follows an elaborate argument, a re-hash of 
all the old errors that he committed five years be- 
fore at the court-martial, which he adhered to then, 
as he has ever since, with the tenacity of a Bourbon 
who can learn nothing and forget nothing. 



Gen. Pope's "Brief Statement of the Case." 

His brief statement of facts made in 1869, is his 
next publication, and it is well worthy of a brief 



204 

inspection. It is at pages 757 and 759 of this re- 
cord. In the first place it undertakes to state the 
case against General Porter. It is in answer to 
another appeal by Porter to the President. In t he 
first place it omits to state any charge or complaint 
of disobedience of the joint order. 

It states this : 

" }[cl)oioell had marched in Portef s rear 
"from Manassas Junction with his corps, but 
" hearing, on reaching the forks of the road at 
" Bethlehem Church the sounds of a severe battle 
" being fought at Groveton, passed the rear of 
" Portefs corjis, and following the road to Sud- 
" ley Sip rings, brought his corps in upo?i the left 
" of our line and immediately pushed forward 
" into action.' 1 '' 

Do you suppose that he believed that, unless he 
saw things through diseased optics ? He then 
sets forth Porter's message to McDowell and King, 
incorporates that in his brief statement and in it he 
omits the vital part of it as it was in his hands, 
viz : 

" 1 am now going to the head of the column 
" to see what is passing and how affairs are go- 
" ing. 1 will communicate with you." 

The whole spirit of this document is hostile. He 
repeats the old story about the delivery of the 
4:80 P. M. order at sV clock : 

" The delivery of this order to Porter at Jive 
"o'clock, at least one and a half hours before 
" sunset, and full two hours before the battle 
" closed for the night, was proved on his trial ; 
" but the order toas in no respect obeyed, 
" and seems to have produced no effect upon 
" Porter, except that instead of retreating to 



205 

" Manassas, according to Jiis first intention, he 
" only retreated part of tJie way— far enough to 
" be out of sight of the enemy and out of dan- 

(< g eT 5 3 

Then certainly here is a most enormous state- 
ment of "truth" in view of the present facts. At 
page 760 in the brief statement : 

"That Porter did precisely '.what he wrote 
" McDowell and King he intended to do was 
" perfectly well known, of course, to every man 
" in his army corps, and easily 2^'oved before 
" the court-martial. It is impossible to believe 
" that any man in this country possessed of the 
" facts can be found so prejudiced as to justify 
" such a transaction, or to ask a modification of 
4C the sentence against Porter. It is Porter him- 
" self who wrote the charges against himself, and 
" whose own written testimony establishes his 
" crime. It is impossible for any man, especial- 
" ly any military man, to imagine any excuse for, 
" or any satisfactory explanation of, such con- 
11 duct." 

Then, on page 761, he publishes, as of the 29th, 
an extract from General J. E. B. Stuart's report, 
which shows that Longstreet was there in force. 

In this extract, General Stuart states, that before 
noon he had been informed of Porter's advance 
along the Manassas Gainesville road. 



'.-> 



General Stuart then says : 

" The prolongation of his {Porter'' s) line of 
" march would have passed through my position, 
" which was a very fine one for artillery as well 
" as observation, and struck Longstreet in 
"flank." 

* * * " Immediately upon receipt of 



200 

44 that intelligence, Jenkins', Kemper's and D R. 
•' Jones' brigades, and several pieces of artillery, 
44 were ordered to me by General Longstreet, and 
" being placed in position, fronting Bristoe, 
" awaited the enemy's advance." 
Upon this, General Pope asserts : 

" It will be observed, also, that when Long- 
" street was dnly notified of his danger, and 
" asked to send troops to resist Porter's advance. 
" he sent only three brigades, viz., Jenkins', 
" Kemper's and D. R. Jones' (all he conld spare, 
'• as will appear from Jackson's report), arid' this 
" was positively all the force ever in front of 
11 Fitz John Porter from first to last, placed 
" therewith no purpose whatever to attack, but, 
" if possible, to prevent his advance." 

Rather remarkable, in view of the clear proof of 
Wilcox's three brigades being transferred in addi- 
tion, to withstand Porter. He publishes in this 
same brief statement an extract from Longstreet's 
report, which omits, however, a very important part 
of that report, cutting out a preceding sentence 
and giving the sentence immediately following that 
which would have set forth somewhat more, as 
other people understand it, and as it is now known, 
the history of the movements of that day. He left 
out this, (showing Longstreet's presence and line of 
battle.) 

" Early on the 29th, (August), the columns 
44 were united, and the advance to join General 
" Jackson resumed. 

<t * *- -* * * 

44 On approaching the field, some of Brigadier 
44 General Hood" s batteries were ordered into po- 
11 sit ion, and his division was deployed on 
" right and left of the turnpike, at right 
44 angles with it, and supported, by Brigadier 
" Evans* brigade." 



207 

" Three brigades, under General Wilcox, were 
11 thrown forward to the support of the left, and 
" three others, under General Kemper, to the 
u support of the right of these commands. 
" General D. R. Jones's division was placed 
" upon the Manassas Gap Railroad, to the right, 
" and in echelon with regard to the three last 
" brigades." 

Having omitted these important sentences, Gen- 
eral Pope proceeds to quote the subsequent por- 
tion thus : 

'■* * * At a late hour in the day, 

" Major General Stuart reported the approach of 
u the enemy in heavy columns against my ex- 
" treme right. I withdrew General Wilcox, ioith 
" his three brigades, from the left, and placed 
" his command in position to support Jones in 
" case of an attack against my right. After 
' ' some few slwts the enemy withdrew his forces, 
" moving them around towards his front, and 
" about four o'clock in the afternoon began to 
" press forward against General Jackson's posi- 
" tion. Wilcox brigades were moved back to 
" their former position." 

Then General Pope, assuming that General Wil- 
cox's division of three brigades, were the same as 
the three brigades mentioned by Stuart in the 
passage quoted from him, (which they w r ere not), 
and ignoring the fact that Jones upon the right 
was in command of a division, and that Kemper 
with his division was there also, and the fact, that 
Wilcox and Hood, if needed, were within easy 
reach, exclaims : 

"It seems, then, that as soon as Porter re- 
" treated towards Manassas from this overwhelm- 
" ing force, Long street immediately withdrew 
" these brigades, and, joining Jackson' s right, 
" immediately pressed forward, with the in 
" against that portion of our army concerning 



208 



" whose defeat Porter expressed such doleful ap- 
" prehensions in liis letter to McDowell." 

Thus falsely imputing to General Porter a re- 
treat which he did not make, and from forces in 
front of him vastly less than he (Pope) knew were 
there. 

Then he incorporates what he got from McDow- 
ell, that extract from Jackson's report of the 30th, 
making it of the 29th, turning Porter's own guns 
against himself, and charging him with lying in- 
active at Dawkin's Branch all that day although 
in full hearing of a great battle, that is to say, 
of Porter's own memorable attack of the 30th, 
which so nearly overwhelmed the rebel army of 
Jackson, until Longstreet came in obedience to his 
urgent call for re-enforcements. Here is an extract 
or statement of " truth," as of the 29th : 

"But Lee, according to the testimony of the 
" chief engineer on his staff, took breakfast that 
" morning (i. e. the 29th) on the opposite side of 
" Thoroughfare Gap, full thirty miles distant, 
" and it was utterly impossible to re-enforce 
" Jackson before a very late hour of night, long 
" before which time the ivhole affair would have 
" been ended. ." 

This taking breakfast on the opposite side of 
Thoroughfare Gap, full thirty miles distant, is one 
of the most astonishing statements that I have ev- 
er heard. Thoroughfare Gap is about six miles 
from Gainesville. There is a map pm Wished in con- 
nection with his report to the committee on the 
conduct of the war, which seems to have some bear- 
ing on this statement of General Lee's taking 
breakfast on the other side of Thoroughfare Gap, 
full thirty miles from Gainesville, a very singular 
thing, which ought to be explained by somebody. 
Here is Thoroughfare Gap ; this is Centreville ; 
and this map reverses the true positions of the Gaps 
and puts Thoroughfare Gap where Manassas Gap 



209 

should be, thirty miles to the west. That is one of 
the maps made and annexed to General Pope's re- 
port to the committee on the conduct of the war. 
It is very strange that a man should read history 
wrong and geography wrong too ; I cannot under- 
stand it. It seems to me that must bean accident. 
Of course General Pope must have known, as well 
as General McDowell, that the statement in Jack- 
son's report incorporated in his " Brief statement," 
to refer to the 29th, did, in fact, refer to the 30th, 
and to Porter's glorious conduct on that day. Yet 
he insisted, and by-and-by I will show you that he 
insists to this day that that is right. But General 
McDowell when brought face to face with his error, 
conceded that he was wrong. General Pope not 
only still insists upon it that it is right, but still in- 
sists that it is no business of his to correct it if it is 
not right. 



Gen. Popes' Explanatory Letter on Brief 
Statement. 

Now I come to his letter of October 23d, 1878, 
showing why he put out the brief statement. 
This is worthy of attention in considering whether 
he is an unbiased person in speaking of Gen- 
eral Porter. It seems that some question had 
been made, and it came to his ears about these ex- 
tracts, and he publishes them again in a letter to 
General Sherman, dated October 23rd, 1878. 

He says : 

' ; Although General McDowell states, in his 
" testimony before the Board, now in session in 
" Porter's case, that he made this extract and 
" sent printed slips to me, I still think it proper, 
" fully to explain my connection with its sub- 
" sequent use in the paper (brief statement), 



210 

" above referred to, and my authority for using 
"it." 

Then lie states how he got it from the War De- 
partment, and got it verified. But we know what 
that meant, that it was a verified extract from the 
book, but the extract which was verified, not giv- 
ing the date, the date was put on by somebody 
else, viz, General McDowell. 

"Having thus called attention in the state- 
" ment itself to Porter's assertion, that the ex- 
" tract from Jackson's report referred to the 
" 30th, and not the 29th of August, 18G2, and 
" given my authority for using it, and my be- 
" lief that Porter was mistaken, and an ad- 
" ditional statement that the case was com- 
" plete without considering the extract from 
11 Jackson's report ; so that it was, and is, prac- 
" tically out of consideration, I supposed, and 
" still siqjpose, that I did everything demanded 
" by fairness and justice." 

" The 'Brief Statement,' with the above note 
" inserted at the bottom of it, was then tiled in 
" the War Department, and copies were fur- 
" nished Colonel Schriver, General Townsend, 
" and others, so that the note at the bottom has 
" been known to them for eight years past, and 
" neither of these officers lias ever suggested to 
" me even that there icas any mistake about 
" them. The opinion of Colonel Smith, and. the 
" assertion of General Porter are, therefore, left 
" to be balanced against the certificate of General 
" Townsend and the letter of Colonel ScJiriver, 
" and ivhatever the facts may ultimately prove 
" to be, I do not see zvhat I have to do with iV 

But, how are these mistakes of history to be cor- 
rected, if the two men who got up that circular say 
when they are brought face to face with the glaring 



211 

error, the one that "he does not think that it is 
his province to correct it," and the other that "he 
does not see what he has to do with it." There is 
one singular fact in this letter, which bears rather 
hardly upon General McDowell, as showing how 
unnecessary it was for General McDowell to come 
here and say that he furnished these statements to 
General Pope, when he procured them from the 
War Department in 1869. He says : 

" It is proper to say that the 'Extracts' in 
" question were sent me in 1867 from WasJiing- 
" ton, 1 do not know by whom." 

That was two years before General McDowell 
went through the supererogatory work of furnishing 
them to General Pope ; he had them already, and 
had been laying them by for future use against 
General Porter. Then he has written various 
letters to General Belknap and the Comte de Paris, 
which are in evidence, full of these re -assertions of 
the exploded mistakes against General Porter, and 
all testifying in the strongest manner to his ab- 
solute and undying hostility to Porter ; which, as 
I have said, is also fairly deducible from the oral 
evidence in this case. There is nothing left adverse 
to General Porter but this opinion, and you can 
fairly estimate the weight that is to be given to it. 

General Roberts has been cited. He is no longer 
living. But to show you how much weight is to 
be given to General Roberts' testimony, he is the 
author of this false and malicious libel against the 
Fifth Army corps, which was contained in the 4th 
specification of the second charge against General 
Porter's corps and its commander in respect to the 
action of the 30th, which General Roberts, as a 
Brigadier-General and Inspector-General of Gen- 
eral Pope's Army, could not but have known all 
about. That specification is as follows : 



212 

"Specification 4th.— In this: that the said 
" Major-General Fitz John Porter, on the field of 
" battle of Manassas, on Saturday, the 30th of 
" August, 1862, having received a lawful order 
"from his superior officer and commanding 
" general, Major- General John Pope, to engage 
" the enemy 1 s lines, and to carry a position near 
" their centre, and to take an annoying bat- 
" tery there posted,, did proceed in the 
"execution of that older with unnecessary 
" sloumess, and, by delays, give the enemy oppor- 
" tunities to watch and know his movements, and 
" to prepare to meet his attack, and did finally 
kk so feebly fall upon the enemy 1 s line as to make 
" little or no imj)ression on the same, and did 
"fall back and draw away his forces unneces- 
" sarily, and without making any of the great 
" personal efforts to rally his troops or to keep 
" their line, or to inspire his troops to meet the 
" sacrifices and to make the resistance demanded 
" by the importance of his position, and the 
" momentous consequences and, disasters of a 
" retreat at so critical a juncture of the day.'''' 

That was too much, even for the court-martial. 
General Roberts stands as the author, with his name 
subscribed to that statement of Porter's conduct of 
the 30th, probably about as gallant and determined 
a light and series of charges as was ever made by 
an army corps in the American army, or any other 
army. How can you give any weight to the rem- 
nant of his opinion. So I leave that part of the 
case, stating, that against the solid facts that Ave 
have proved, it seems to me you can attach no value 
whatever to the opinions of these three reckless 
and ruthless personal enemies of Porter. 



213 
The Animus of General Porter. 

Finally, a few words as to the animus of General 
Porter. On the present solid facts, this charge of evil 
animus seems to me to be not the least material. It 
never was resorted to even by Judge Advocate 
General Holt, except to throw in as a make- weight 
to determine the scales which he thought were, upon 
the evidence, doubtful. But now it is apparent to 
all the world, and no longer doubtful, that Porter 
did his whole duty, no matter what his estimate 
of General Pope might have been. If his 
feelings were such as General Burnside testified to, 
that he entertained, in common with all the officers 
of the army, or a great part of them, namely, a dis- 
trust of General Pope's ability to conduct a great 
campaign, and yet, notwithstanding that, he did his 
whole duty, the performance of his whole duty is 
all the more meritorious, is it not? But what was 
General Porter's animus? I shall not consume the 
time of the Board in developing all that is shown 
by the despatches and telegrams of Porter, from 
the time of starting from Harrison's Landing, from 
the time that he first knew that he was toco-operate 
with, and finally to join the army of Pope in Vir- 
ginia. There is everything in those despatches 
which is to his credit — sleepless vigilance, untir- 
ing activity, implicit obedience as an officer, evi- 
denced by all the despatches, by all the telegrams, 
by all the orders. I will not consume the time of 
the Board in doing it, but I would like the Board 
to take these telegrams, these despatches, covering 
the movements all the way from Harrison's Land- 
ing up to the 26th of August, where his telegrams 
are first called in question as offensive. They show 
that he did all that could become a gallant and 
brave general, as in all our previous history where 
he was concerned he had done. They do not indi- 
cate anywhere any hostility to Pope, or any pur- 
pose not to do his duty. They testify all the time, 



214 

that he was doing his duty to the utmost. What 
were the relations in which he stood in sending 
these telegrams ? To whom were they addressed? 
Were they telegrams for publication ? Not at all. 
Were they orders to subordinates ? Not at all. 
Were they for the public eye? Not at all. But 
General Burnside had requested him to keep him 
informed, as a means of communication with the 
President of what was going on. Now, I challenge 
the doctrine of the prosecution in this case, as to 
the relative attitude of corps commanders. I deny 
that they are not at libery to criticize the movements 
of their superior general, to a superior or to the 
supreme source of all military authority. I agree 
that they must not criticize to subordinates ; that 
they must not criticize in the public ear ; that they 
must not so speak as to create disaffection: But, 
has it ever been known, in any country, that sub- 
ordinate generals might not send criticisms to 
head-quarters, even upon the conduct of a cam- 
paign by their immediate commander ? In what 
army has it not been done? In what country has 
it not been permitted ? Why, the theory of the 
infallibility of the Pope, to question which is 
heresy, is now for the first time sought to he ap- 
plied to military matters — they set up the infalli- 
bility of this Pope, and that all questioning of it is 
treason. That will not do. Even Napoleon, in 
the zenith of his glory, allowed criticisms upon 
himself, and of superior generals by those tinder 
them. It is a new theory in this free country, that 
because a man happens to be a major-general and 
a corps commander, he is tongue-tied, that he has 
lost all freedom of thought — all freedom of speech. 
A pretty good specimen of what a co-ordinate, if 
not a subordinate, commander can do in the way of 
criticism of a commanding general, appears in Gen- 
eral Pope's criticism to President Lincoln about 
General McClellan, which is contained in his report 



215 

to the committee on the Conduct of the War,, at 
page 105 ; and as his authority will not be ques- 
tioned here, I would like to read that. He says : 

u In face of the extraordinary difficulties 
" which existed, and the terrible responsibility 
" about to be thrown -upon me, I considered it 
" my duty to state plainly to the President, that 
" I felt too much distrust of General McClellan 
" to risk the destruction of my army, if it were 
"• left in his power, under any circumstances, to 
" exhibit the feebleness and irresolution which 
" had hitherto charactized his operations." 

Well, I think that is a pretty good sample of the 
kind of criticism which is allowable. It seems to 
me that it is necessary to allow criticisms, for the 
safety of the army. Suppose that, instead of a 
greatmaster of the art of war like General Pope, 
a great army had an incompetent commander, 
with skilful generals under him, the whole army 
might be destroyed, if you take from them that 
power of criticism. Now, I undertake to say, 
that Porter's allusions in these telegrams are all 
true, all perfectly justifiable ; although the dis- 
creetness of sending them or making some of 
those remarks, knowing what General Pope is, 
might possibly be questioned. I have stated 
his relations to Burnside. and the object of send- 
ing the telegrams. It is true that Pope's whole 
campaign is not in review here ; but something is 
in view which is referred to in these telegrams, and 
that much I must bring to the attention of the 
Board. It appears that General Pope took com- 
mand in the summer ; I think it was June or July 
of 1862, and began the formation of this army of 
Virginia. He came from the west and imported 
new doctrines of military science, which certainly 
startled, if they did not shake the confidence of all 
military men in the east ; and as these telegrams of 



216 

Porter, so much'objected to, refer expressly to these 
new theories of war, I desire to bring the new theo- 
ries of war once more to the attention of the Board. 
I refer to his famous introductory order of July 
14th, on page 278^of the Board Record. If such an 
order cannot be criticized, then General Porter was 
wrong in criticizing it ; if it cannot be ridiculed, it 
was wrong for General Porter to laufjh at it. But 
I shall insist that even a military saint, if there be 
such a person, could not help laughing at it. This 
was the order which was proclaimed, not only to his 
own army, but to the rebel army, when he assumed 
command of the Army of Virginia. 

" Washington, Monday July 14th. 

" To tlie officers and soldiers of tlie Army 
1 ' of Virginia : 

" By the special assignment of the President of 
the United States, I have assumed command of 
this army. I have spent two weeks in learn- 
ing your whereabouts, your condition and 
your wants, in preparing you for active opera - 
' tions, and in placing you in positions from 
' which you can act promptly and to the pur- 
' pose. 

" I have come to you from the West, where we 
' have always seen the backs of our enemies, 
' from an army whose business it has been to 
' seek the adversary, and to beat him when 
''found; whose policy has been attack cud not 
' defence. In but one instance has the enemy 
c been able to place our Western armies in a de- 
1 fensive attitude. I presume that I have been 
' called here to pursue the same system and to 
' lead you against the enemy. It is my pur- 
' pose to do so, and, that speedily. I am sure 
' yon long for an opportunity to win the dis- 
• Unction you are capable of achieving ; that 
' opportunity I shall endeavor to give you. 



217 

" Meantime I desire you to dis7niss from your 
" minds certain phrases which I am sorry to 
1 ' find in vogue amongst you. 1 hear constantly 
" of taking strong positions and holding them" 

As Porter did on the 29th. — 

" of lines of retreat and of bases of supplies. 
" Let us discard such ideas.' 1 '' 

There, I think, you see the source of his con- 
demnation of Porter's acts of the 29th. 

" The strongest position a soldier should 
" desire to occupy is one from winch he can 
" most easily advance against the enemy. Let 
' ' us study the probable lines of retreat of our 
"opponents, and leave our own to take care of 
" themselves. Let us look before us and not be- 
1 ' hind. Success and glory are in the advance. 
" Disaster and shame lurk in the rear. 

" Let us act on this understanding, and it is 
" safe to predict that your banners shall be in- 
" scribed with many a glorious deed, and that 
" your names will be dear to your countrymen 
" forever." 

" JOHN POPE, 
" Major -General Commanding." 

This was a public proclamation, made on the 14th 
of July. It was not only proclaimed to his own 
army, but to the army opposed to him. What did 
it promise them ? It gave them an understanding 
of how he was going to act ; it assured the enemy 
that there should be.no more such conduct on 
the part of the federal army, as taking strong 
positions and holding them ; that they would not 
preserve any lines of retreat, or maintain any 
bases of supplies ; the only strong position he 
would look for would be the one from which he 
could most easily advance upon the enemy, by 



218 

which, I understand, he means to be always upon 
the road ; that he would always leave his own 
lines of retreat to take care of themselves ; that he 
would never look behind him, because disaster and 
shame lurked in the rear. That is his proclama- 
tion. Was it merely for the purpose of buncombe, 
or was he going to act on this understanding "I On 
that we have some light thrown in his report to the 
Committee on the Conduct of the War, which shows, 
as it seems to me, that it was a genuine thing — 
a deliberate method of warfare — because eight 
days previous he had been examined as a witness 
by Mr. Covode, before the Committee on the Conduct 
of the War, at Washington, and when asked how 
he proposed to right, he said : 

"At the same time I shall be in such posi- 
" tion, that in case the enemy advance in con- 
" siderable force towards Washington, I shall be 
" able to concentrate all my forces for the defence 
" of this place, Avhich I propose to defend, not 
u by standing on the defensive at all, orconfront- 
" ing the enemy and intrenching mj^self, but I 
" propose -to do it by laying off on h is flanks, 
' ' and attack him from the moment he crosses 
" the Rappahannock, day and, night, until his 
" forces are destroyed, or mine.'''' 

By Mr. Odell : 

" Q. Is it your design to act on the defensive 
" alone ?" 

"A. Not at ally 
" Q. So that you mean to attack?" 

" A. I mean to attack them at all times that I 
" can get an opportunity. If I were to confront 
" them with the force that I have, and go build- 
" ing intrenchments, &c, they could flank me 
" on either side, and force me back without my 
" being able to offer any resistance of any conse- 



219 

*' quence. There is a possibility that they may 
" send a large force this way, if the command of 
" General McClellan be in a perilous condition, 
" or where it can be held by an inconsiderable 
" force, and prevented from coming out. They 
" may do that, but I do not think it very likely 
" that they will attempt to move on this place 
" just now. But if they should come this way 
" with a very large force, it seems to me that the 
' ' only sort of defence of Washington I can afford, 
" with the force I have, is to lie off upon the 
"'flanks of their army, and attack them day and 
" night, at unexpected times and places, so as to 
' ' prevent them from advanciny. It will be hard 
" work, but I do not see anything else so likely 
" to prevail against them" 

By Mr. Covode : 

" Q. Would you not, in all these movements, 
" feel embarrassed with the knowledge, that 
"while you are moving forward on the enemy, 
" you are looked upon as the protector of the 
" capitol here ?" 

" A. No, sir ; for 1 am fully convinced I am 
" doing the best I know to effect that object. / 
" is not necessary, in my opinion, in order to 
" protect the capital, that I should interpose my- 
" self behceen the enemy and the place itself ; in 
"fact it would be the very icorst policy to do so 
" now, for wherever I could put myself, they 
u could place themselves between me and the 
" capitol, by attacking my flanks. By laying off 
" on their flanks, if they should have only forty 
' ' thousand or fifty thousand men, I could whip 
"them. If they should have seventy thousand 
" or eighty thousand men, I would attack their 
" flanks and force them, in order to get rid of me, 
" to follow me out into the mountain which 
" would be tohat you would want, 1 should sup- 



220 

" pose. Tliey could not march on Washington, 
" with me lying \\ ith such a force as that on their 
" flanks. I should feel perfectly satisfied that 
" I was doing the best I could with my force, to 
" dispose of them in that way." 

These declarations had been already made 
and published when he took command of the 
Army, and it is the reference to this sort of 
thing in these despatches of Porter's, that has been 
so much complained of. We do not see the whole 
of this campaign, but we have certain glimpses of 
it which show that he acted upon this understand- 
ing and view of the art of war, and provoked the 
criticism, not only of General Porter, but of all 
soldiers. I invite your attention to the position at 
7 p. m., on the 26th of August, to see how it was, 
that Jackson got in behind him, while he was ' 'look- 
ing before and not behind. " Pope's despatch is 
contained in Porter's statement, at page 86, and it 
shows where these forces of his were posted. It is 
a despatch from Warrenton Junction, August 26th, 
7 p. m., to General Porter. 

"Please move forward with Sykes' division, 
" to-morrow morning through Fayetteville, to a 
" point within two and a half miles of the town 
" of Warrenton, and take position where you can 
"easily move to the front, with your right rest- 
" ing on the railroad. Call upMorell to join you 
" as speedily as possible, leaving only small cav- 
" airy forces to watch the fords. If there are 
" any troops below, coming up, they should 
" come up rapidly, leaving only a small rear 
" guard at Rappahannock Station. You will 
" find General Banks at Fayetteville. I append 
" below the position of our forces, as also those 
" of the enemy. I do not see how a general en- 
"gageuient can be postponed more than a day 
" or two. 



221 

" McDowell with his own corps, Sigel's and 
" three brigades of Reynold's men, being about 
" thirty-four thousand, are at and immediately 
" in front of Warrenton ; Reno joins him on his 
" right and rear, with eight thousand men, at an 
" early hour to-morrow ; Cox with seven thou- 
" sand men, will move forward to join him in the 
" afternoon of to-morrow ; Banks with six thou- 
' ; sand is at Fayetteville ; Sturgis, about eight 
" thousand strong, will move forward by day 
" after to-morrow. " 

There they were at 7 o'clock, p. m., on the 2Gth 
of August, facing towards the Rappahannock, fac- 
ing the enemy. At 12 o'clock that night in a des- 
patch from General Pope to McDowell in his offi- 
cial report, at page 234, we have this extraordinary 
state of things growing out of this policy of " look- 
ing before" and not " behind ; " and letting his 
lines of communications " take care of themselves. " 
Jackson had, in fact, got through Thoroughfare 
Gap, on the 26th, in the morning, without General 
Pope's knowing or suspecting it. That appears in 
Jackson's report, printed in the Board record, at 
page 522. He had gone perhaps twenty miles and 
struck, and Pope knew nothing of it, until he was 
informed by report next morning, when his whole 
army was still " looking before " across the Rappa- 
hannock ; and Jackson, twenty-four hours previous, 
had slipped in behind him. This is dated August 
26th, 1862, at midnight, just at the very moment, 
as I understand, that Jackson was striking in his 
rear upon the railroad, between him and Washing- 
ton. 

" General Sigel reports the enemy's rearguard 
" at Orleans, to-night, with his main force en- 
" camped at White Plains. You will please 
" ascertain very early in the morning whether 
" this is so, and have the whole of your command 



222 

" ready ; you had best ascertain to-night, if you 
4k possibly can. Whether his whole force, or the 
" larger part of it, has gone around, is a question 
" which we must settle instantly, and no portion 
" of his force must march opposite to us to-night 
" without our knowing it. I telegraphed you an 
" hour ago, what disposition I had made, sup- 
' ' posing the advance through Thoroughfare Gap, 
" to be a column of not more than ten or fifteen 
" thousand men. If his whole force, or the 
kk larger part of it, has gone, we must know it at 
" once. The troops here have no artillery ; and 
' ' if the main forces of the enemy are still oppo- 
" site to you, you must send forward to Green- 
" wich, to be there to-morrow evening, with two 
" batteries of artillery, or three if you can get 
t( them, to meet Kearney. We must know at a 
" very early hour in the morning, so as to deter- 
" mine our plans. " 

"JNO. POPE, 

" Major General." 

Now, there is an illustration of leaving lines of 
retreat to take care of themselves, and emphatic 
proof that disaster and sham, lurked in the rear of 
this very movement. Stuart struck at Catlett's 
Station on the night of the 26th, throwing every- 
thing into confusion, and at daybreak of the 27th, 
Jackson's force captured Manassas, the base of 
supplies, destroying an immense quantity of stores 
upon which the suscenance of Pope's army de- 
pended, and actually cutting off that army from 
communication with the capital which he was de- 
fending, by "laying off on the flanks of enemy." 
This appears by Stuart's report in the Board 
Record, at page 525 ; and Trimble, who was 
in that affair, puts it at 12]- A. M. on the night of 
the 26th and morning of the 27th. There was an 
illustration of the practical working of his plan of 



223 

''looking before" and. not " behind/" — of letting 
liis lines of retreat and communication take care of 
themselves and of not caring anything about his 
bases of supplies. Then you have the illustration 
of the pursuit of Jackson to Centreville when Jack- 
son was not at Centreville. and had not been there. 
Reno and Heintzleman were ordered to Centreville 
on the 28th and Porter on the 29 th. There was 
an instance of studying the probable lines of 
retreat of the enemy. I claim that all the 
fighting on the]* 29th illustrates his method of 
attacking wherever he "could get an oppor- 
tunity to do so," as he swore before Covode's 
Committee that he intended to do ; and his 
insisting that the enemy were running away on 
the 30th, and attacking them as if they were, is a 
specimen of his policy of attacking under all cir- 
cumstances and never standing on the defensive. 
Let me read you the evidence of General Patrick 
on the subject, at page 193, for it shows that this 
theory of attacking under all circumstances, and 
without regard to the consequences, was carried out 
to the full. General Patrick found the enemy very 
speedily on that morning and the night previous. 

" I reported the condition of affairs, as they 
" had been during the night and as they then 
" appeared, that the enemy had come down the 
" road here about where they lay during the night 
" [north of Young's Branch], and that they had 
" withdrawn to within the woods here [near 
" Groveton]. My recollection is that it came out 
" farther than that ; that is, that it continued 
" nearer toward the pike and made something of 
" an angle here. I reported that the wood was 
" full of rebs. 
Question. " On both sides of the pike \ " 
Answer. " Yes ; but mostly on the south side. 
" 1 was there twice. I cannot say at which time 



224 

" this occurred. I should think, however, it was 
" the second time I was there. IVfy instructions 
" then were from .General McDowell to go back. 
" The conversation was between McDowell, Pope 
" and myself. 

Question. " You had better state it as it Avas." 

Answer. " Well, I cannot give the words. ' : 

Question. " No ; the substance. " 

Answer. " The substance of it was, 'You are 
" mistaken. There is nobody in there of any 
" consequence. They are merely stragglers.' I 
" gave the reasons, and ! I supposed, I believed 
' ' that there were heavy bodies in that wood ; the 
" fact that this column had come down in that 
" way and must have fallen back in that direc- 
'■ tion, because otherwise Reynolds would have 
" interfered with them. The direction was to go 
" back and feel of them — put in my skirmishers 
" on both sides of the road and see what there 
" was there. As I got there some of Si gel's 
" scouts, mounted, were there ; they went in, and 
" before getting up to the wood anywhere from 
" the edge of the wood there was a pretty strong 
" fire from what would seem to be a skirmish line 
" poured out upon them, and they came riding 
" back very hastily, and I remarked, 'It was as 
" I told you, the woods are full.' In the mean 
" time I was getting out the skirmishers to go 
" forward, and I went up again to McDowell and 
" Pope and reported this. I cannot say to which 
" it was ; they were both together, and one of 
" them replied, 'O, these Dutchmen are always 
" seeing the enemy,' referring to these scouts. 
" Now get off and get some coffee and you will 
" feel better natured, and then go back and throw 
" out your skirmishers and pursue them with 
" your whole command, for we can't afford to let 
" them escape. We have got to bag them." 

Question. " Who said that ? " 



225 

Answer. "They both used the expression, but 

" McDowell was the one who used it especially 

" to me. 
Question. " Did you make any reply I 
Answer. " I think I asked him ' which side of 

"the bag will it be?' 

And in fact it proved to be the wrong side of the 
bag. 

Was not that an instance of attack, because he 
would never assume a defensive policy \ Well, 
now, with these glimpses of the method of the 
campaign, let us come to these telegrams that are 
so much complained of. At page 84 appears a tel- 
egram of August 25th. It will be remembered that 
at that time General Porter was under General Mc- 
Clellan's direction. He telegraphs to Burnside, 
giving a full account of all that transpired ; he was 
then in the advance proceeding up from the Rap- 
pahannock. 

" To General Burnside : 

" Have you received my despatches indicating 
"my movements to-morrow? You know that 
" Rappahannock Station is under lire from op- 
" posite hills, and the houses were destroyed by 
" Pope. I do not like to direct movements on 
" such uncertain data as that furnished by Gen- 
" eral Halleck. I know he is mis informed of the 
" location of some of the corps mentioned in his 
" despatches. Reno has not been at Kelly's for 
" three days, and there is only a [ticket at Rap- 
" pahannock Station ; and Kearney, not Banks, 
" is at Bealeton, Reno and Reynolds are be- 
" yond my reach. I have directed Sykes to go 
" to Rappahannock Station at 5 to-morrow, and 
" will go there myself via Kelly's Ford. Does 
" General McClellan approve ? 

Now, what harm is there in that ? McLellan 
was his superior commander. Was it wroug 



226 

for him to seek to have the approval of General 
McClellan? The next telegram that they com- 
plain of is that of August 27th, when General 
Porter had, as we claim, voluntarily joined 
General Pope, and made himself a part of his 
army. But whether voluntarily or not. it was 
the disconnecting from one army and attaching to 
another; and the thing complained of is, that he 
asked General Burnside to in form General Mc- 
Clellan that he had done it ; that he might know 
that he was doing right. He did not ask for any 
advice from McClellan ; he had no communication 
from or with McClellan ; and it seems to me. that 
as a wise soldier he informed General McClellan, 
so that he, Porter, might know that McClellan was 
informed that he was with Pope, and looking no 
further to McClellan for orders. Is not that the 
fair construction of this despatch \ Let me read 
it: 

"From Advance, 11:45 p. m., Aug. 26th. 
" Received, August 27, 1862. 

kt Major-General Burnside ; Have just re- 
" ceived orders from General Pope to move 
" Sykes to-morrow to within two miles of War- 
kt rent-on, and to call up Morel] to same poinr, 
" leaving the fords guarded by the cavalry." 

You see the vigilance which all these telegrams 
display, notwithstanding they contain these objec- 
tionable passages. 

"He says the troops in rear should be 
u brought up as rapidly as possible, leaving only 
<k a small rear guard at Rappahannock Station ; 
" and that he cannot see how a general engage- 
" ment can be put off more than a day or two. 
" I shall move up as ordered, but the want of 
" grain and the necessity of receiving a supply 
" of subsistence will cause some delay. Phase 



227 

" hasten back the wagons %nl down, and in- 
"form McClellan, that I may know I am doing 
" right r 

Now, what harm there is, in a commander of a 
corps departing from one army and coming, 
whether by orders from Washington or by his own 
voluntary act, to constitute a part of a co-op- 
erating army, sending back word that lie had 
done so, for the information of his former com- 
mander, nobody has yet undertaken to explain. 
They said it was looking to McClellan. Well, were 
not those circumstances under which it was proper 
for him to look to McClellan for the purpose I have 
indicated % 

The next complaint is in regard to a tele- 
gram of August 27th, from Warrenton Junction. 
Now, we are coming to the time when General 
Porter, having a clearer insight as to what was 
going on, and of the method in which the campaign 
was being conducted, conld not help expressing his 
natural instincts, as it seems to me, as a soldier, 
and he indulged in a little criticism upon the per 
formances which were so startling and" so different 
from the theories of war upon which, I suppose, he 
had been educated. At page 88 of the statement 
this dispatch enclosed an order from General Popje, 
which I will presently refer to ; but this is what is 
complained of : 

" Warrenton, 27th, p. m. 

" To General Burnside : 

" Morell left his medicine, ammunition 
" and baggage at Kelly's Ford ; can you have it 
" hauled to Fredericksburg and stored ?" 

General Porter was looking all this time to 
General Burnside for supplies. 

"His wagons were all sent to you for grain 
" and ammunition. I have sent back to you 



228 

•• every man of the First and Sixth New York 
" Cavalry, except what has been sent to Gaines- 
" ville. I will get them to you after awhile. 
•• Everything here is at nixes and sevens, and I 
" find lam to take care of myself in every re- 
" sped. Our line of communication has 

•• TAKEN CARE OF ITSELF, IN COMPLIANCE WITH 

" orders. The army has not three days' pro- 
*• visions. The enemy captured all Pope's and 
" other clothing ; and from McDowell the same, 
•• including liquors" 

Now, what does he refer to there ? Is it not abso- 
lutely true % What had happened ? Jackson had 
got in behind Pope while Pope was looking out for 
hi in at the front, and while disaster and shame 
were thus lurking in the rear — there they were, 
Stuart at Catletts' Station, in the shape of disaster, 
and Jackson, as shame, at Manasses. Every- 
thing was at ''sixes and sevens." Had not the 
commanding general proclaimed that he was going 
to act on the understanding that lines of communi- 
cation and retreat should take care of themselves, 
that he would not take care of them, and that his 
subordinate commanders should not take care of 
them \ This was one of the results of his novel 
policy. Was it criminal I Was it more than human 
for General Porter, in writing to General Burnside, 
with whom his communication was lawful, com- 
municating, if you please, with the President, who 
was the superior of Pope, to indulge in this irresisti- 
ble and spontaneous criticism upon the results of 
this novel method of warfare which had here, for 
ili.' first time, been inaugurated and so forcibly 
illustrated I You observe General Pope's very 
words in his proclamation are the words that 
Porter uses in this despatch. 

The next one that they complain of is that of 
August 27th, 4 p. m., on page 89 of the statement. 



229 



"I send you" the last order from General 
" Pope, which indicates the future as well as the 
" present. Wagons are rolling along rapidly to 
" the rear, as if a mighty power was propelling 
" them. I see no cause of alarm, though this 
" may cause it." 

That referred to the wagons by the thousand that 
were pouring on towards Alexandria, rolling night 
and day over those roads, especiall} r that road from 
Warrenton Junction to Bristoe, which we have so 
carefully examined. Had he any authority for the 
statement % This order from General Pope, which 
it transmitted, contained the very facts upon which 
he was commenting. Let me read it. Here is the 
order from General Pope, directing the flight of all 
wagons and of all trains towards Alexandria : 



"&' 



" Headquarters of Army of Virginia, 
Wa r rextox Juxctio x. 

August 27th, 1862. 
•* * % t» * 

Major-General Banks, as soon as he arrives at 
Warrenton Junction, will assume the charge of 
the trains, and cover their movement towards 
Manassas Junction. The train of his own corps, 
under escort of two regiments of infantry and 
a battery of artillery, will pursue the road south 
of the railroad, which conducts into the rear of 
Manassas Junction. As soon as the trains have 
passed Warrenton Junction, he will take post 
behind Cedar Run, covering the fords and 
bridges of that stream, and holding the position 
as long as possible. He will cause all the rail- 
road trains to be loaded with the public and 
private stores now here, and run them back 
towards Manassas Junction as far as the rail- 
road is practicable. Wherever a bridge is burn. 
ed,so as to impede the further passage of the rail- 



230 

" road trains, he will assemble them all as near to- 
" gether as possible, and protect them with his 
" command until the bridges are rebuilt. If theen- 
" emy is too strong before him, before the bridges 
" can be repaired, he will be careful to destroy en- 
" tirely the train, locomotives and stores, before 
" he falls back in the direction of Manassas Junc- 
" ticn." 

This was an order for a precipitate and universal 
flight in the direction of Alexandria, of all wagon 
trains. It was the execution of that order that 
blocked up the road on the night of the 27th, so 
that General Porter, up to three o'clock, could not 
move. Now, was it a serious or wicked criticism 
for General Porter, writing as he was, this message 
to Burnside, to say : 

tl Wagons are rolling along rapidly to the 
u rear as if a mighty power was propelling them. 
u I see no cause of alarm, though this may cause 
"it." 

This also, is seriously complained of in the same 
telegram : 

"I found a vast difference between these 
" troops and ours ; but I suppose they were new, 
" as to-day they burned their clothes, &c, when 
•' there was not the least cause. I hear that they 
" are much demoralized, and needed some good 
" troops to give them heart, and, I think, head. 
" We are working now (<> get behind Bull Run, 
" and I presume will be there in a few days, if 
" strategy don't use us up." 

How true that was ! How prophetic ! Strategy 
did use them up, and those that were not used up 
did, Hiion the night of the 30th, quietly withdraw 
behind Bull Run, and take their places in safety on 
the heights of Centreville. 



231 

" The strategy is magnificent, and tactics in 
" the inverse proportion. I would like some of my 
" ambulances. 1 would like also to be ordered to 
" return to Fredericksburg, to push towards 
kk Hanover, or with a larger force, to push to- 
tk wards Orange Court House." 

Now, what does that mean ? A suggestion of 
what I have heard military men say was, even in 
the then wretched situation, a wise expedient. 
What was it ? To strike behind Lee, at his lines 
of communication, and compel his instantaneous 
retreat. If that had been done, all this useless 
slaughter of the 29th and 30th would have been 
avoided. That was Porter's suggestion, of which 
they complained. That was his idea of getting 
away and doing something; of dealing an effectual 
blow at the enemy, with whom they were all con- 
tending. 

4w I do not doubt the enemy have a large 
' k amount of supplies provided for them, and I 
'* believe they have a contempt for the Army of 
" Virginia." 

Do you not believe it? What else but such a 
sentiment could have inspired Jackson to make 
that dash through Thoroughfare Gap, and put 
himself in the trap in which he did put himself, 
surrounded by the Army of Virginia? Facts are 
to be looked at in analyzing this case, now that the 
passions of the war are over. Is it not true? 
What but that very sentiment could have brought 
Jackson in there? Will any military man say, 
that if he had not entertained such a sentiment, he 
would have dared to do so I He had read Pope's 
proclamation — to him a proclamation — as well as 
to Pope's own army, which notified him that Pope 
was not going to look behind him, nor at his base 
of supplies ; that he was to look before and not 



232 

behind, because disaster and shame lurked in the 
rear. He knew that there was a great supply depot 
at Manassas, and in he went in obedience to General 
Pope's invitation, and destroyed it utterly. 

" I wish myself away from it, with all our 
" old Army of the Potomac, and so do our com- 
•• panions." 

What does that mean 1 Has he not suggested 
what he meant, that he would like to be ordered to 
make a strike in Lee's rear. But what sensible 
officer was there under Pope's command that did 
not wish himself out of it \ Ask any of the sur- 
vivors, and they will say the same thing, to a man. 

" I would like also to be ordered to return 
" to Fredericksburg, to push towards Hanover, 
" or with a larger force, to push towards Orange 
" Court House. I wish Sumner was at Wash- 
" ington, and up near tho Monocacy, with good 
" batteries. I do not doubt the enemy have a 
" large amount of supplies provided for them, 
" and I believe they have a contempt for the 
" Army of Virginia. I wish myself away from 
" it, with all our old Army of the Potomac, and 
" so do our companions. I was informed to-day 
" by the best authority, that, in opposition to 
" General Pope's views, this army was pushed 
" out to save the Army of the Potomac, an 
" army that could take care of itself. Pope 
" says he long since wanted to go behind the 
" Accoquan. I am in great need of the am- 
" bulances, and the officers need medicines, 
" which, for want of transportation, were left 
" behind. I hear many of the sick of our 
" corps are in houses by the road — very sick, I 
" think. There is no fear of an enemy crossing 
" the Rappahannock. The cavalry are all in the 
" advance of the rebel army. At Kelly's and 



233 

" Barnett's fords, much property was left, in 
" consequence of the wagons going clown for 
" grain, &c. If you can push up the grain to- 
" night, please do so, direct to this place. There 
" is no grain here or anywhere, and this army is 
" wretchedly supplied in that line. Pope says 
" he never could get enough. Most of this is 
" private, bat if you can get me away, please do 
"so." 

What does he refer to ? Has he not stated what 
it referred to? Has|he not laid out principles of 
counter-attack, which, if acted upon, would have 
avoided the partial destruction of this army ? 

Well, what is the next that is complained of I It 
is the despatch of August 28th, 9.30 a. m. at Bris- 
toe. 

"I hope all goes well near Washington." 

Now, McClellan was back, near Washington. 

" I think there need be no cause of fear for us. 
" I feel as if oiTmy own way now, and thus far, 
" have kept my command and trains well up. 
" More supplies than I supposed on hand have 
" been brought, but none to spare, and we must 
" make connection soon. I hope for the best, 
" and my lucky star is always up about my 
" birthday, the 31st, and hope Mc's is up also. 
" You will hear of us soon by way of Alexan- 
" aria." 

That is complained of as a very contemptuous 
reference to the movements of the army. — " You 
will hear of us soon by way of Alexandria," I 
want, in that connection, to read to you a passage 
from General Pope's report to the Committee on 
the Conduct of the War at page 172, containing, as 
it seems to me, a j^assage bearing on this. Three 
years afterwards, when his passions were somewhat 



234 

cooled, and lie had got over the excitement of the 
campaign, at least, he makes this confession, 
giving an account of this campaign of the Army of 
Virginia. 

"At no time could I have hopsd to fight a 
" successful battle with rhe immensely superior 
" force of the army which confronted me, and 
" which was able at any time to out-flank me, and 
" bear my little army to the dust." 

Is not that an extraordinary statement after all 
the boasting proclamations of the campaign ? This 
is a cool statement of fact three years afterwards. 
Of course, he knew, and everybody knew that he 
might be looked for, as is here stated by Porter, 
and as the fact turns out, by way of Alexandria. 
What else could possibly be hoped for in the situ- 
ation, as it was on the morning of the 28th ? Then 
they complain of this : 

" All that talk about bagging Jackson, &c, 
" was bosh." 

Well, it had so turned out, had it not 1 

"That enormous gap — Manassas — was left 
" open and the enemy jumped through ; and the 
" story of McDowell having cut off Longstreet, 
" had no good foundation. The enemy have 
" destroyed all our bridges, burnt trains, &c, and 
" made this army rush back to look at its line of 
" communication, and find us bare of subsistence. 
" We are far from Alexandria, considering the 
" means of transportation. Your supply train of 
"forty wagons is here, but I can't find them. 
" There is a report that Jackson is at Centreville, 
" which you can believe or not." 

There is a sneer in that. But is it not justified ? 
This was at Manassas, at 2 P. M. of the 28th. The 



235 

next morning the raid by Longstreet, who was cut 
off, took place. It shows that General Porter's 
sagacity and soldierly instinct led him to see, and 
foresee, the situation in a clear manner the informa- 
tion of which, to the Government, was of the great- 
est utility. Again is his despatch of 6 a. m., on the 
29th, at Bristoe. 

"I shall be off in half-an-hour. The messen 
" ger who brought this says the enemy had been 
" at Centreville, and pickets were found there 
" last night. 

" Sigel had severe fight last night ; took many 
" prisoners : Banks is at Warrenton Junction ; 
" McDowell near Gainesville ; Heintzleman and 
" Reno at Centreville, where they marched yes- 
" terday, and Pope went to Centreville with the 
" last two as a body-guard." 

There is the only personal reflection that I can 
find in these despatches. It seems to me to be very 
harmless and innocent. 

"At the time, not knowing where was the 
" enemy, and when Sigel was fighting within 
" eight miles of him, and in sight. Comment is 
" unnecessary. 

"The enormous trains are still rolling on, 
" many animals are not being watered for 50 
" hours ; I shall be out of provisons to-morrow 
"night; your train of 40 wagons cannot be 
"found." 

"I hope Mac's at work, and we will soon 
" get ordered out of this. It would seem from 
" proper statements of the enemy that he was 
" wandering around loose ; but I expect the}' 
" know what they are doing, which is more than 
" any one here or anywhere knows." 

Is that not true? What had just happened? 



236 

What was true that morning? What is sworn to 
by General McDowell as being true during all that 
campaign, from the 12th, when he went to join 
General Pope, up to the 29th, when this despatch 
was written i General McDowell swore before you 
at Governor's Island, that on all these days, from 
August 12th to August 23th, he and General Pope 
were hunting for each other a good deal. Now, 
does not that justify this observation, that knowing 
what other people are doing is "more than any 
one here knows"? This was written at the very 
time when McDowell was taking his famous ride, 
when Pope himself was saying, " I have not been 
able to find out anything about McDowell for a 
long rime, or until a late hour this morning." 

I submit that at this late day, when we look at 
these things coolly and dispassionately, there was 
no wickedness, no malice, no evil animus in these 
despatches. They were almost irresistibly prompt- 
ed and called forth by the extraordinary situa- 
tion ; they were confidential to Burnside and 
the President. General Burnside testified that 
it never occurred to him that General Porter, in 
writing them, had any evil motive or purpose to- 
wards General Pope : he only thought that it 
showed that General Porte]' felt about the com- 
manding general as everybody else did, a certain 
distrust in consequence of his new methods of war- 
fare practically carried out. It is stated in the 
statement, and it may not be improper to repeat it 
here, that the President thanked General Porter, 
personally, for those very telegrams, on the battle 
field at Antietam, where he met him. Now, we say, 
that if you want to find General Porter's animus 
in these despatches, you must find it in what he 
was doing at this time, as evidenced by the des- 
patches — working to his utmost, night and day, 
pressing forward with irresistible vigor, as it seems, 
and with a wise application of what he knew of the 



237 



rules of war. However he may have felt about 
General Pope, these very telegrams demonstrate 
•that all the time he did his whole duty. What 
more is wanted % Did not the authorities at Wash- 
ington think so % Why was it that the week after 
they put him in command of 18,00:) troops in 
the defense of the fortifications at Washington? 
Why was it that they left him in command after 
wards during the great battle of Antietam, and only 
checked his course when they were pursuing the 
enemy after Antietam down towards Fredericks- 
burg \ Those are questions that are very hard to 
answer. I do not wish to discuss this question of 
animus further. I only want to say that actions, 
as the Recorder says, speak louder than words, 
and if you want Porter's animus, you must find it 
in the whole history of his life ; you must find it 
in all his record from the time he left this Academy, 
all through the war with Mexico, upon the penin- 
sular where he achieved great and glorious deeds ; 
you must find it in that day of the 30th ; yes, and 
in this day of the 29th, which is among his proud- 
est, and will stand in history as one of his wisest 
and best days. 

In closing this case, I must refer, by way of gen- 
eral observation, to certain evidence that has been 
introduced unnecessarily, as it seems to me. The 
facts nobody can complain of ; but when it comes 
down to small scandals, is it not better to reject 
them, as Judge Advocate Holt rejected them— this 
evidence of Lord and Ormsby, and their absurd 
stories of what they say took place in Gene- 
ral Porter's quarters in Washington during his 
trial there. There he was one day in great 
excitement coming in from the trial. Do you 
doubt, on what you know now, that he had cause 
for immense excitement \ He is a very cool man, 
but do you question that his blood must have been 
up and that all there was in him of indignation and 



238 

rage was stirred to its utmost depths? Th*y said 
that they heard him saw " I war n't loyal to Pope. 
I was loyal to McClellan." Well, what was that* 
Was it addressed to them ? No ; it was an excla- 
mation, excited and wrathful. What did it mean? 
Did it not mean simply an outbreak of wrath, that he 
could not contain, at something that had been said 
or done at the court-martial that was trying him 
that da}'? Instead of being a statement, a proposi- 
tion, an admission, a confession, as it is claimed, 
it was a wrathful repudiation of the idea, 
and is incapable of any other construction. I will 
not dwell upon that. The Judge Advocate rejected 
it. Lord and Ormsby swore each other to secrecy, 
and then ran and told the Judge Advocate, and he 
treated it with the contempt that it deserved. Yet 
that which could not be used in the days of the 
heat and passion of war is brought in here to serve 
a. certain purpose, in this era of peace and good- 
will. Then, what do you think of Dr. Faxon's 
story? Was it necessary to bring in these absur- 
dities? Dr. Faxon who had heard that there was 
a charge against General Porter of being dilatory 
on the march from Warrenton Junction to Bristoe, 
comes and testifies that as he was marching along 
with his regiment, going through Bristoe, at 2 
o'clock in the afternoon, he passed where General 
Porter was standing at his headquarters with some 
gentlemen, one hundred feet oft", and although his 
regiment did not stop, although they went tramp- 
ing along on the road, he heard General Porter say 
to one of his aides that he "didn't care a damn if 
they didn't get there." But they had got to 
Bristoe already ; it was beyond Bristoe, at "2 o'clock, 
where General Porter had arrived at 8 in the morn- 
ing, that this took place. I think that Doctor had 
better have been left in charge of his patients in 
Massachusetts. Then, what do you think of John 
Bond ? He was sent to carry rations up the Sudley 



239 

road on the afternoon of the 29th, and he saw a 
man, who, somebody told him was General Porter, 
and General Porter asked him how the battle goes, 
and he made an explanation of how the battle 
went. He described General Porter's person, that 
he had a moustache and no beard, that he had a 
hat and a Major General 1 s uniform ; but it turns 
out that he had a cap and a full beard, and 
no Major-General's uniform at all. Now, might 
not John Bond have better been left carrying 
rations to the end of his days than to have been 
called here ? And Bowers, the scout. The learn- 
ed Recorder tries to find points of distinction 
between a scout and a spy. Well, Bowers was at 
head-quarters one day, when General Porter was 
surrounded by his staff. Porter says, " General 
Pope is coming through this command this after- 
noon, and I don't want any attention paid to him," 
absolutely denied by all the survivors of his staff. 
Was there ever any more ridiculous stuff than 
that sought to be imported into a serious contro- 
versy \ I suppose that all these Avitnesses are ab- 
solutely worthless, in every point of view. 

And now, if the Board please, enough has been 
said. 

The fate of the petitioner is in your hands. His 
sufferings under this sentence for the last six- 
teen years have been peculiar, unlike those that 
any other General or soldier has ever sustained. I 
do not propose to depict them ; they cannot be ex- 
aggerated by any language. Only eminent soldiers, 
such as compose this Board, can fully realize and 
appreciate them. He is not the only person who 
now stands awaiting your judgment ; not only he, 
but his family and his comrades in arms, that glor- 
ious Fifth Army Corps, which never yet met with- 
out re-affirming their faith in his innocence, the 
whole army, as I believe, and every faithful man who 



240 

has ever been connected with it,stands expecting and 
hoping for the restoration of his good name and 
fame ; because, it is not his good name and fame 
only that is concerned, but the army's and the 
country's. I believe that this nation is too great, 
that it is too magnanimous, to suffer the continua- 
tion of such a wrong when once it has been ascer- 
tained. If the exigencies of those times required 
that this shame and contumely should be borne by 
him during all this interval, his patriotism and his 
loyalty have stood the test. Nobody has ever 
heard a whisper or a murmur against his country, 
or its cause, from him. He has always been faith- 
ful. He knew, or hoped he knew, that time would 
bring his relief. There were historical instances 
which would justify the hope. There was the case 
of brave old Admiral Cochrane, Earl of Dundonald, 
who suffered a similar, but by no means equal 
ignominy, convicted of a crime of which he was 
wholly innocent and ignorant, in 1814 ; and he had 
to live until 1832, before the brand of infamy was 
taken from him. But the British nation was mag- 
nanimous, and restored him at last to all the honors 
and titles of which he had been unjustly deprived. 
If any such indirect purpose as I have referred 
to made Porter's punishment and humiliation 
necessary ; if he was a sacrifice to discipline, 
has it not answered its purpose? If it was neces- 
sary to strike down an innocent man to enforce 
discipline upon suspected men in the army of the 
Potomac, has it not done its work? Look at 
them under all commanders, before and cer- 
tainly afterwards — look at them from Antietam to 
the last struggles in the wilderness, under the suc- 
cessive commands of McClellan, Burnside, Hooker, 
Meade and Grant. When, anywhere, did a man of 
them fail to do his whole duty? 

We think the time has come at last for this 
gross wrong to the petitioner to be righted. He 
has looked for it hopefully and faithfully for 



241 

the last sixtee.n years. He has looked for it be- 
cause he was sure of his innocence, because he 
had absolute faith in his cause, faith in his coun- 
try, faith in justice, faith in God. The question 
now is, whether God and justice and country 
shall all forsake him. We have no fears. We 
leave the result confidently with you. It seems 
to me that the time and place are both propitious 
for his vindication. In ten days more will be the 
anniversary of his humiliation. Here, where his 
military life began, is the place where his star should 
be restored to its true and native lustre, and so in 
his name, and in the name of the brave army corps 
which he commanded, in the name of the army 
which he did his best to honor, in the name of 
truth insulted, and of justice outraged, we demand 
for the petitioner full and complete reparation. 



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